National Library
of Canada

Canadian Theses Service

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Service des thèses canadiennes

NOTICE

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, and subsequent amendments.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30, et ses amendements subséquents.

NL-339 (r. 88/04) c

Canada

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE ALBERTA FARMER-LABOUR PARTY: A STRUCTURATIONAL APPROACH TO THE HISTORY OF THE CO-OPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH FEDERATION IN ALBERTA, 1932 - 1962

BY

©

DAVID ALBERT KALES

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND
RESEARCH IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

(SPRING 1992)

National Library of Canada
Canadian Theses Service
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale du Canada
Service des thèses canadiennes

The author has granted an irrevocable non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested persons.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence irrévocable et non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de sa thèse de quelque manière et sous quelque forme que ce soit pour mettre des exemplaires de cette thèse à la disposition des personnes intéressées.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège sa thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

ISBN 0-315-73082-X

Canada

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

RELEASE FORM

NAME OF AUTHOR: DAVID ALBERT KALES

TITLE OF THESIS: THE ALBERTA FARMER-LABOUR PARTY: A STRUCTURATIONAL APPROACH TO THE HISTORY OF THE CO-OPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH FEDERATION IN ALBERTA, 1932 - 1962

DEGREE: MASTER OF ARTS

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED: 1992

Permission is hereby granted to the UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA LIBRARY to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly or scientific purposes only.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.

David A Kales
....
(Student's signature)

61 Glaewyn St.
St.-Albert, Alberta
....
(Student's permanent address)

Date: December 18, 1991

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis, entitled

THE ALBERTA FARMER-LABOUR PARTY: A STRUCTURATIONAL APPROACH TO THE HISTORY OF THE CO-OPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH FEDERATION IN ALBERTA, 1932 -1962

submitted by **DAVID ALBERT KALES** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of **MASTER OF ARTS**

....
C.M. Small
Associate Professor

D. T. Hall
....
David Hall
Professor (Supervisor)

....
P.J. Johnston
Associate Professor

....
R.C. Macleod
Professor

Date: October 2, 1991

In Memory of

Edward Albert Kales (1912-1984)

ABSTRACT

The Alberta Co-operative Commonwealth Federation existed as a political party from its inception in 1932 to its transformation into the Alberta New Democratic Party in 1962. It was established in 1932 as a continuation of political and social practices that characterized the relationship between the United Farmers of Alberta and the Canadian Labour Party (Alberta Section) throughout the 1920s and early 1930s. The new party was designed to reproduce these relationships and practices within a structured and functional institution - the Alberta CCF. The history of the political party, however, can largely be regarded as a struggle over the control and interpretation of the structuration process throughout the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. Attempts to institutionalize this process resulted in the amalgamation of the associate political organizations (UFA and CLP) into the CCF in 1942. The attempt to integrate socially and systemically the UFA and CLP into the Alberta CCF failed because of internal struggle between pro- and anti-CCF forces and external influences of Social Credit. The attempt to create a careful equilibrium between distinct factions broke down after the failures to achieve electoral success in the 1940s and 1950s. The political crises and organizational problems which developed within the Alberta CCF had their fundamental origins in the social and political relationships which were produced when the CCF was formed in Calgary in August 1932. This thesis studies the underlying causes and implications of the structurational decline of the Alberta CCF as a political party.

"The modern prince, the myth-prince, cannot be a real person, a concrete individual. It can only be an organism, a complex element of society in which a collective will, which has already been recognized and has to some extent asserted itself in action, begins to take concrete form. History has already provided this organism, and it is the political party - the first cell in which there come together germs of a collective will tending to become universal and total."

Antonio Gramsci
"The Modern Prince"

Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci
Edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. New York: International Publishers, 1971. P. 129.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Firstly, I wish to acknowledge the painstaking advice, encouragement and patience of my supervisor, Dr. David J. Hall, throughout the research and writing of this thesis. Secondly, I must acknowledge the assistance and comments of several close confidants and co-workers: Glenn Foulds, Robert Hesketh, Robert Irwin, Steve Boddington, Eric Gormley, Juliette M. Champagne, Tony Hollihan and Sean Moir. Their intellectual company has been stimulating and inspiring.

The assistance of several librarians and archivists throughout Canada and Great Britain deserve notice. In particular, the staff of the Provincial Archives of Alberta, the Glenbow Alberta Institute Archives, City of Edmonton Archives, the University of British Columbia Special Collections, the National Library of Canada, the National Archives of Canada, Ontario Archives, the British Museum Library and the British Labour Party Archive have been most helpful and encouraging. Their assistance in producing material for my research has been immeasurable, and comments and suggestions helpful in the overall context of the Party's history.

Dr. Ged Martin of the Centre of Canadian Studies at the University of Edinburgh must be thanked for his continued interest in my academic future.

Throughout the long excruciating process of research and writing, the patience and support of my family was deeply appreciated. Without the love and support of my sisters, nieces, brother-in-law and especially my mother this thesis would never have been completed.

My committee members - Paul Johnston, Carola Small and Rod McLeod - must be thanked for their many questions and comments regarding this thesis and its contents.

Finally, I must thank Glenn B. Foulds for his crucial editorial assistance in the final stages of the preparation of this thesis. His comments were always helpful and encouraging.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I. Introduction: Political Party History, Approaches and Postulates 1
References 211

II. Towards the United Front Party: The Alberta CCF and Social Reproduction, 1907-1935 38
References 222

III. Building the Party: The Alberta CCF and Social-System Integration, 1935-1942 93
References 238

IV. Towards Crisis: The Alberta Farmer-Labour Party, Social Conflict and System Contradiction, 1942-1949 134
References 247

V. The Alberta Farmer-Labour Party in Crisis: Social Conflict and System Dysfunction, 1949-1962 171
References 259

VI. Conclusion: Towards an Historical Ontology of Political Parties: The Case of the CCF in Alberta 195
References 267

BIBLIOGRAPHY 268

APPENDIX 291

ABBREVIATIONS

CCF - Co-operative Commonwealth Federation
CEA - City of Edmonton Archives
CLP - Canadian Labour Party (Alberta Section)
CPC - Communist Party of Canada
BLP - British Labour Party
DLP - Dominion Labour Party
ERA - Economic Reconstruction Association
GAIA - Glenbow Alberta Institute Archives
ILP - Independent Labour Party
LPP - Labour Progressive Party
LSR - League for Social Reconstruction
NAC - National Archives of Canada
NLC - National Library of Canada
PAA - Provincial Archives of Alberta
SPC - Socialist Party of Canada
UBCSC - University of British Columbia Special Collections
UFA - United Farmers of Alberta

Chapter I

Introduction: Political Party History, Approaches and Postulates

Structure, Function and System: Theoretical Postulates and Historiography of Political Parties

An examination of the literature on political parties suggests several conclusions. The literature in the social sciences is extensive, but most studies tend to concentrate on specific political parties within temporal and spatial borders. Approaches to political party studies have shifted since the early 20th century from an emphasis on the political party as an organization, with unique organizational dynamics, to concern about political culture and systems. The party, once the perfect medium for studying politics, has become little more than an adjunct to studies dealing with various types of systems. Forgotten in this trend is the understanding that political parties are social institutions and organizations. Moreover, the new social history has almost completely ignored political parties as frameworks for popular political activity and involvement.[1]

One reason for the lack of interest in political parties from an organizational point of view is that the traditional authorities on organizational theory had a pervasive influence on the subsequent literature. The works of Ostrogorski, Weber, Michels and Duverger deal with political parties and their activities from the standpoint of the organizational core and its dynamics.[2] Despite the wide variety of theoretical works by sociologists on the nature of organizations, little has been done on the theory of political parties.[3] In the western hemisphere, the study of political parties has been dominated by Michels and Duverger. Michels' analysis of the oligarchical party, however, has gone relatively unquestioned by political scientists and historians.[4]

Thus, political scientists and historians turned away from political parties as organizations and tended to concentrate on developing models concerning party structures and electoral dynamics, and explaining relationships between parties and social classes. In Canada, political systems, as areas of analysis, have become more important than parties.[5]

Scholars have pointed to the need for a precise definition of political parties as one specific problem in the literature. According to Giovanni Sartori, there is a need to define exactly what a "political party" is within historical and political science literature.[6] The proposed definition had to include reference to the actors (the members, supporters and leaders), actions and activities, consequences of actions and the domain in which the party operates. Moreover, one defines parties according to function, structure and systems.

A number of political scientists and sociologists have concentrated on the functions and goals of political parties resulting in extensive literature on party classifications according to goals and aims. In terms of functional analysis, the key question discussed is whether the party is the instrument of its internal membership or is the leadership primarily responsive to the electorate. With regards to the latter approach, Michels' dictum of the "iron law of oligarchy" has been extensively studied.[7] His arguments moved party theorists towards an analysis of the structural components instead of its functional components. Michels perceives that the party would be the tool of the membership in the expectation that the entire electorate would be incorporated into parties.[8]

In any definition of a political party, there remains the problem of exclusion. From what other organizational or operational tendencies do parties need to be distinguished, and on what basis? In terms of role, how do parties differ from other organizations? The first task of definition is to delimit the political party. The party differs from a faction, political movement and political association. This brings into question the whole approach of differentiation and the origins of parties.[9] Within the evolutionary approach to party formation, at what stage do political movements become political parties and how could the two be characterized and distinguished? The second task is to define the party. Basic definitions of political parties take on either structural and functional hues. According to Harold Lasswell, a political party comprises a "group formulating comprehensive issues and submitting candidates in elections."[10] The party secures and exercises power through the formal co-ordination of votes. Non-formal political organizations, pressure groups, revolutionary parties and factions are excluded from this functional definition.[11] Fred Riggs notes that any organization that nominates candidates for election to an assembly could be typified as a political party. This definition is structural and not functional because the basis for classification remains the structural criterion.[12] Kenneth Janda understands political parties to be organizations that "pursue the goal of placing their avowed representatives in government positions."[13] The crucial criteria include the electoral process (inter-party competition) and the placement of representatives in governmental positions by direct act of designation.[14]

Sartori's definition is that a political party is a political group "identified by an official label that presents at elections and is capable of placing through elections candidates for public office." The major criterion is that of electoral significance. Sartori continues to uphold the functional approach to politics where the actions of political bodies determine their composition. The need for a minimal definition, according to Sartori, fulfills the singular purpose of identifying the object. It serves only to differentiate a political party from something else for comparative purposes. He argues that political scientists and historians cannot build a theory of political party and party systems unless it is established "what is not a party".

Serious conceptual difficulties begin when scholars differentiate between political movements and political parties, as in the case of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation and Social Credit League. The use of restrictive operational definitions, such as those offered by Sartori and Janda, tends to lead to an evolutionary analysis of a political organization from movement to party in an explanatory mode similar to that of Michels. This results in a unilinear dysfunctional approach to party history. The question should not be what parties are for, but why parties are born, and what is born under that name.

Political parties are organizations and ought to be studied using various methodologies. Scholars in Europe are beginning to resurrect organizational studies of political parties incorporating the structure, function and activities of political organizations in terms of alliances and struggles for power among different participants.[15] Political organizations have a series of characteristics imposed by "structural-technical imperatives" including the need for a division of labour, co-ordination between different offices, and specialization in relations with an external environment.

Angelo Panebianco understands the most crucial element in any study of political parties is the dynamics of the struggle for power within an organization.[16] This struggle offers the key for understanding the functioning and development of a political organization.[17] Like Michels and Feliks Gross, Panebianco understands that the activities of political parties serve to guarantee, perpetuate or increase the social power of those who control them.[18] According to sociologist Charles Perrow,

> organizations are tools for shaping the world as one wants it to be shaped. They provide the means for imposing one's definition of the proper affairs of men upon other men.[19]

The emergence of a new political organization, such as the CCF or Social Credit, can bring about a broadening of the boundaries of the political system. Moreover, the emergence brings about the rise of a new "power elite" that replaces the existing group or allies with them. This kind of perception of political parties and their role within the larger social and political environment refers back to

Michels' view of parties as instruments for the maintenance and widening of power of some men over others.[20] The basic omission from the theoretical literature on political parties is an examination of the formational development of these organizations and its repercussions. This formative phase in party development is minimized by Michels and Duverger. The different strategies and tactics undertaken in the formative phase influences and conditions the later life of the organization.[21] The political choices made by the founders, the initial struggles for organizational control and the way in which the organization was formed "will leave an indelible mark. Few aspects of an organization's functioning and current tensions appear comprehensible if not traced to its formative phase."[22]

This kind of analysis - organizational history - has its theoretical problems. Studying one political party in relative isolation from others specifically and from the political culture in general freezes the environment with an extremely narrow focus. A certain level of political development and modernization is assumed in the period in which the political party is examined.[23] A further problem relates to the differences between North American and European political cultures in relation to the creation and development of political parties.

Several key considerations must be examined concerning the organizational development and evolution of political parties. Firstly, the organizational order of a party must be examined with reference to the mechanisms and approaches used to deal with the innumerable pressures and challenges of the political environment. Secondly, how do political parties become "institutionalized" and the theoretical problems it embraces. Thirdly, specific organizational problems, such as size, division of labour, organizational complexity, role of environmental influences and pressures, and features of party bureaucracy must be addressed. Finally, the processes of organizational change through periods of a party's development must be considered.

According to William Crotty, "party organizational analysis ... is one of the oldest in party research and one of the most frustrating."[24] In many studies, historical and political studies of parties are inconsistent. Many political scientists believe that political parties are nothing more than the manifestations of social divisions in the political arena. Conflicts both outside and within political parties are seen as conflicts between representatives of different social interests.[25] This trend emphasizes the divergences between the composition of a party's electoral following and that of its members, as well as between membership and leadership caused by distortions in the representation of social interests.[26]

These studies do not contribute much to an understanding of party functioning.[27] The political party is not a mechanical mirror of the social system at large, either in its organization or in its politics. Moreover, the party is a producer of inequalities within its own structure.[28] The political party "is a system which is at least partly autonomous vis-à-vis social inequalities, and the tensions that often persist within it are primarily the product of such a system."[29]

Another basic problem with political party analysis is the **a priori** acceptance of party goals and purposes. The goals of the party determine its activities and organizational characteristics, Party studies measure the discrepancies between the goals and party behaviour towards the realization of them.[30] Parties are organizations formed to achieve specific goals, they are strictly committed to the realization of these goals, and historians and researchers can easily identify them. The assumption is made that the party's stated objectives represent its most characteristic features and are most influential in moulding its structure and mode of action.[31]

A political party is defined in a narrow limited manner by Feliks Gross as

> an organized group oriented towards political goals, that attempts by its actions to maintain the status quo or to change the existing social, economic and political conditions by means of

> influencing attainment or the conquest of political power.[32]

Presumptions are made that political parties are goal-oriented groups and that "declared goals" are "real goals" to which party activities must be oriented.[33] Parties studied as part of party systems tend to postulate minimal definitions of the goals common to all parties.[34] They are organizations pursuing the aim of electoral victory as a means of political power.

This analysis is insufficient because, as Michels points out, political parties regularly adopt ideological policies and undertake courses of action certain to minimize their chances of electoral success (as in the case of marxist parties).[35] The uses of the Michels' argument in the literature on socialist and labour parties tend to overemphasize political ideology and policy as an explanation of electoral failure.[36] The attribution of goals to parties as an explanation of party behaviour, internally and externally, is part of a larger analysis of the relationship that exists between goals and activities in a complex organization.

While the notion of political parties as organizations has been readily accepted in the literature, debate still surrounds whether they are institutions.[37] Stuart Huntington notes that institutions are organizations that have "stable, valued, recurring patterns of behaviour."[38]

The concept of institution, referring to "an established organization or corporation", implies a general hierarchy of organizations based upon complexity and extent of structure.[39] However, social theorists denote an institution to be characterized by specified normative patterns whose

> successive survival is influenced by how it is rooted in a community's life-world tradition, by enforcement through the mobilization of power and through charisma, and by adaptation to situational changing learning experiences, interests and utility calculations.[40]

The Parsonian analysis of institutions (as organizations) implies a theoretical frame of reference based upon the construction of an idealistic model of how political and social institutions were to be structured and functional. Studies of institutions (political or otherwise) could not be restricted to levels of structures, interests and power relationships nor to individual action. If institutions were to be seen as meaningful structures interrelating with other meaningful structures, then a more comprehensive approach had to be developed.[41]

A functional approach to institutions and organizations involves examining relationships between the attainment of goals and the fulfilment of required functions within a system. If the institution is able to maintain goal attainment constantly, then the functional existence of the structures required for such a purpose can be described. Functionally examining a political party involves viewing it as the normative pattern of a concrete system of interactions related to one particular goal (the function) and indicating which structures (patterns of interaction) are needed to be developed in order to achieve the goal (or fulfil the function).[42] The extent of the institution's goal attainment can be ascertained by a measure of how marked the required patterns of interaction are. Thus, structures within institutions are nothing more than normalized patterns of interaction required for a specific functional purpose.

Approaches to Party History

How then can political parties be studied? From the foregoing discussion, a number of theoretical postulates can be stated with regards to our historical examination of the Alberta Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. Firstly, the political party is a social system and should be considered the basic unit of historical analysis. This does not imply that other political groupings and parties will be dismissed as having no effect at all. The conceptualization that a systems approach must be upheld in order to study the existence of an unique political party is rejected. The political party is a system in itself involving the patterning of social relations, understood as reproduced practices. Moreover, the definition of a political party as a system does not involve any crucial degree of "systemness". The unity of the system involves, on the one hand, reciprocity between individuals and groups within the party, and on the other the normative reproduction of the system.

Secondly, the political party as a social system is composed of individual actors who are fully rational and cognizant. In other words, the social system (the party) depends solely upon the capability actors maintain and exercise to "make a difference" in the production of certain outcomes.[43]

Thirdly, the study of the political party involves a discussion of structures. Within the context of structuration, structures exist only insofar as they are involved in the production or reproduction of the political party as a social system. Moreover, structures can be regarded as rules and resources which supporters, members, activists and leaders use to reproduce the social systems of which they are a part. Structural properties of a political party are basic principles of organization and may be informally or formally used in social relationships and processes that occur within the party and between the party and the outside environment. Because the connection between the individual and the political party is contingent upon the continual production and reproduction of social interaction within the confines of the party, the political party has a dualistic structure that connects this production to the reproduction of the social system spatially and temporally.

Fourthly, the study of a political party involves the study of conditions governing the continuity, change or dissolution of the party as a social system. Whereas the functionalist school emphasizes progress and evolution the structurational approach affirms that the relationship between production and reproduction involved in the duality of structure implies that change is present throughout. Moreover, all reproduction is contingent upon processes over which the political party may have no control. How the political party chooses to deal with these external processes depends on the production and reproduction of social processes within the party. The range of activities accorded to individuals within the social system is always dependent upon unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences of actions.

Fifth, the political party as a social system can be analysed in terms of its social integration (the level of reciprocity of relationships and practices between individuals) and system integration (relations between collectivities). The degree of integration (social or system) may involve an analysis of social conflict (a division of interest and struggle over power and resources) and system contradiction (an opposition or disjunction between the structural principles of a social system). In the analysis of these elements of a political party, the social involvement of individuals as agents must be paramount.

Historiography of the Alberta CCF

The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) has been one of the most extensively studied phenomena in Canadian history and political science almost since its inception. Following the victory of the CCF in Saskatchewan in 1944, scholars in North America took particularly keen interest in it. The literature on the CCF in Alberta is, however, not as extensive as one could wish. Myron Johnson's 1974 thesis covers only the period between 1932 and 1935 and details the interrelationship between the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA) and the CCF.[44] Bruce Monkhouse followed with his thesis on the Alberta NDP nine years later.[45] The articles by Alvin Finkel, Olenka Melnyk, Larry Pratt, Robin Hunter and Frederick Engelmann provide some examination of the turbulent history of the Alberta CCF.[46] However, in comparison with other provincial CCF parties, there is, as yet, no exhaustive examination of the movement and party in Alberta.[47]

There is a trend in the historiography of the movement and party pertaining to the CCF in Alberta. In the general monographical literature[48], Alberta is mentioned frequently as both the birthplace of the national movement (Calgary, 1932) and one of the most fertile grounds for expansion and success.[49] After the defeat of the UFA in 1935 and the rise of the provincial and federal Social Credit fewer references are made to the Alberta CCF and its prominent leaders. The entire focus of the CCF seems to be shifted towards Ontario and Quebec, and in accounts of party history nationally prominent Alberta CCF leaders such as William Irvine, Elmer Roper, Fred White, Norman Priestley, Robert Gardiner, E. J. Garland and Henry Spencer are eclipsed by M. J. Coldwell, David Lewis, James S. Woodsworth, Thomas C. Douglas and Elmore Philpott. By the late 1940s the Alberta CCF hardly exists in the established historiography.

One Albertan who predominates is William Irvine. Second only to Woodsworth, the founder of the CCF, Irvine is discussed in the literature solely in terms of his national significance instead of his role in building the Alberta CCF.[50] The reason is an increased centralization of the CCF in Ontario and the disregarding of Alberta because of the strangle-hold of the Social Credit League. This does not do justice to the progressive men and women who kept alive the democratic socialist dream in Alberta throughout the 1940s and 1950s.

Another aspect of the historiography that has not encouraged extensive coverage of the Alberta CCF is the need to examine the CCF in the context of Alberta political culture and the Social Credit phenomenon. A generation of scholars in the 1940s and 1950s scrutinized Alberta political culture, largely under the guidance of S.D. Clark.[51] Possibly the most significant result of these studies lies in the conclusions of C.B. Macpherson, who writes in Democracy in Alberta that Alberta political culture consisted of independent commodity producers, a dominant petit-bourgeois culture and a quasi-party political structure that effectively eliminated the chances that a democratic socialist movement had to develop and grow. Socialism and radicalism could not flourish in such a unique political and cultural framework. However one views the merits of Macpherson's arguments in any discussion of the Alberta CCF, one must come to terms with the arguments theoretically.

The primary thesis concerning the CCF in Alberta originated with Myron Johnson. He maintains that the CCF failed because of an "accident of history." Examining the social and economic conditions of Alberta during the first half of the 1930s and Alberta's radical past and the success of the Social Credit movement, Johnson disputes the theory of Macpherson that Alberta political culture in the 1930s was inherently antisocialist; instead, it was the association of the CCF with a "doomed" UFA government leading to the elimination of the UFA in the provincial and federal elections of 1935. The failure of CCF was not "virtually inevitable" but had much to do with political circumstances beyond the control of individual leaders.[52] Moreover, Social Credit "was **viewed as a radical alternative** to the government".[53] To Johnson, Social Credit was similar to the CCF as a radical movement, advocating drastic measures to counter the economic and social effects of the depression. Such an anti-establishment platform appealed to both parties and the same kind of voter - "the dissatisfied and the have-nots".[54] Johnson's conclusions attribute a great deal of significance to "accidents of history".

In terms of the Alberta CCF, the crucial circumstance of politics is the fact that the CCF was associated with the UFA, at a time when a UFA government was in power and in public disfavour. This presented the CCF with a dilemma that proved fatal. It could not run against the government, yet it could not persuade the government to adopt its program. The CCF did not represent an alternative to the government, a competing socialist program, nor a viable organization (since the CCF was not running in the election), and yet it suffered from the UFA government's handling of the Depression and the government scandals. This clearly left Social Credit to run as the alternative to the government.[55]

According to Johnson, the CCF-UFA affiliation continued to damage CCF hopes in Alberta after the 1935 election. It was not until 1939 that the CCF was able to throw off the UFA and operate provincially as a distinct political party. However, the Alberta CCF, according to Johnson, could not function as an adequate opposition to Social Credit because, as late as 1940, Social Credit was still perceived to be the "people's party" by Alberta voters. By 1938, Social Credit was beginning to lose credibility because of its failure to implement promised radical social credit legislation. Some Social Crediters were turning to the CCF as the only alternative. Yet the CCF could not muster enough votes in the 1940 provincial general election to win one seat. In addition, Johnson states that the general prosperity that existed in the 1940s provided a further explanation for Social Credit success and CCF failure.[56]

The oil boom may very well explain the lack of success for the CCF in the latter half of the 1940s and early 1950s, but Johnson has trouble analysing the period between 1935 and 1944. Aberhart managed to defuse internal political opposition and maintain political power by introducing half-hearted social credit measures and using the Second World War to denounce the CCF as unpatriotic. Rural over-representation, the electoral system, and the supposed ideological purity of the Alberta CCF movement also assisted Social Credit in the provincial elections.[57] Johnson cites the case of the Saskatchewan CCF which incorporated Social Credit elements into a "united progressive front" in the election of 1944, in contrast to CCF opposition to Social Credit policies in Alberta.[58]

Still, Johnson's original argument is that it is the relationship between the UFA and CCF that affected both potential voter support and activity in the period after 1935. The Alberta CCF, he argues, faced "serious weaknesses and problems of its own" including its war policy, lack of an electable issue, lack of visibility and recognition, and lack of political preparation because of the inhibiting effect of its association with the UFA.[59]

Johnson's analysis must be reevaluated within the larger political environment. Between 1935 and 1944, the CCF in Alberta was highly visible with the presence of William Irvine, Elmer Roper and Chester Ronning. As a result of the relationship with the Alberta Labour Party, the Alberta CCF was able to muster a considerable propaganda edge over its more established Liberal and

Conservative opposition parties. In 1936, the CCF began to publish its own weekly paper, the People's Weekly (formerly the Alberta Labor News).

Bruce Monkhouse rejects Johnson's thesis and re-examines Alberta political culture for an explanation of the historical weakness of democratic socialism in Alberta. His understanding was that the electoral history of the provincial CCF in Alberta "has largely been one of frustration".[60] An Alberta political culture predominantly supporting individualism and free enterprise was inhospitable to socialism.[61] The culture of Alberta has "historically predisposed a substantial segment of the electorate to support the political right".[62] During the Depression, disastrous socio-economic conditions and strong feelings of alienation and resentment towards established political parties lent potential for support of radical political alternatives.[63] According to Monkhouse, Alberta political history, with the exception of the UFA period, is noted for its consistency in supporting political parties of the right.[64] The lack of success of the CCF in Alberta stems from the fact that its ideological **raisons d'etre** are consistently in conflict with mainstream political opinion.

Johnson's "accident of history" theory is insufficient to account for the continued failure of the CCF. Whereas ideological orientation does not play a role in Johnson's theory, Monkhouse argues that since the beginning of the Second World War and prosperity, support for conservative political values and policies has gone almost unchallenged.[65] Although Johnson is correct in perceiving the non-traditional political heritage of Alberta through the Non-Partisan League, the UFA and Social Credit, Monkhouse states "the dramatic changes that began after 1935 made it highly unlikely that **a party that was seen to be on the far left** of the Alberta political spectrum could have succeeded".[66] By the early 1940s, Alberta political culture was biased against the left. Ernest Manning conducted the 1944 provincial election, for example, on the basis of free enterprise versus socialism:

> It was largely Manning's ability to appeal to certain **latent concerns and fears** of the Province's farmers and workers that in effect dissuaded a number of voters from supporting the C.C.F." [67]

The religious fundamentalism and a general antipathy for the political left "clearly did not contribute much support for the radical positions of the Alberta CCF".[68]

Monkhouse sees Social Credit, at least under Manning, as underscoring the importance of resource development, governmental non-intervention, individualism, conservatism and moralism.[69] He disputes the arguments made by Johnson that Social Credit was a radical movement and emphasizes the fact that Alberta's long history of religious fundamentalism tended to favour pro-establishment politics and preferred conventional institutions and organizations.[70] Thus, there was and still is a "fundamental contradiction" between the social, cultural and economic makeup of Alberta and the platform and ideology of the CCF.[71] Monkhouse argues that the CCF was not successful in Alberta because it could never become anything more than an erratic fringe political group.

Monkhouse prefers to see Social Credit as an extreme conservative political movement. A recent trend in Social Credit historiography interprets the movement as radical and leftist, at least initially.[72] Social Credit was radical populist, attractive to dispossessed farmers and laborers alike. Perhaps it was an "accident of history" that allowed Social Credit, instead of the CCF, to be the major progressive vehicle of political discontent. Undoubtedly its connection with the decaying United Farmers of Alberta did not help the cause of the Alberta CCF. Monkhouse forgets or ignores the fact that the Canadian Labour Party also formed part of the Alberta CCF along with the General Membership Section or Clubs Section.[73] Furthermore, both Johnson and Monkhouse appear to overlook the Alberta CCF erosion of Social Credit support in the period after 1937 because of the "backbenchers' revolt". Whereas Social Credit membership dwindled from 41 000 in

1937 to a low of 3 500 in 1942, the Alberta CCF grew from 2 000 in 1935 to 12 000 in 1944.[74] The drop in membership in the Social Credit League reflected the disillusionment with failed progressive policies and with Aberhart's dictatorial leadership.[75] Alvin Finkel observes that the Social Credit League began its existence as a broadly based secular radical-reformist party.[76] The whole character of the movement changed rapidly when Aberhart died and E.C. Manning became premier in 1943. For example, multinational oil companies lined up beside the Social Credit administration against the attacks of the Alberta CCF in the 1944 provincial election. After the purge of the evangelical Douglasites in the late 1940s, the League came under the unquestioned control of Manning.[77]

Alvin Finkel examines both the Alberta Co-operative Commonwealth Federation[78] and the Canadian Labour Party (Alberta Section).[79] According to Finkel, the loose coalition of the provincial wing of the Canadian Labour Party and the UFA made it impossible for the CCF to directly enter the 1935 provincial election. Although the Party reorganized between 1939 and 1942 giving it a broader base and distinct political identity, it was never able to present a legitimate challenge to Social Credit. The provincial CCF, contends Finkel, was "still born" as a result of the 1935 election.[80] Social Credit succeeded partly because the Alberta CCF failed to capture the imagination of the public.

One major weakness of the CCF movement, exploited by Social Credit, was its elitism. The leaders of the new movement were the ideological spokespersons of the UFA (e.g., Irvine and Priestley) and the CLP (e.g., Alexander, Mentz and Crawford). After 1940, the Alberta CCF experienced a democratic reorganization but between 1932 and 1940 it was "a vague entity in Alberta politics, with no provincial programme and few members affiliated directly to the party."[81] Finkel agrees with Johnson that the affiliations of the UFA and CLP with the CCF "proved to be its [CCF] undoing." The leaders of the labour and agrarian components of the Alberta federation were unwilling to sacrifice their existing organizations to the common cause.[82] Undoubtedly, given the impact of the Social Credit movement within the United Farmers of Alberta, the Labour Party was more active within the provincial CCF than the UFA.[83]

Finkel questions whether the development of a grass-roots socialist organization could have forestalled the rise of Social Credit. There was considerable interest in the radical manifesto of the UFA and the platform of the CCF.[84] The Labour Party was extensively active not only in urban areas, but also rural areas adjacent to cities.

However, the CCF failed to capitalize upon the increasing disenchantment with Social Credit in the latter half of the 1930s.[85] What was left of the United Farmers of Alberta split almost evenly between the CCF on the left and the People's League on the right.[86] The political destabilization within Alberta between 1937 and 1944 resulted in the reorganization of the Alberta CCF in 1939 and 1942. The movement desired to distinguish itself from the reformist Social Credit under Aberhart and Manning by maintaining its ideological purity.[87] The subsequent failure to co-operate with the Labour Progressive Party (Communist Party) in 1944 resulted in the election of only two MLAs.[88] The failure of the party to even achieve the status of Official Opposition led to disillusionment of the CCF after 1944. According to Finkel, the slow start during the Depression and the inability to translate significant popular support into legislative seats in 1944 left the party with

> too weak a base to withstand the ideological onslaught of the Social Credit Party, which had shed its radical depression image for the mantle of a free enterprise party which was guiding Alberta into a period of seemingly unending economic growth and prosperity.[89]

Finkel, like Monkhouse, believes that the Alberta CCF was "a non-entity in Alberta politics".[90]

Another factor in the electoral failure of the Alberta CCF stemmed from the decline of the Labour Party in the

1930s. After the expulsion of the Communists in 1929, the Labour Party concentrated exclusively on electoral activity and collaboration with agrarians. With the Party becoming the "private preserve" of union bureaucrats and socialist intellectuals, a political vacuum developed in Alberta filled by Social Credit.[91] Union leaders became hesitant when the CLP entered into an alliance with the UFA to form the CCF in 1932/33. After 1935, direct links with unions became "unstuck" when affiliations were withdrawn. The Labour Party had hoped, in the 1930s, to act as an unifying force among all sections of the working class but "degenerated into a small, aging [sic] sect whose continuous existence inhibited the CCF's attempts to create a unitary organization".[92] By the time the CLP submerged completely into the CCF in 1942 the CLP had disintegrated into a small shell of its former self. Labour leaders were unimpressed by the provincial CCF and desired to maintain an arm's-length relationship with that organization.[93]

According to Olenka Melnyk, the Johnson thesis has been largely discredited by historians, but its key significance is that the UFA "did more to bury the CCF cause than its worst enemy".[94] It was highly possible that the UFA would not have survived the Depression as a political party and government, even if Social Credit had not made its appearance. However, the UFA's flirtation with social credit monetary theories "seriously undermined the CCF's chances in Alberta".[95] To the average prairie farmer, argues Olenka Melnyk, there was no difference between the CCF and Social Credit; however, it is clear to her that the CCF existed to restructure the existing political and economic system whereas Social Credit sought to make capitalism uniquely Albertan and more effective.[96] The historical controversy over whether Social Credit was a right-wing movement or a left-wing movement has everything to do with interpretations about the failure or survival of democratic socialism in Alberta.

Melnyk reiterates the traditional interpretation that a combination of factors - political culture, lack of a charismatic leader and its radicalism - led to the CCF's continued failure. According to Melnyk, the trouble with the CCF in Alberta was that it "was not dangling 25 bucks in front of voters' noses. And then there was the bogey of socialism." Fiercely independent, prairie farmers had always been deeply suspicious of the whole notion of public ownership, particularly of land. The press, big business and opposition parties capitalized on these fears, doing all they could to convince the public that a CCF government would confiscate "everything from their farms to their toothbrushes".[97]

Factors beyond the control of the CCF - the electoral system and the political culture - worked against the party.[98] Rather pessimistically, Melnyk and others accepted the interpretation that the

> party never recovered [from the 1944 provincial election] but slowly slid towards political oblivion. The virulent anti-communist hysteria of the Cold War years sadly infected the beleaguered CCF Party in Alberta, effectively destroying party unity"[99]

Robin Hunter takes a more positive view of the party, stating that it was the largest (and at times only) opposition party in the province, replacing the UFA while the Conservatives and Liberals collapsed.[100] He raises an important question of whether the political machinery in place in Alberta in the early 1940s was organizationally capable of handling 12000 members and running two electoral campaigns months apart. The implication is the National Office and David Lewis (National Secretary) ought to have taken more responsibility for the fiasco in 1944.

Hunter applies a marxist analysis that stems from Macpherson, and Richards and Pratt.[101] Mechanization, urbanization and modernization in the late 1940s and early 1950s expressed itself ideologically in the decline of populism and expansion of the capitalist outlook in society.[102] The ideological pressures demoralized the Alberta CCF resulting in fatalism and a move away from practical politics towards utopian rationalism.[103] According to Hunter,

> there was little feel [sic] that the party's activity in itself was a factor in the party's fate, and the sense that a socialist movement could only be successful "when the time was ripe" was often expressed."[104]

This same tendency is noted by Larry Pratt.[105] The new modern leaders of democratic socialism in Alberta - Neil Reimer, Ivor Dent and Grant Notley - sought to emphasize practical political and organizational tasks instead of theoretical debate and education. In a sense, Grant Notley's contribution to democratic socialism in Alberta was to complete the transition of the Alberta CCF from movement to political party.[106]

Frederick Engelmann returns to a discussion of Alberta political culture, analysing Macpherson, Pratt and Richards.[107] Through an examination of political developments in Alberta history, Engelmann firmly states that Alberta during the 1920s and 1930s had a "left-of-centre government" and a quasi-party system dominated by the left.[108] This places serious doubt on the interpretation that Alberta political culture was predominantly right-of-centre and that Social Credit, the "illegitimate heir" of the UFA, was a right-wing movement.

Structurational Approach to Party History

The Alberta Co-operative Commonwealth Federation as a political party can be examined from several points of view. Traditional forms of political analysis include studies of party organization, structure, activities and leadership ("micro-analysis"), and the overall political culture.[109] Political parties are also changing social subculture, constantly evolving and devolving because of conflicting personalities, ideologies and environments, both internally and externally. It is a social form that can be analysed independently of all external elements. The party can operate, within a spatial/temporal framework and in relationship with other forces, as a form of mini-society.[110] In this case, the political party becomes an historical system and the central object of our study.

Certain elements make this methodological task difficult. The Alberta CCF as a political party has a structure that functions within a larger environment. Consideration of these elements (structure, function and system) distances us from the role that individuals play. The gap between structure and function must be bridged to provide a conceptual means for analysing the role individuals play in historical events. Moreover, reference must be given to the constant interrelationship between the individual, the unit of analysis and the overall system.

Interpretation of the significance and role of the Alberta Co-operative Commonwealth Federation must hinge on how the political party is perceived, how it is studied across space and time, and how it relates to other elements within the political and social system. Structurational analysis, as developed by Anthony Giddens, provides an appropriate epistemological framework within which to study the Alberta CCF as a political party.[111] According to Giddens, the basic domain of study is neither the experiences of individuals nor the existence of any form of societal totality, but "social practices ordered across space and time."[112] Any form of human activity, whether political or social, individual or collective, organized or anarchistic, involves a certain degree of rationalization and cognition on behalf of the human actors. Moreover, human action, as expressed through various social structures (such as political parties) occurs "as a durée, a continuous flow of conduct."[113] These actions, taken collectively, form the basic framework for social structures and can be seen as "embedded sets of processes".[114] Structuration involves perceiving social systems in structural terms - as a complex patterning of social relations or social phenomena.[115] The social system is composed of the situational activities of human agents, reproduced across time and space.[116] Applying structuration to a political party, as a social system, implies studying the modes in which such systems are produced and reproduced in interaction, internally and externally. Such activity is patterned (produced) and reproduced according to rules and resources in the diversity of action contexts. Moreover, in order not to emphasize one element over another, a duality of structure ensures that the structural properties of social systems are both the medium and outcome of the practices they organize.

The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in Alberta can be perceived as a social system that was produced as a result of political relationships between individuals and collectivities. Those patterns of relationships were reproduced forming structures in the form of party functions, organs and institutions, which serve to continue the reproduction of such relationships over time and space. These structures, as they exist in a certain temporal environment, can be examined as normative rules and resources. The relationships between individuals within the party are restrained by knowledgeability and practical consciousness, which is a form of reproduction of earlier forms of consciousness. Studying the structuration of a social system, like a political party, involves considering the conditions governing their continuity, change and dissolution. The concept of duality of structure implies that change is present throughout the constitution of social systems. All forms of social reproduction are contingent and historical, subject both to unexpected change because of unconscious sources of cognition and motivation, and social conflict within the system and system contradictions between systems.

The aim of this thesis is to present the Alberta Co-operative Commonwealth Federation as a political party, from conception to death, using as a theoretical approach the structurational theory of Anthony Giddens. This approach makes it possible to examine how and why the Alberta CCF was formed, the difficulties experienced in its earlier periods in attempting to bring together and finally co-opt the United Farmers of Alberta and the Canadian Labour Party into an united political party of the left, and the roots of the decay and internal collapse. Throughout, the CCF is examined as a social system. The party did become involved in electoral politics with its competitors. The failures in the 1940s and 1950s to achieve electoral success had severe repercussions on the party internal equilibrium, but the crises and problems which developed within the party had their fundamental origins in the social and political relationships which were produced when the CCF was formed in Calgary in August 1932. This analysis does not neglect or reject the external environment of the Alberta party "system" or "culture", but attempts to develop an approach and model of how political parties should be studied historically.

Chapters II and III examine the formation of the Alberta CCF and the initial attempts to create a left-wing united front political party in Alberta between 1932 and 1942. The Alberta CCF can be perceived as a logical extension of previous political efforts to consolidate the left and build a political party. The structural elements were already in place before 1932 and the CCF ought to be regarded not as a new political movement but as a reproduction of social practices that preceded it within the UFA and CLP. The development period, between 1932 and 1945 should be regarded as a structurationalist process in which social processes were produced and reproduced over a period of time leading to new forms of political and institutional structures. The Alberta CCF was an attempt at both social and system integration of the UFA and CLP.

Chapters IV and V detail the ongoing social and institutional relationships between the various groups of actors and structures within the Alberta CCF after 1942. Social conflicts within the party led to structural dysfunction after 1946. This can clearly be seen in several crises which permeated the party and involved individuals, social processes, and degrees and forms of knowledge and perceptions. Faced with inherent electoral failure after 1945, in part due to the social contradictions within the party, the Alberta CCF underwent a long period of structural and functional decline leading to the creation of the Alberta New Democratic Party in 1962. This chapter analyzes some of the underlying causes and implications of the structurational decline.

Chapter VI concludes with a discussion of the ongoing debate on whether the CCF was a movement or party. This thesis understands that the Alberta CCF was a party structurally and functionally because of previous structurational processes within the UFA and CLP. The study of the Alberta CCF as a political party rests on the theoretical contention that previous studies fail to address the question of how such institutional organizations operate at a human level. Such an approach must be cognizant of both normative and basic day-to-day processes of social production and external influences that act to manipulate such process. Important exogeneous factors for purposes of social analysis must be introduced into this analysis. The inevitability must be accepted that external actions of other social systems and actors may influence internal party processes. Political parties are above all social systems, largely independent of other systems. By examining the scope and forms of social processes taking place within political parties, as will be done within this thesis, one will have a better understanding of how political parties interact with each other on a systems level. The production of social life must be regarded as an essential contribution to the study of forces and processes in history.

Chapter II

Towards The United Front: The Alberta CCF and Social Reproduction, 1907 - 1935

Social Reproduction and the Origins of the CCF

The Alberta Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) was a social system, defined by Anthony Giddens as the patterning of social relations and understood as reproduced practices. These practices include social activities and relationships between individuals and groups performed within the context of the system (i.e. the CCF). The patterns of these practices are reproduced in and through social praxis, but organized by means of institutional forms of conduct. The structuration approach denies the functional and systemic approach of making "the party" the only level of analysis. This reorientation of perspectives in the party history of the CCF allows the examination of both social relationships and practices to provide an explanation of how the party was formed and existed. A social system, such as the Alberta CCF, cannot be created without reference to earlier social systems. Certain social interactions and practices are reproduced by existing social systems that form the basis of new social systems. The nature and character of these original structures constitute the structuration of the social system that results in its continued existence.

The United Farmers of Alberta (UFA) and the Canadian

Labour Party (CLP) were social systems in which social practices and relations were produced and reproduced. Some forms of social practice continually reproduced by individuals include the identification with the political party through electoral support, partisan activity or membership. Social practices include those activities that "make a difference" to the continuity of the system as a whole. Other forms of practice include procedures through which individuals become involved within the party. These activities are reproduced through eventual consequences and outcomes. Attendance at a nominating meeting for a party's candidate has the effect of reproducing the practice of holding nominating meetings. The consequence or outcome of such practice may reverberate to the individual and the reproduction of the same practice later.

The conditions that led up to the decision in Calgary, in August 1932, to form a political party included extraneous political and economic events that fell outside the social systems involved. The Depression, the political and financial inability of federal and provincial governments to deal with the worsening economic situation, and the moral bankruptcy of the traditional political parties were motivations for creating the CCF. However, the CCF as a social system with social practices and relationships, had to exist in the contributing systems to be reproduced in the new system. These factors had little to do with the Depression or extraneous political circumstances. Their structural reproduction in 1932 combined with an organizational desire to respond politically to a specific set of circumstances - the Depression. This desire crystallized in the formation of an "united front" party combining socialists, labourists and agrarians in a political vehicle.

The political relationship between agrarian and labour organizations (essentially the CLP and the UFA) was a social practice that had been reproduced consistently since 1907. William Smith, editor of The U.F.A., reflected on the past 25 years as one of "unremitting struggle towards the attainment of an equitable social order."[1] The agrarian and labour movements had been moving towards each other since an attempt to forge a united front in 1907 had failed. This relationship can be defined on several levels, including personal (between party members and leaders), functional (joint electoral committees), ideological (through conceptualization of group government and the united front), and institutional (representation or involvement of labour in farmer governments). These relationships were reproduced structurationally in the UFA and labour parties in Alberta. In time, they became institutionalized, as part of the social system, and were regarded by both members and leaders as one of the cardinal principles of the organizations.[2] However, the reproduction of these social relationships and processes was not absolute and they were altered by changing political and social situations.[3]

The concept of farmer-labour co-operation and the united front was distinctly different but by 1932 had combined to create the structurational conditions necessary to establish the Alberta CCF. The relationship between agrarian and labour organizations, and the structural-functional mechanisms, were reproduced regularly throughout the period by both the UFA and the CLP.

The first concrete approach was between the Society of Equity (forerunner of the UFA) and the Trades and Labour Congress (TLC) in Alberta in 1907.[4] Both organizations accepted the need for a political organization that reflected their concerns. A special committee was formed at the leadership level to "devise a feasible proposition" whereby the TLC and the Society could work in "harmony and co-operation".[5] A joint farmer-labour convention was held in Calgary, 1907, to cement the relationship between the two organizations.[6] What occurred at that convention was not only a production of "united front" approaches on behalf of farmers and labourers, but a reproduction by socialists within the TLC of their political demands. The convention accepted initially that the cause of farmer-labour co-operation would be extended to the political arena, but the farmers balked at the adoption of the programme of the Socialist Party of Canada.[7] However, democracy ruled, the resolution was adopted and the Socialist Party of Alberta (SPA) was formed.

No consensus was formed in wide-spread support of the party and the cause of farmer-labour co-operation was disrupted when the Society of Equity withdrew from the coalition.[8] Two different outcomes of this social process had crucial implications for the origins of the CCF. Firstly, agrarians separated the conceptualization of farmer-labour co-operation from a "united front" party because they did not trust the socialists and radicals within the labour movement. Labourist elements in the Socialist Party continued to work to build a Labour Party in Alberta similar to that in Britain. Secondly, the labour movement reproduced patterns of social interaction and activity that were divisive. The divisions between socialists, marxists and labourists reinforced the agrarian concept that a united front with labour was dangerous.[9] After the creation of the Socialist Party of Alberta, socialists within the party reproduced a dogmatic marxist socialist perspective, inherited from De Leon's Socialist Labour Party in the United States. Finding this unpalatable, the moderates within the party, individuals and groups fell away leaving a dominant hard-core group of followers.[10]

The failure to construct a united front with the agrarians and the weak organizational base that resulted from it guaranteed the Socialist Party's isolation from the mainstream of Alberta labour.[11] The Alberta Federation of Labour refused to support the SPA in the 1913 provincial election and actively engaged in setting up candidates against it.[12] The abandonment of the Socialist Party by organized labour left bitter feelings on both sides that remained for two decades. To the remnants of the Socialist Party, the culprits were bureaucratic labour leaders in Edmonton; to the labour leaders, they were doctrinaire socialists and marxists. Motivations became institutionalized into social practices and interactions between individuals and the collectivities they formed throughout the 1920s.

The system reproduction of the Canadian Labour Party was accomplished after World War I within Alberta similar to the British Labour Party. The new Dominion Labour Party (DLP) sought to reconstruct an internal united front because emphasis was placed on co-operation and recognition of organizations "having similar objectives as those affiliated with the British Labour Party."[13] Socialists, trade unionists, farmers and other progressives were invited to join a new political partnership. The completion of this process occurred at the 1919 annual convention of the AFL convention in Medicine Hat. Fred White of Calgary proposed that the political party should be formed to unite "labour and kindred organizations into a homogeneous political party".[14] Labour leaders in Edmonton, particularly Elmer Roper, had other narrowly defined plans.

The movement towards labourism also produced a new relationship with the United Farmers of Alberta. In January 1920 Labour Party leaders drew up a platform that was "agreed to in every part by the farmers."[15] Specific social practices were introduced into the relationship between two social systems (DLP and UFA). Allotment of constituencies was discussed and a resolution was passed at the DLP annual convention calling upon district branches of the party to come to an understanding with the UFA for electoral co-operation. This practice was reciprocated by the UFA when they invited Alfred Farmilo of the Edmonton Trades and Labour Council to attend the annual UFA convention in Calgary in January 1921.[16] This new systems relationship was extended to the federal political scene when the UFA in Strathcona adopted a joint program for co-operation among the UFA, DLP and the Great War Veterans' Association.[17] At this early stage in the relationship, leaders tended to agree that minimal electoral co-operation and organizational independence would be insisted upon.[18] Both organizations would attempt to maintain institutional integrity, while at the same time supporting broad concepts of industrial co-operation. These conceptualizations became reproduced in social practices throughout the 1920s, breaking down shortly after the onset of the Depression.[19]

The consolidation of further labour-agrarian co-operation was foiled by specific systems contradictions within the Labour Party.[20] In Edmonton, a group of disenchanted trade unionists and socialists, headed by Ernest Brown, offered "a real labour party" instead - the Independent Labour Party (ILP). Arguing that the DLP was being controlled by labour, Brown promoted a labour party "independent" of outside interests. The failure to form an united front with the UFA and the domination of the DLP by the trade union leadership convinced the dissenters that the DLP had forsaken its socialist roots. In response, the ILP offered to workers and agrarians a class-based analysis of society. Reference was made within the preamble to the party's constitution in 1921 to the "co-operative commonwealth" implying something more substantial than simple co-operation.[21] They advocated an united front approach to party-building, which the DLP had rejected.[22] In rejecting the united front overtures from the ILP, DLP leaders sent a message to socialists and radicals that organized labour would not tolerate any interference with their perception of labour politics.

The provincial election in 1921 confirmed that there was a deep split within the membership of the Labour Party in Alberta. In December 1921, the DLP became the Alberta section of the Canadian Labour Party.[23] This involved more than a simple change of names. The DLP had been open only to trade union affiliates and city party organizations; the CLP became a federated party consisting of affiliated organizations including trade unions, socialist societies, co-operative societies and local labour parties. The new structural provisions succeeded in shifting the party to the left in an attempt to attract independent leftists.[24]

The amalgamation of the DLP and the ILP into the CLP was not accomplished easily. Clear structural contradictions persisted between the ILP and the DLP, and continued to be reproduced within the CLP Party and the CCF. Sections of the old ILP in Calgary and Lethbridge refused to amalgamate with the Edmonton-organized CLP with demonstrated regional problems. Calgary labour remained skeptical of the Edmonton-dominated CLP and continued to reproduce social practices different from those of the CLP.[25]

The CLP upheld the concept of the "united front" as a reproduced element in its social relations with other social forces and systems, but the structural contradictions between the labourist leadership, and the more militant members caused social conflict within the party.[26] In particular, the expulsion of communists in 1929 damaged the party's image. Annoyed by their tactics against social democracy, CLP leaders expelled organizations and individuals from the party who were connected with the Communist Party of Canada.[27] The party, however, was totally reliant upon the members for the reproduction of specific institutional activities (electoral and extra-parliamentary), and the purge resulted in further contradictions between left and right wings within the party and dysfunctionalism. Expulsion of the communists meant a loss of a valuable section of the active membership, yet everyday party processes (holding meetings, nominating candidates, canvassing) could not be reproduced because of the structural interference of the communists. The action of expulsion, distasteful though it was, saved the Labour Party from the fate of structural dysfunction.[28] However, among the unforseen consequences of this action was the resurrection of the process of building a new united front party.[29]

The Alberta CCF was created by the joint structuration of two social systems - the UFA and CLP. The phenomenon in Alberta was unique because similar forms of social action were being reproduced at the same time by two different social systems. The change in leadership within the UFA (from Henry Wise Wood to Norman Priestley) was followed by the release of the UFA Manifesto. These events acted upon the CLP so that both organizations were converging towards a common goal - the construction of an united front party.[30] However, individual leaders and activists within each organization were preparing to forge new social relationships and practices that would structurally connect both organizations. Much hinged on individual ideas of what the CCF was and how it would structurally and functionally operate with two founding organizations.

The strategy for developing the CCF in Alberta did not rest with a desire to construct a populist social democratic movement nor in the construction of a monolithic political party. The strategy for building the Alberta CCF in the 1930s was to construct an united front. The process involved in social and structural change is a transition from one form of system to another towards a more definitive political organization.

Structurally, the transition involved the equitable copying or reproduction of social and political relations from previous organizations (the UFA and CLP) to the new system plus the creation of new modes of structural arrangements. The process cut across both founding organizations vertically, thereby integrating members and leaders into the new system, with differing degrees of success. The process was even more important in the post-1935 period when the Left in Alberta was demoralized and fractured. Reconstructing the united front was the strategy applied between 1935 and 1942 to connect the various strands of the UFA and CLP.

The structural process of building a new organization had begun at the first meeting of the Western Conference of Labour Political Parties in 1929. By 1931, it had become apparent that organizational and ideological movement on behalf of the UFA would extend the project from an united front labour party to a broad based united front party. The conference called upon agrarian groups to "organize politically and industrially for the abolition of capitalism and the establishment of a co-operative commonwealth."[31] The UFA reciprocated by calling upon all groups sharing a faith in the ideals of the "co-operative commonwealth" to meet in a joint convention with representatives of labour parties in Calgary in July 1932.[32]

The statements issued by the UFA and CLP were a repeat of calls for joint action and broad based unity. It added a new structural element. Expectations were raised that the manifesto of the UFA, issued in January 1932, would be the theoretical foundation of a new political structure. It was not enough for political parties to agree to co-operate with each other; some form of vehicle for the expression of political co-operation had to be established.[33] Both the UFA and the CLP shared the same goal - co-operation of all industrial units for the purpose of realizing the co-operative commonwealth.[34]

The structural imperatives of the new organization were decided upon at the joint meeting. The basis for organizational co-operation necessitated a federation of organizations, the purpose of which was the establishment of a "co-operative commonwealth" in which the basic principle regulating production, distribution and exchange would be supplying of human needs instead of making profits.[35] The general viewpoint and program involved in the economic socialization had already been expounded and accepted by the affiliating labour, agrarian, socialist and other groups.

From the beginning, it was perceived that the proposed organization would be national in perspective, but the involvement of the UFA in the proceedings suggested that whatever organization was constructed at a national level would be reproduced at the provincial level. According to the conference proceedings, it was agreed that each province would establish councils composed of representatives of affiliated organizations. There would be dual affiliations with both the national and provincial CCF councils. The national council, moreover, would be composed of an executive appointed by an annual convention of delegates appointed by the provincial councils.[36]

Further social reproduction occurred at the provincial level with regard to the name of the organization; the initial resolution was for "The Commonwealth Federation (Farmer-Labour-Socialist)", but Walter Mentz of the CLP suggested that the title be amended to include "Co-operative" to reflect the federalist united front perspective. Most delegates were content to have the name "Commonwealth Party" as styled by Woodsworth and Irvine earlier, but the agrarian and labour socialists in Alberta wanted the title to include the qualifier "farmer-labour-socialist" in brackets to reflect the union of progressive forces. Moreover, unlike previous united front organizations, "co-operation" was highlighted, both functionally and organizationally.

If the purpose of the CCF was to develop an united front at the provincial and federal level, then it would become apparent in the discussions and decisions regarding organizational structure. Many of the participants desired to avoid the pitfalls of mainstream political parties and the errors of their past political experiences. In Coldwell's report on the proposed structure, it was suggested that the CCF would be a loose federation of affiliated agrarian, labour and socialist groups.[37] The federal CCF consisted of nine affiliated organizations representing farmers, labour and socialists. In a clear sense, the only federally affiliated bodies were the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees and the League for Social Reconstruction. In the other examples, all parties were provincial in scope.[38] It is evident, given the state of federal and provincial politics in each of the four western provinces, that the inclusion of labour parties would have more impact in provincial politics than at the federal level. At the federal level, there were only three Labour MPs (two from Manitoba and one from British Columbia) and twelve progressive MPs from Ontario, Saskatchewan and Alberta.

Conceptual Contradictions of the CCF, 1932-1933

The nature of the CCF and its structure became the major problem emerging from the 1932 conference. Two contradictory views were expressed. Some delegates believed that the CCF had to become an efficient political instrument with a rigid party structure and disciplinary apparatus. Others took the position that traditional political parties tended to thwart democracy and change and advocated that the CCF remain a loosely structured popular movement. The supporters of the former appeared to be labour party spokespersons while the non-party tradition was held by those associated with agrarian political movements.[39] Between these two extremes, Woodsworth offered a moderate proposal, which was accepted. The CCF would become a loose federation of affiliated bodies with a simple decentralized structure. The national council would oversee national political developments and coordinate political action by affiliating parties within provincial systems. National representation would be by affiliating organizations and not by province. This implied that provincial CCF councils would handle the relationships between the affiliating provincial organizations, whereas the national council would mediate between groups at the national level. The composition of the provisional national council suggested further that the inclusion of an individual had more to do with that individual's political significance and organizational importance at the provincial level.[40]

The structure of the CCF in Alberta in the transition period after its creation in 1932 reflected the reproduction of social practices that had been followed within the UFA and the CLP.[41] Theoretically, according to the federal constitution, provincial councils would be organized consisting of one executive member from each affiliated body within the province. In practice, the structuring of the CCF was constrained by system contradictions emanating from the two founding bodies. Robert Gardiner, representing the UFA, stated clearly at the Calgary convention that the UFA would continue to act "for the moment" as an independent, autonomous force within Alberta and would resist any attempt to submerge its identity.[42] The rationale stemmed from the need for reassurance from other organizational leaders that they would be solely responsible for co-ordinating CCF activities within their own provincial councils. Distinct organizational identities of the founding affiliates proved to be a major structural constraint upon the CCF from the beginning.

Despite attempts from spokespersons involved in the formation of the CCF to minimize the "united front" characteristics of the new organization, newspapers in Alberta questioned whether the UFA would be able to exist separately from the CCF. The Edmonton Journal noted the CCF as "a great political structure such as is envisaged would be a party, whether so designated or not."[43] This the Alberta Labour News could not disagree with, because it had contemplated in earlier editorials and statements that a "united front in the political fight at Ottawa for control of the federal government" would essentially mean a restructuring of Alberta economic and political life.[44]

A difference of opinions flourished about whether the CCF was a political party. William Irvine attempted to defuse the controversy by pointing out that just because a provincial political alliance had been formed in Saskatchewan between farmer and labour did not necessarily mean that the same would occur in Alberta.[45] Walter Mentz argued that the delegates representing labour, socialist and farm groups in the western provinces settled on a common objective, a "co-operative commonwealth federation" for the purposes of "capturing the political power of the state in the provincial, municipal and federal fields".[46]

The contradictions between the UFA and CLP were clearly reflected in the reproduction of political processes. For labour spokespersons such as Walter Mentz, the CCF was designed to be a political party absorbing structures, processes and relations existing in the CLP and the UFA. To agrarian leaders, the reproduction of organizational integrity of the UFA was mandatory. The contradictory statements between UFA organizational leaders and government leaders during this initial period (1932-1933) reflected the growing institutional insecurity within the UFA stemming from the government's inadequate handling of both the economy and members' concerns.[47] Premier Brownlee, for example, denied the existence of any split within the UFA organization, yet warned against the

> loose talking and loose thinking of all propagandists and adventurists, who were today advancing seeming facile but unreal and revolutionary solutions to western Canadian problems.[48]

By the end of 1932, the CCF in Alberta was still a paper organization. A provincial council was established according to the requirements of the federal constitution, but no formal meetings had yet been called. Communication flowed haphazardly between three individuals in Alberta: Norman Priestley, Secretary of the National CCF, and William Irvine and Mrs. George Latham of the National Council. Priestley acted as the contact between the CCF and the UFA while Latham connected the CCF to the CLP. Irvine acted as Alberta's representative to the National Council. The relationships between the affiliating organizations (CLP, UFA and DLP) and the CCF were institutionalized according to previous relationships that existed between the CLP and the UFA, federally and provincially. According to the organizational plans laid out at the Calgary convention, membership in the CCF would come only through affiliated bodies, such as the CLP and the UFA. However, the transition of the CCF from a paper organization to a social system was accelerated by the emergence of several groupings of individuals uncontrolled by the leadership or institutional forms of the founding organization.

Early in 1932, before the CCF was formed, certain elements within the CLP undertook the process of building up a mass grouping within the party. Like the CCF, the CLP was a federated political organization "to which trade unions and other bodies accepted the Party as their political expression."[49] Through the efforts of Labour aldermen Harry Ainlay and Margaret Crang, the constituted rules of the CLP began to be shifted in order to allow for the membership of unattached citizens. The Alberta Teachers' Federation, through Crang and Mary Crawford, desired to work with the Labour Party in its activities. Since the association could not affiliate with the Party, its members desired an organic link with the CLP. Provision was made in the constitution for citizens to become members in the party to "unite with the Labour Party to form human society."[50] A Membership-At-Large section was organized by the Party and described by Elmer Roper as "a live and active section of the Party."[51] Contained in its rank and file were university professors and students, teachers, business and professional people, unemployed, housewives and "others who are sympathetic with the purposes and ideals of the Labour Movement."[52]

The objective of the "Membership-At-Large" branch was to bring together into an articulate group "all workers whose sympathies are whole-heartedly [sic] in support of the ideals and objectives of the Canadian Labour Party but who otherwise would have no means of identifying themselves therewith".[53] Pressure to create a new section came from citizens and non-unionized workers who had no opportunity to become involved collectively in the Labour Party. Part of the rationale for establishing the Membership-at-Large section of the Labour Party was to extend socialist education to a wider audience. Weekly radio broadcasts from Edmonton allowed the CLP to begin to extend its organizational and ideological influence to other urban centres in Alberta and to rural areas surrounding Edmonton. Socialists within the Party, such as Walter Mentz, Mary Crawford and William Alexander led the section in pursuing these activities.[54]

The significance of the section for the CCF cannot be denied. The party was reacting to popular demand for both educational services and political representation within one of the affiliates of the CCF. The reproduction of popular demands was the vehicle for more extensive involvement of the Party in providing information and education.[55] Part of the reproduction of social processes involved the formation of study groups to discuss socialist and labour questions.[56] To meet the demand for "further enlightenment on social and economic questions" the CLP Membership-at-Large section developed a program of speakers and topics for the 1933 year.[57]

The initial purpose of the section was to link up all classes of labour with the Labour Party.[58] The long-term purpose of the Membership-at-Large section of the CLP was to become the membership base of the Alberta CCF. The reproduction of relationships and processes relating to political activity and knowledge would be systematically reproduced within the CCF. The social connection between the CCF and the Membership-at-Large section was closer than between the leaders of the CCF and the CLP. Moreover, the section attempted to link specific elements within the UFA to formulate a broader base from which the CCF could grow. Canadian Labour Party leaders, such as Alf Farmilo and Elmer Roper, were weary of the symbiotic relationship existing between the CCF and the CLP and openly suggested that the former was merely a transition organization.[59] On the other hand, members of the Membership-at-Large section understood that they would form not only the "largest and most important unit in the political labor movement" but also the membership of the Alberta CCF.[60] In January 1933, the section held a convention at which representatives were

> drawn from all classes of society who desire to study more fully, in the spirit of scientific enquiry, the socialist program and to help build the new economic vehicle which we believe will carry the stranded passengers from the wrecked capitalistic machine not only to prosperity but also towards a measure of happiness undreamed of in the past.[61]

In the interim period when the Alberta CCF lacked any kind of structural framework, institutional relationships began to be built by members of the UFA and the CLP. Initially, leaders and spokespersons from both organizations referred to the CCF as an ideal, and not as a distinct social or political entity. However, after several months of considerable media attention to the CCF, conceptual meanings began to change. According to one Alberta Labor News writer, past labour and socialist speakers had been "dealing in generalities." The time was coming when the UFA and CLP had to put their plans into practical operation.[62] According to Labour MLA Lionel Gibbs, the CCF

> offers to the thinking people of Canada an opportunity to express such lack of confidence as they may feel in our present economic and social arrangements. It also forms the rallying point for those who are prepared to demand and enforce such an increase of social ownership and control of essential industries and utility services as will free the people of Canada from the strangling pressure of profit ownership.[63]

Walter Mentz, in December 1932, warned that "if the U.F.A. government can not show more sand than it has up till now there will be a revolt against it...."[64] The UFA government, he noted, had an "wonderful chance" to line up the people of Alberta for the CCF.[65] The frequency to which the Alberta Labor News and The U.F.A. referred to the CCF, in its organizational sense, highlighted the production and reproduction of an organic conceptualization of the CCF in the minds of both the UFA and CLP members and the public.

If social reproduction was occurring among members, at the leadership level another form of social process was being reproduced. In October 1932, a provincial by-election was called for Camrose. In the past, labour had co-operated with the UFA in nominating candidates and assisted in the campaigns. Chester Ronning of Camrose Lutheran College officially ran in the election as a candidate of the UFA, but the campaign was clearly CCF-motivated from the start.[66] Labour leaders, referring to the by-election victory, wanted

> representatives who will hew to the line, letting the chips fall where they may. Pussyfooting cannot, and should not, be tolerated under the woeful conditions that prevail. Far better to go down fighting for justice, and hence on the side of eternal truth, than to see a weak compromise, which unfortunately can only spell humiliation and defeat.[67]

The process and vehicle for agrarian-labour political/electoral co-operation, a joint-committee, was reproduced and institutionalized within the structural form of the CCF. The new body made possible closer relationships between the two organizations at both the leadership and membership levels. This was clearly the initial purpose of the CCF in Alberta; but in the social reproduction of those processes, the CCF became reformed and conceived in a manner that had not been understood or accepted months before. Institutional consolidation of the process followed in January 1933 when the CLP and the UFA approved the organizational commitment to affiliate with the CCF.[68] The third affiliated body, the Lethbridge DLP under Andrew Smeaton, dissolved in January and became part of the Canadian Labour Party.[69]

The decision of the two provincial bodies to approve the affiliation with the CCF led to the "official organization" of the CCF in Alberta. On 16 February 1933, a joint meeting of the executive of the CLP and UFA was held to constitute the Alberta Provincial Council of the CCF.[70] Norman Priestley was appointed chairman and Elmer Roper became Provincial Secretary.[71] Like the national council, the composition of the provincial council rested on representative equality of affiliating organizations.[72] Six members of each provincial organization would compose the Provincial Council. This encompassed institutional and organizational duality within the organic structure of the CCF leadership.

The difficult question of the physical existence of the CCF in Alberta was soon raised and had to be dealt with by the Provincial Council. Shortly after the Calgary convention, the National Council decided that membership in the CCF would be restricted to affiliated bodies. Woodsworth noted that the organization was an equal and representative federation of parties and not an incoherent mass movement.[73] He upheld the right of affiliated organizations to preserve their own identities and the view that the national CCF would be nothing more than the sum of its constituent parts. Interested individuals could not directly become members of the CCF at either the provincial or federal level, but had to join one of the affiliated bodies. One interpretation of this is that the founding groups wanted to avoid establishing a centralized political party. By preserving the indigenous nature of the confederation and preventing the accretion of power at the centre, the CCF would provide a kind of constituent democracy.

The approach of the national leaders of the CCF concerned those within the UFA and CLP who wished to regard the CCF as an united front party. Norman Priestley responded to their questions about the lack of an open membership by citing an institutional approach to party building. Citizens could join

> locals of farmer or labour or socialist organizations, or form study groups or labour

> groups in towns and cities consisting of people who subscribe to the principles of the C.C.F.[74]

When there were enough people in an area to constitute the nucleus of a provincial-wide movement, an independent association could be formed. Only then, Priestley added, could the movement apply for affiliated status through the Provincial Council.[75] Organizational practices, which were traditional approaches in the CLP were becoming institutionalized. However, a significant and dangerous contradiction was developing between the leaders' perception of what the CCF was through the reproduction of their actions, and the perceptions of members and supporters of the CLP and UFA.

Individuals had begun forming political groups early in the 1930s in urban areas in order to collectivize their responses to the economic depression. Shortly after the formation of the CCF in August 1932, they attached themselves to the new organization. In some cases, as the name appealed to their political sensitivities, they used the name and initials as part of their group's name. Some began requesting affiliation to the National Council of the CCF. Two social processes were at work. Firstly, these individuals desired to become members of the Alberta CCF either through direct membership or indirectly through affiliated organizations. Secondly, the use of the term "Co-operative Commonwealth Federation" (or its initials) implied a general acceptance of the program of the new organization. These processes were in direct contradiction to the rules established by the national leaders of the CCF. One group requesting affiliation to the Provincial Council was the National Labour Club of Calgary, which contained ex-DLP members who had refused to join the CLP. George Church was appointed to handle an official reply to the National Labour Club of Calgary, which had requested affiliation.[76] However, the feeling was that the Calgary CCF Central Council offered an opportunity for closer co-ordination of labour and political groups:

> The constitution of the CCF provides only for affiliation of provincial units, and it has not been thought wise to make provision for the affiliation of local units. We would therefore suggest to the Calgary National Labour Club and similar bodies that they affiliate with a Central Council of the C.L.P. and through that medium become associated with the Provincial Council of the CCF.[77]

In essence, the situated practice of the Canadian Labour Party in handling affiliations to that body became reproduced in the structural properties of the Alberta CCF. The leaders sought to reproduce the essential meaning of the CCF as an affiliated co-operative confederation of political groupings with no distinct existence outside the parameters of the founding organizations, and the institutional practices whereby individuals and groups could affiliate and identify with the Alberta CCF.

The individual leaders attached to the CCF, perhaps fearing the repercussions of opening up the CCF in such a volatile economic and political environment, drafted an internal document titled the "Plan of CCF Organization for the Province of Alberta."[78] This document, agreed to by the executives of the CLP and UFA, established the organizational rules under which the CCF would grow in Alberta in the future. Individuals and collectivities "who subscribe to the program of the C.C.F." but who were not associated with either the CLP or the UFA, could be organized in urban areas under the authority of the Provincial Council. A two-step affiliation process was considered. At the first stage, individuals or groups had to connect with a local associated with nationally affiliated groups (UFA or CLP). When such groups, or individuals, desired to become associated with the CCF, they had to form themselves into a provincial organization and affiliate with the National Council.[79] Representation of these individuals and groups was provided through the organization of a central council of the CCF in cities and federal and provincial constituencies "where local branches of two or more nationally affiliated groups exist." The central council was entrusted with the powers to co-ordinate "all C.C.F. activity."[80] Through this organizational plan, provision was maintained for the eventuality of a third-wing or general membership section of the Alberta CCF, but only on terms favourable to both the UFA and the CLP.

It is obvious that the leaders of the UFA and CLP, who were involved in some way with setting up the CCF in Alberta, were not comfortable with the conceptualization of the new organization as an united front party. They did not want to surrender any individual or collective power to an organization dedicated to building a broad-based political force. Through their positions as leaders of affiliating organizations, the members of the Provincial Council of the Alberta CCF used their power to place limits on the range of options open to individuals and collectivities who desired to become members. The rationale used centred on the legalistic argument and the practical angle that there was no need to set up a third organization because the UFA and the CLP provided general-membership divisions through which ordinary Albertans could identify.[81]

UFA-CLP leaders, however, seriously underestimated the scope of popular interest in the CCF. This manifested itself in various ways. Some groups, organizations and individuals approached the Provincial Council asking for either recognition or affiliation status with the CCF at either the provincial or federal level. Other collectivities appeared in the political landscape after appropriating the name of the CCF or its initials. Both tended to represent groups or organizations that had existed previously under another name but which desired to become attached to the CCF for political reasons. Despite urging from Norman Priestley, they were unwilling to join either the UFA or CLP.[82] They argued that the rigidity of affiliating through the UFA or CLP would turn away potential supporters. Some of the groups wanted to use either the term "co-operative commonwealth" or the initials "CCF" in their titles, but this was sharply rebuked by the CCF National Council.[83] In Edmonton, for example, a group of the Provincial Association of CCF Clubs, established in November 1932, requested affiliation status from the Provincial Council but were denied on the grounds that such social practices violated the organizational rules. However, they were requested to contact the National Council for further assistance in renaming their organization and applying for provincial affiliation.[84]

In rejecting several organizations from affiliating with the CCF and thereby preventing the development of a membership base, the provincial leaders reproduced a social practice that had been developed earlier in their organizational history. Both organizations experienced in the 1920s the difficulty of working with individuals and groups who had extremist connections. Structural constraints and rules were used to screen out groups and individuals who could threaten the delicate relationship between the two founding organizations. In the "third period" of communist penetrations of social democratic parties, the CCF felt that controlling affiliation and membership was desirable "consolidating the forces under as few heads as possible, that is a political right wing and a political left wing."[85] Priestley felt that only two groups affiliated with the CCF were necessary in Alberta.[86]

Some groups were more persistent than others in arguing their case for affiliation. In the summer of 1933, before the Regina convention, a serious threat came from two organizations that offered themselves as the "third affiliate" of the CCF in Alberta - the Co-operative Commonwealth Association (CCA) in Calgary and the Economic Reconstruction Club in Lethbridge. Reacting to rumours that the National Council was considering forming a third affiliate in Alberta to replace the defunct DLP, both organizations sent applications to Norman Priestley seeking and requesting to be recognized as the official section.[87]

The Economic Reconstruction Club appeared to have a stronger case because the Calgary organization violated one of the structural rules of the provincial CCF. Because the provincial leadership was leaning more towards the Lethbridge group, its spokesperson, Ralph Cooke, approached the Calgary group and suggested that the two amalgamate.[88] Acting in strict compliance with the organizational plan adopted by the Provincial Council earlier in the year, Cooke suggested that both groups (plus one in Edmonton) be recognized as an affiliated provincial association.[89]

Negotiations commenced between several southern Alberta groups, without the intervention of federal or provincial leadership, to form a CCF clubs section.[90] The resulting proposal sent to the Provincial Council noted that a "Co-operative Commonwealth Association (Alberta Section)" be officially recognized as the third arm of the CCF in Alberta. Moreover, in anticipation of the approval, the Calgary and Lethbridge groups reconstituted themselves and adopted the CCA name.[91] This was, of course, completely unacceptable to the Provincial Council. The provincial leaders, desiring to control their own sections, were not interested in forming a "third arm" of the CCF within the province. A strict interpretation of the constitution "materially retarded [the organization's] progress because we cannot state that we are definitely affiliated with the CCF; we can only say that we hope to be."[92]

Making the problem more difficult for the provincial leadership was the fact that the Calgary Central Council of the CLP supported the affiliation of the CCA. According to the Calgary spokesperson,

> there is but a slight hope of any of these people ever joining either the U.F.A. or the C.L.P., yet they are strong supporters of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. It seems obvious that it would be a grave mistake to ignore these people or prevent them from becoming the third arm of the CCF in Alberta.[93]

Cooke made the same observations and noted that the provincial association would be formed from the two groups establishing a nucleus enabling activities to continue in organizing other groups throughout Alberta.[94] Faced with this situation, Priestley backed down and referred the entire matter to the National Council. He noted, finally, that "it would be a grave mistake to ignore any section of the people who wish to become part of the CCF in Alberta."[95] The time was quickly approaching for the groups to be united under a common constitution "with a view to uniting the non-Labor, non-Farmer element into one association, which will become an integral part of the CCF".[96]

Provincial and National CCF leaders were procrastinating over the "third group" issue by referring the matter to the National Council, scheduled to meet during the convention in Regina. The responsibility for deciding the future of the CCF was delegated to the provincial CCF leaders who had to decide the "[pertinent composition] of the representation to the affiliated groups - farmers, labour and each provincially organized club."[97] Two powerful national affiliates, who had strong autonomous feelings, ensured that the national and provincial councils had to tread softly when considering expanding the CCF to a third section in Alberta. Such a mass arm of the CCF could not become more powerful than the UFA or CLP.

At the first national convention of the CCF in Regina in July 1933, the national constitution was approved. Accordingly, membership in the CCF consisted of "**approved** provincial organizations which accept the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation Programme."[98] The National Council was empowered to direct the national organization of the CCF and carry out policies between national conventions. The provincial councils, on the other hand, were responsible for directing CCF affairs within the provincial boundaries either at a federal, provincial or municipal level.[99] As expected, the resolution of the "third arm" problem was shifted back to the provincial council.

At the national convention, the Alberta Provincial Council authorized the establishment of a committee to investigate ways in which a "third group" could be incorporated into the Alberta organizational framework. The report was presented to the Provincial Council on 23 September 1933 and adopted.[100] The policy adopted established a "third group" to provide for the membership of individuals who did not want to, or could not, become members of the UFA or CLP. The new affiliated section became known as the "Economic Reconstruction Association" (ERA) and all local organizations that subscribed to the principles and program of the CCF were invited to be admitted as units of the provincial Association.[101]

The policy drafted by Norman Priestley and Clarence Gibbs was "not strictly in accord with the provisions of the constitution."[102] The situation merited special attention since one of the affiliated groups was also the provincial government and thus had vested interests. Of the several groups "seeking a way to enter the Federation", none had been satisfied by the responses of the provincial or national council. They did not have the "prestige of official recognition, nor ... the means wherewith to organize this third element in society."[103] The action taken by the Provincial Council in creating a "third arm" was politically necessary given the situation in Alberta, but not constitutionally correct.[104] However much the provincial council wanted to incorporate all the interested groups into the third affiliate, some groups were not permitted. Neither the Calgary CCA nor the Edmonton branch of the Provincial Association of CCF Clubs was endorsed by the Provincial Council as an affiliate.[105]

The Economic Reconstruction Association was established with branches in Edmonton, Calgary and Lethbridge.[106] By July 1934, Norman Priestley reported to the National Council that the ERA was a fully functional affiliate in Alberta as the third wing of the movement.[107] Even this decision to establish branches by the provincial council did not stop the flow of applications for temporary affiliations of study groups of non-agrarian, non-labour individuals.[108] Some of these were later affiliated with the ERA section but the process had to be developed slowly with reference to the constitution. Priestley held out hope that perhaps a fourth affiliate might be formed consisting of rural study groups. When the total of these individual groups reached a membership of one hundred in five federal constituencies, the provincial council would call a provincial convention to organize a CCF Club section.[109]

There were other groups, however, that never received the recognition they deserved because of their connections with the Communist Party or other political organizations. In July 1933, the Workers United Council Calgary Unit No. 1 applied for affiliation but was rejected.[110] The Unemployed Married Men's Association (UMMA) tendered an affiliation fee in December 1933 and announced that they had formed "Group No. 1 of the Commonwealth Association". The League for Social Reconstruction (LSR) attempted to form a group of the CCA even though it was noted that the latter had been banned by the National Council.[111] Similar action had been taken by the Vancouver Branch of the LSR.[112] All three organizations had their affiliation fee returned and were informed that they had to work within the framework of the ERA section.[113] This had the effect of alienating some individuals and groups from the CCF and towards other political forces.

The dichotomy and contradiction between the Alberta leadership and the supposed membership of the CCF indicated the extent to which the former's use of reproduced social relations led to structural constraints. The initial purpose of the CCF, for the UFA and CLP, was to institutionalize relationships and processes between the two organizations within Alberta. For them, the CCF was now at most an united front of distinct social groups and organizations, each of which had to maintain their organizational independence and integrity. There was no room within their structured conceptualization for a third party that would string together the UFA and CLP and finally replace them at the federal, provincial and municipal levels. The Alberta CCF was, at their level, nothing more than the social processes, ideas and relationships with which they were familiar, structurally reproduced across time and space.

At the same time, however, different forms of reproductions were taking place that were to have a profound effect upon the organization and its success. These structurations occurred between individuals and groups within the membership of the UFA and CLP, and among non-affiliated progressive forces. The reproduction of educational and institutional processes at the mass level was oriented towards seeing the CCF as a distinct political party with a mass-based membership. At first, this base took on hues of an united front of progressive groups but as the leaders' positions hardened over the issue of the "third arm", the conceptualization and demand for a mass membership section incorporating the membership of both parties and progressive elements within Alberta society grew. The two forms of structuration conflicted and contrasted. As the reproduction of social processes of some groups and individuals was constrained and finally terminated by the structural rules imposed by the leadership, a movement was perceived turning away from the CCF towards another developing organizational form - Social Credit. The structural rules imposed by the leadership, however, did not stop the reproduction of a mass membership base within the CCF itself. Both structurations were distinct, yet contradictory, leading to social conflict and system contradictions later in the history of the CCF.

The recognition of the ERA as the third affiliated group of the Alberta CCF presented another thorny problem for provincial leaders. The practice had been followed in the Labour Party for several years of rank and file dual membership. In a situation where the CLP was a coalition of several groups, individual membership might be extended across several organizations at the same time. To a certain extent, this process was followed within the CCF, first, at the leadership level and, finally, at the rank and file level. The reproduction of this process was divided laterally. Alberta CCF leaders held dual memberships - in their affiliated organizations and in the

CCF. William Irvine held memberships in all three organizations by virtue of his personal relationships. This practice was accepted, even acknowledged, as fruitful. However, when the members of the different sections tended to hold double or triple memberships, the leaders balked. The National Council recognized the "complete autonomy of the many units ... as well as their unity of interest expressed in the aims and objects of the CCF".[114]

The situation in Calgary can be examined more minutely as a case for the entire CCF social system in Alberta. In that city, two major progressive forces interacted on a regular basis - the Independent Labour Party and the United Farmers of Alberta. These groups reproduced a social practice that had been continuing for several years within that city - political and electoral co-operation.[115] After the founding convention in August 1932, the reproduced social practices were altered, reflecting new political developments. The resulting Calgary CCF Committee was the structural institutionalization of the existing social relationships.[116] The organizations that were involved in the Committee included the CLP, DLP, the Calgary and Bow River UFA constituency associations, the United Farm Women of Alberta (UFWA) and the LSR. The Calgary Committee was an educational group dedicated to disseminating the ideas of the CCF in southern Alberta.[117] The educational effort was a logical extension of the electoral co-operation that existed between the above mentioned groups. As the scope of the committee's activities increased, more groups joined including the CCA, Unemployed Single Men's Association, Unemployed Married Men's Association and the Calgary Labour Club.[118] Subcommittees were formed providing arrangements between the various organizations. By March 1933, a mutual decision had been taken by the CCF Committee, in consultation with the various groups, to consider the establishment of a central CCF organization. Both the Calgary Labour Club and the CCA were encouraged to affiliate with the CCF Provincial Council.[119] Official CCF sanction of the activities of the Calgary organization was slow in coming, even though Norman Priestley participated in the monthly organizational meetings (as a member of the UFA only). At the leadership level of the organization, the integration of the various political/social elements had not been possible. Local parties' leaders may have assumed that the Calgary CCF Committee was a broadly based co-operative organization, designed to institutionalize the reproduction of social practices between the groups. However, the emergence of the Co-operative Commonwealth Association tended to shift the emphasis from the social reproduction of existing political organizations to the production and consequent reproduction of an independent membership base for the CCF. This became realized later, in 1933, when the CCF Committee began assisting in the organizing of ERA branches.[120]

Contradictory perceptions on the part of individuals within the constituent parties that made up the CCF Committee led to political difficulties. Individual leaders insisted on reproducing long established social practices within their own parties and were concerned that the establishment of a separate CCF in Calgary would jeopardize their parties, and their role as leaders within them. Members of the ERA came from outside the CLP-UFA network and the active participation of the Committee in extending the organizational work of the ERA prompted a backlash from both the UFA and CLP local leaders. Both Fred White and Norman Priestley were concerned about the organizational independence of their respective parties. At the end of 1933 the UFA pulled out of the CCF Committee citing differences with the CLP and ERA. The CLP, at the same time, accused the ERA and UFA of interfering in their social practices of policy-making and candidate selection. Ultimately, the solution in Calgary was not to disband the CCF Committee and to allow individual organizations to go their own way. This would have led to a politically dysfunctional situation in the city. Instead, the leaders and participants in the CCF Educational Committee decided to transform the organization into a CCF Central Council with constituency councils at the federal level. Norman Smith and Aemila Turner of the UFA made the decision to work within the organizational framework of the CCF for the CCF. Other prominent labour leaders, such as Aylmer Liesemer and John Gaule, switched allegiance from the Labour Party to the CCF.[121] The social practices that occurred within the Calgary CCF Educational Committee between 1932 and 1934 reflected both the growing disenchantment with leaders' rigidity concerning organizational forms of social practice, and the positive need for a grass-roots CCF movement.[122]

Provincial CCF leaders, coming from either the UFA or the CLP, attempted to solve the dual membership and third-group problems by reverting to previous social practices with which they had been familiar. CCF Central Councils, consisting of equal representations of the UFA, ERA and CLP, were organized in Edmonton and Calgary to better co-ordinate CCF activities in the urban areas. No steps were taken to incorporate the various CCF Clubs into this federation or to replace the UFA locals with CCF locals.[123] They based their arguments on the pre-existing assumption that the CLP would co-ordinate party matters in the urban areas, while the UFA would handle rural affairs. However, what was not apparent to the provincial organizers was the extent to which both affiliates (UFA and CLP) tended to operate in the other's sphere of operation.[124] There also appeared to be more individuals in the urban areas wishing to affiliate to something other than the CLP and the UFA and still attempt to maintain some independence from the ERA.

UFA and CLP leaders may have thought that the creation of the third-arm of the CCF would dispel criticism from the left that the CCF was not doing enough to bring about an united front and be sufficient to allow non-labour and non-agrarian individuals to join in common cause. Their assumptions proved false as the ERA was a paper organization. Major structural constraints were imposed on the ERA by CCF provincial leaders that impeded the functional involvement and structural development of the ERA in conjunction with the UFA and CLP. The Provincial Council was concerned from the beginning that problematic political tendencies would develop within the ERA section. To ensure that extremist elements did not take over the section, provisions were made for the ERA to "develop along orderly and democratic lines."[125] When the total Alberta membership for the section reached 750 in five federal constituencies, with a minimum in each constituency, the section would be allowed to draw up a provincial constitution and elect its own officers. Until then, the Provincial Council (executives of the UFA and CLP) would manage affairs of the ERA.[126] Moreover, membership within the ERA was restricted to those individuals who subscribed to the principles and program of the CCF and who were not members of any other political organization.[127]

Furthermore, the use of the name "Economic Reconstruction Association" tended to shift potential supporters away from the CCF. Provincial organizers were adamant in their refusal to allow any organization, no matter how small or faithful to the principles of the new party, to use the name "Co-operative Commonwealth Federation" or its initials. This act, although insignificant in comparison with other social processes, had considerable psychological effect and structural consequences for the Alberta CCF. It prohibited, in a crucial time period, the reproduction of a conceptual relationship between the CCF idea and the CCF party. Unless that symbolic signification could be reproduced at an individual level, the CCF in Alberta, as envisioned in 1932, could not be reproduced sufficiently to overcome a number of structural constraints imposed by UFA and CLP leaders.

The significance of these structural problems of the Alberta CCF between 1932 and 1935 relates ultimately to the structuration process undertaken by both the UFA and CLP through the Provincial Council of the CCF. An understanding of the purposes and motivations in the decisions taken at each stage can be obtained by freezing social conduct. Canadian Labour Party leaders, for example, had narrow preconceived perceptions of what the CCF was and the resulting roles of the UFA and CLP within the CCF. The interpretation of these roles depended upon individuals' knowledge of what had transpired at Calgary and prior political experience, applied reflexively through communication. In his position as president of the CLP, Elmer Roper wielded both sanction and power. His position as president was legitimate, which supposed domination over individuals and groups. Moreover, when Roper became a member of the Provincial Council of the CCF, he brought with him legitimation and domination. However, his conceptual framework dictated where and how power and sanction would be applied. In January 1933, Roper informed J.S. Woodsworth of the decision of the CLP to affiliate formally with the CCF. This decision was, however, conditional. Some leaders of the party felt that a reservation must be attached to the conditions of affiliation signifying the concern that the CLP had about other groups and organizations who wanted to join the CCF. According to Roper,

> no charters [should] be given to any groups or organizations ... which are judged by the Executive Committee of the C.L.P., Alberta Section, to constitute an infringement upon the proper constituency of the C.L.P.[128]

The CLP was concerned that an attempt would be made to "line up" trade unions and individuals as "the foundation group for the purpose of setting up an opposition organization and attempting to affiliate with the C.C.F."[129] The ulterior motive of the CLP in opposing the establishment of any third group in Alberta was in "protecting the very good organization that we already have in the province."[130] Roper was attempting to maintain the organizational and political hegemony of the CLP within the CCF, and with that hegemony came individual power and domination through leadership. Norman Priestley, acting on behalf of the UFA, noted that the reservation of the Labour Party was shared by leaders of the UFA. Through the structural institution of the Provincial Council, both sets of leaders had the power and sanction to recommend for or against affiliation in accordance with the interpretative scheme that had been developed regarding the CCF.[131]

System Integration and the Social Credit Threat

The distinction between social and system integration within the Alberta CCF between 1932 and 1935 had more to do with the types and extent of social relationships and processes. Social integration, as related earlier, referred to the reciprocity of practices between individuals and social groups within social systems as reproductions of social encounters. Systems integration, on the other hand, refers to the reciprocity between individuals and collectivities across social and systems boundaries. Such integration at either the micro- or macro-level of analysis was strongly influenced by and consequently reproduced institutional parameters of the social system. The relationship between the UFA, as part of the Alberta CCF, and Social Credit must be seen as part of this phenomenon. The problem with this analysis stems from the assumptions that Social Credit, like the CCF, was a social system. An examination of Social Credit is significant only insofar as it affected the reproduction of social processes within the CCF. However, the intrusion of Social Credit into UFA and CLP social systems also, to some degree, affected the Alberta CCF. A more crucial element for the CCF was the lack of integration between the CCF and UFA social systems.

The level of integration can be measured in terms of how individuals in one social system saw themselves in relationship to the other. Obviously, in the months before the 1935 provincial and general elections, the level of social integration on the part of members and supporters in the UFA with the CCF had dwindled considerably.[132] There were various reasons for this systemic failure. Obviously, the relationship between the UFA and Social Credit is important, but it tends to fall outside the parameters established for the CCF. The effect of such social relationships and processes profoundly influenced the relationship between the CCF and the UFA at both a systems and social level, and contributed to the second phase of CCF social system development.

The political tactics undertaken by CCF leaders who came from the UFA cannot be described as simply fatalistic or defeatist. Norman Priestley believed that the success of the CCF in Alberta depended upon the success of the UFA government at the polls. In this regard, the government (and UFA organization) had two choices: adopt either the UFA-CCF program or the policies advocated by William Aberhart. The government, weakened by the resignations of Brownlee and Macpherson, divided into factions, and increasingly under attack by formerly supportive constituents, remained unaffected by Priestley's arguments and neglected both choices.

With the government's ultimate decision unknown until early 1935, the CCF Provincial Council continued to plan the organizational development of the CCF based on the provisional plan of 1933. Throughout 1933 and 1934, UFA and CLP leaders were elated by the number of CCF study groups and ERA locals being formed throughout Alberta. It appeared that the CCF and its programme enjoyed a wide basis of support in the agrarian community, but they were both overly optimistic and mistaken. Suffering from disillusionment over the failure of the government to solve their economic problems and deflated by the moral ineptitude of its leaders, the farmers turned away in large numbers from the idealistic conception of the "co-operative commonwealth" towards apparently more realistic financial and social reforms proposed by Social Credit.

Two conceptual difficulties at the UFA grass roots level made the social integration between the UFA and CCF increasingly difficult. Many agrarians were concerned about the policy planks contained within the Calgary statement of 1932 and the Regina Manifesto with regard to land nationalization. J.M. Coldwell of Kathyrn stated in December 1933 that many farmers in his area wanted Priestley or Garland to answer the popular charges

> that the CCF would make all share and share alike, that it kills individual enterprise, initiative and ambition, that those who own farms and businesses would lose all, that greed and selfishness would kill all, that the leaders of the CCF are not big enough to put it over, that the leaders and followers of the CCF are only people who are down and out, they have nothing and never had, the leader is a jail bird, etc.[133]

Some farmers attempted to find a common link between the monetary reforms advocated by the UFA, CCF and Social Credit. Christian Opp desired to know in November 1933, if the "Douglas system" and the CCF were the same, and if they were not, could some effort be made to "join all hands so we might be able to win the battle."[134] The interest which UFA leaders had in social credit confused UFA members and supporters. Priestley himself attempted to reassure supporters that the CCF policy of socialization was similar to Douglas' scheme of financial reform.[135] If the Provincial CCF was concerned about the extent of Social Credit propaganda that was being disseminated through The U.F.A. and popular pamphlets provided to UFA study groups, then they should have used their powers as leaders to correct the ideological imbalance. The question of public ownership had the effect of alienating many potential members and supporters for "too much interference with private rights."[136] Norman Priestley assured his critics that Social Credit's and the CCF's objectives were similar - the abolition of poverty, restoration of the rights of the community, the preservation of liberty to the individual consonant with his place in an organized society and the creation of a Christian social order.[137]

The other conceptual problem facing UFA members was the concept of farmer-labour political co-operation as expressed through the institution of the CCF. Frank Phillimore wanted to know what labour and farmers had in common "so as to form a real co-operative commonwealth."[138] The disunity between workers and agrarians was a

> feature of our competitive system and will not be a feature of an economy in which production is for use and not for profit; when society is conscientiously organized to make possible the enjoyment of the abundance which science, technical skill and our abounding natural resources provide.[139]

The role of agrarians within and under a proposed CCF government was also being questioned. Priestley attempted to set the CCF policy with regard to agriculture and agrarians:

> We believe that the family farm is the best basis for a soundly organized co-operative system in Canada. We therefore do not propose to socialize land in the sense of acquiring the title for the state. We propose to progressively, and as occasion demands, protect the working farmer in the processes of production and marketing.[140]

Despite serious structural constraints, Norman Priestley and other UFA-CCF leaders had begun seriously to contemplate what a CCF provincial government would look like in Alberta. With assistance from Research Review, the monthly theoretical journal of the CCF published in Regina, provincial leaders began simplistic yet constructive political planning for the inevitable day when the UFA and CLP would submerge their institutional identities within a populist but structured united front party.

By the beginning of 1935, the political situation in Alberta had become increasingly muddled by the resignation of John E. Brownlee as premier, the increased pressure on the UFA by Social Credit supporters, the political independence of the CLP and the inefficiency of the CCF to consolidate effectively. Both founding sections of the CCF were torn apart by contradicting perspectives on tactics and strategies. Within the Labour Party, the creation of a third provincial wing of the CCF had increased concerns that the CLP would become politically marginalized. In response, Carl Berg desired to move the CLP away from the CCF towards separate political and institutional existence. The UFA was torn apart by three different factions - those supporting the adoption of a Social Credit platform, those supporting continued links with and eventual absorption into the CCF, and those who wished to maintain organizational integrity. Norman Priestley found himself under continued attack from both the UFA and CCF for inept institutional and political handling of the relationship between the two organizations. Pressured by George MacLachlan to drop Social Credit from the UFA annual convention agenda in 1935, Priestley maintained his confidence in the integrity and historical validity of the UFA.[141] The historical task of the UFA was to

> destroy if at all possible, the delusion that has been set up in the province of Alberta by this man Aberhart. To do that appears difficult enough without our attempting to destroy an economic philosophy much more substantial and more universally laid.[142]

Some UFA members, who supported the continued relationship with the CCF, believed that Social Credit was a passing fad. However, the UFA government "had made a mess of things" with the result that

> thousands who are CCFers will vote Social Credit, not because they have great faith in it but rather that it is in opposition to the old order.[143]

Jack King, CCF organizer for the province, sympathized with Fraser and hoped that "these difficulties will iron themselves out."[144]

The provincial CCF found itself in the summer and fall of 1935 in a delicate political situation. The impending defeat of the UFA government by Social Credit, provincial and national CCF leaders observed, seriously threatened the entire CCF organization in Alberta. Although there was no official relationship between the UFA government and the

CCF, the UFA organization was tied to the new party as an affiliate. If the organization and government were defeated, the future of the CCF would be jeopardized. Moreover, the CLP had taken the unprecedented step of distancing itself from the UFA (and hence the CCF) because of the impending defeat. The supposed united front of 1932 had broken down by 1935.

Social Credit played a predominant part in these events but the continued reproduction of structural deficiencies and misconceptualizations on the part of UFA and CLP leaders towards the CCF must figure prominently in any structurationalist analysis. Confusion reigned over whether the CCF was the UFA under a new name as the chief apologist for the government, Norman Priestley, was also National Secretary for the CCF. The inability or the refusal, by many UFA leaders to distance themselves from the disastrous policies of the UFA government resulted in a sense of betrayal among many CCF supporters in Alberta.[145]

The results of the provincial election on 22 August 1935 shocked everyone within the CCF both in Alberta and throughout Canada. The left splintered, leaving Social Credit with fifty-six provincial seats as opposed to two Conservatives and five Liberals. The euphoria that permeated Social Credit ranks was matched by political demoralization in provincial CCF circles. Both the UFA and the CLP had run separate campaigns as separate organizational entities. Only one CCF candidate was jointly supported - Elsie Wright in Edmonton. Elmer Roper attributed the failure of the CCF in Alberta to the lack of satisfactory organization. Writing shortly after the provincial election, Roper stated that

> if there had been a provincial CCF organization in the field with candidates definitely running under that banner, we would have had a CCF government in Alberta today....[146]

An examination of the vote distribution revealed that the leaders of the CLP in both Edmonton and Calgary had lost the support of their members. In Calgary, where MLA Fred White was running for re-election, the Labour vote decreased from 15% in 1930 to less than 5% in 1935. In Edmonton, the decrease was even more substantial, from 22% in 1930 to 4% in 1935.[147] Charles Keeley of Mayerthorpe, a CCF candidate in the federal election, noted that the party did not make its appeal on the basis of hope. "In our endeavour to be honest we have forgotten to be wise."[148] Priestley was still optimistic that there was still a large contingent of UFA voters who would remain loyal to the CCF.

> We have confidence in our analysis of the economic ills of society and are assured that the Alberta electorate will have to turn to such policies sooner or later; though they may have to suffer much meanwhile. I believe that our people of whom there are at least 32,000 still left to us will be more convinced than ever of the soundness of our position.[149]

Immediately after the provincial election, and also after the federal election, the provincial and national CCF leaders were criticized for their inept handling of the Alberta situation. The defeat of the provincial UFA government led to the collapse of the UFA-CCF campaign in the federal election.[150] UFA members questioned the ability of federal leaders to appreciate the threat of Social Credit and to make modifications in UFA-CCF political tactics accordingly. Coldwell, for example, believed that Aberhart was a "passing cloud which will be dispelled within two years."[151] Elmer Roper and other Alberta CCF leaders were not so optimistic.

Chapter III

Building the Party: The Alberta CCF and Social-System Integration, 1935 - 1942

The defeat of the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA) in the provincial election and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) in the federal election made one point especially clear to CCF leaders. The reproduction of certain institutionalized processes within the CCF had to be changed to respond more effectively to the Social Credit government. In particular, the former reliance on the UFA and Canadian Labour Party (CLP) organizations to recruit and motivate members and supporters to the CCF program failed to materialize in a political victory. Considerable Social Credit support came from the very constituency from which the base support for the CCF was supposed to be drawn.

UFA Integration and Constraints in the CCF

The crucial difference between the first period in the history of the Alberta CCF (1932-1935) and the second period (1935-1942) centers on the system reproduction of social relationships of members and leaders. The structural restraints put in place by the institutional reproduction of farmer-labour co-operation and the maintenance of organizational integrity undermined any social relationship that existed between the CCF in Alberta and individuals. In the second period, however, new forms of social relationships were produced and reproduced that ensured a degree of direct personal and social connection with the CCF.[1] After the dual defeats of 1935, both members and leaders sought to affirm a personal and social relationship with the Alberta CCF. The production and reproduction of these processes at both a social and systems level formed the basis of the second stage.

Immediately after the provincial election defeat in August 1935, questioning began as to the organizational structure of the CCF in Alberta. According to an editorial in the Alberta Labor News, the electoral disaster would be "a clearing of the ground for a new and better political structure for the farmers and workers of Alberta."[2] According to Elmer Roper, Albertans expressed disappointment that they were not given the opportunity to vote for CCF candidates and program. Farmers and labourers "were not prepared to accept as CCF candidates the representatives of either of the groups affiliated with the CCF".[3] He believed that the majority of the members of the CLP and the UFA members desired to "have their political expression through the CCF", that they were not prepared to assist in the reproduction of existing political and social relationships.[4] The foundation of the CCF program was waiting, according to Roper, "for the superstructure of an unified, homogeneous organization that will stand the test of experience in the days to come."[5]

Labour Party leaders, such as Roper, had to take some responsibility for the structural deficiencies that had enabled a Social Credit government to come to power. Roper's statement reflected a crucial reorientation away from existing social processes towards the development of new ones. Moreover, in a personal column, Roper insinuated that he had made a mistake in maintaining certain structural constraints against the provincial CCF. Accordingly, it was "better never late, but better late than never."[6] He realized that the Alberta CCF should have been structured differently from the beginning; more open as a political party rather than the creature of two provincial bodies:

> But, the people who had the decision in their hands - and of course I was one of them - had vested interests to protect. They felt that any provision for direct membership in the CCF in Alberta would militate against the prestige of the foundation organizations, the Labour Party and the United Farmers of Alberta. We were right too. But were wrong also.... We'd have been better off to let our prestige as established organizations go hang. If we had permitted the organization of CCF Clubs three years ago the chances are that they might have swamped the old organizations. But in so doing we'd have acquired a new prestige which might have stood up better than the variety we possessed.[7]

Roper's allegiance switched completely to the CCF. He openly assumed that the CLP and the UFA would be absorbed without difficulty into the provincial CCF. "I am all out for the formation of an unified C.C.F. movement in this province."[8] Members of the CLP (those within the General

Membership Section) wholeheartedly agreed with Roper's assessments. A resolution was forwarded by the Central Committee of the Calgary CLP requesting that the federal arrangement be abandoned and a "straight party be formed to be known as the CCF."[9]

In September 1935, the Provincial Council officially disbanded the ERA and replaced it with the CCF Clubs Section. Direct membership with the Alberta CCF was provided through this mechanism. In addition, the organizational inclusion of both UFA and CLP members into the framework of the party was opened. The Alberta Labour News reported that "this may be the open door through which Alberta may set up one strong CCF body, such as exists in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Ontario."[10] The new section was designed to incorporate the general membership section of the CLP and the UFA Clubs. Moreover, the executive advocated that membership in the CLP and UFA become individualized for "those prepared to accept the program and policies of the organization and to abide by its decisions."[11] This new arrangement provided for the automatic reorganization of the CLP Membership-At-Large section as part of the CCF Clubs section.

Ultimately, the production and reproduction of social processes, whereby ordinary citizens, supporters and members of the UFA and CLP could become members of the Alberta CCF, had a profound affect on existing institutionalized relationships between the UFA, CLP and the CCF. Members of the founding organizations who still believed in the organizational independence and integrity of the UFA and CLP felt threatened and alienated by the new populist swing of the Alberta CCF.

A crucial test for the provincial party came at the annual convention of the UFA in January 1936 at Calgary. Obviously, the most important issue to be discussed at the convention concerned the future political course of the UFA and its relationship with the CCF. Resolution 18, drafted by Norman Priestley, urged delegates to renounce all direct political activity and reconstitute the UFA as a "provincially rallying point for agricultural organizations."[12] The organization was asked to transfer its political role to the CCF. In the end, after two days of debate, the resolution was defeated and the UFA remained in provincial politics.[13]

The decision of the UFA against the better judgement of the CCF National Council, of which Priestly was part, led to the restructuring of the Alberta CCF during the spring and summer of 1936. A central council of CCF Clubs was established in February 1936, consisting of three executive positions and a number of "at large representatives."[14] By April, fifty-three clubs had been organized in the province.[15] The Commonwealth Youth Movement (Alberta Branch) was formed and affiliated with the Junior UFA.[16] Throughout the restructuring period, CCF leaders received contradictory advice from the membership on the organizational structure of the party. George Pritchard, for example, requested that the Alberta Provincial Council of the CCF be given disciplinary powers over affiliate bodies and the responsibility for drawing up a provincial CCF program.[17] The new CCF had to have a broader type of organization than previously to "encase the widest strata of the farmers and urban workers."[18] Furthermore, the task of the first Alberta CCF convention in July 1936 was to unify and co-ordinate the movement into a "homogeneous authoritative party of the common people."[19]

The provincial convention was the turning point in the history of the Alberta CCF. Definite patterns of social processes were produced that still contained certain structural constraints that had been imposed before 1935. The convention called for the involvement of the Alberta CCF in provincial politics. A provincial program had to be developed, however, with the approval of the three sections. Alberta CCF Clubs were to be affiliated with the national and provincial CCF councils, and provisions were made for the establishment of central councils of club organizations in every provincial constituency. An executive was created consisting of officers elected at the convention and one representative of each of the federal ridings. Overseeing provincial developments was a

Provincial Executive consisting of the president, vice-president, secretary and treasurer. A code of conduct upon which disciplinary measures would be based was drafted.[20] All the essential elements of a political party organization were produced and reproduced within the Alberta CCF. Various forms of social relationships were reproduced: between members of the affiliating organizations with respect to ultimate loyalty and purpose of the CCF; between members and leaders; between leaders; and between specific offices structurally defined. Although earlier institutional relationships between the UFA and CLP were reproduced structurally in the Alberta CCF, new conceptualizations of what the CCF was going to become forced both leaders and members to reorient themselves towards the new party and to undertake a major loyalty decision as to which organization to continue working within. Towards the end of the 1930s, this process was reproduced with the effect that members and leaders of the UFA and CLP who had made the decision to support the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation shifted their allegiance to the Alberta CCF. Those who did not, however, remained structurally attached to the old organization or resigned. The relationship between the CLP and CCF between 1935 and 1942 reflected a careful shift of members and leaders from one organization to the other. The relationship between the UFA and the CCF, however, was more precarious.

The organization of the CCF Clubs as the third section of the provincial CCF represented a significant break with the past structuration of the party. The executive believed that the plan was

> to broaden the basis of membership in the province to include persons who were not, and did not care to become, members of the Labour Party or UFA, but desired to associate themselves with the CCF.[21]

In January 1937, the UFA met in convention at Edmonton and again deferred the question of withdrawing from provincial politics in favour of the CCF. Robert Gardiner noted in a confidential report to the National Executive that "no work has been done by the directors of the UFA in support of the CCF."[22] Moreover, several members of the UFA Executive engaged in activities relating to the "People's League" in opposition to both Social Credit and the CCF. Former premier Richard Gavin Reid and Alfred Speakman were "diligent in broadcasting, via public meetings, propaganda calculated to turn the farmer against the CCF."[23] The UFA was divided into several groupings of members and leaders. Widespread confusion resulted at the convention as to the proper future course of action. A preferential ballot was given to convention delegates outlining several options, one of which was to remain affiliated with the CCF.[24] Interpretations of what the individual options meant differed. Gardiner noted that the third option meant affiliation with the national CCF only, thereby destroying the provincial CCF. The first option recommended that the UFA abandon politics to the CCF, but the second recommended abandoning politics without reference to any other political movement. Gardiner endorsed the perspective that the UFA should continue its affiliation status at the federal level. He was concerned that the CCF provincially was providing too much leadership for a movement that did not exist. The Alberta CCF, accordingly, was far more progressive than the people it wanted to lead. Gardiner believed that overt support for the CCF as a provincial party would "keep us away from the masses, or take us too far ahead of the masses...." The UFA was to Gardiner the "effective instrument and spearhead of progressive political thought in Alberta."[25] Attacking some UFA leaders who had become CCF members and supporters, Gardiner questioned

> What is the good of leadership if there is no one to lead. If you go too fast in your movement ahead, you will lose contact with the people and will not be able to take them with you.... I simply say that you must not go faster than people are capable of understanding and following you.[26]

Irvine responded by citing the moral obligation of UFA leaders to stand committed to the CCF as one of the founding bodies. A subtle warning was applied that he and other UFA members were prepared to switch their loyalties to the CCF if the UFA did not make the right decision.[27] The convention decided on the third ballot to remain affiliated with the CCF at the federal level.[28] The resolution adopted the next day recommended that the UFA "remain actively in provincial politics, as a provincial group."[29]

The result was, to CCF provincial leaders, unsatisfactory. However, the delegates had not supported the People's League, thereby depriving the CCF of valuable organizational machinery.[30] There was a fear among the leaders that both the intense pro- and anti- Social Credit supporters might swamp the UFA convention and force the organization to make a political committment. It became apparent that the majority of the UFA convention delegates (and possibly the remaining UFA members) saw the CCF as primarily a federal political force, and they had not yet accepted its provincial involvement. Moreover, with the previous experience of Social Credit clubs and locals undercutting UFA locals in the rural areas before 1935, the convention saw the formation of a separate CCF Clubs section as a threat to existing UFA local organizations. They requested, without success, a disbanding of the third section.[31]

Notwithstanding, the decision by the 1937 UFA convention caused keep concern and impatience among provincial leaders and members. Some of the UFA-CCF delegates threatened to withdraw from the convention and "break up the UFA."[32] Consideration was given to the thought of calling an emergency convention of the CCF Clubs in order to make a clean break.[33] Edward Garland, CCF organizer in Alberta, sought to continue the relationship with the UFA on an organizational and personal level. The organizational power of the UFA was still formidable and could assist in co-ordinating the rapid organization of CCF clubs in the rural areas. Moreover, CCF Club members should become UFA members

> thus retaining the radical viewpoint within the farm movement. If all the CCF supporters withdraw from the UFA the latter will be left entirely to the reactionaries and in all probability will be used against us at some critical moment.[34]

Both UFA and CCF leaders knew that open hostilities between the CCF Clubs and the UFA would prove fatal to the future of both organizations within the province. As a sign of good faith, the UFA convention approved the position that all candidates in provincial elections endorsed by the CCF Provincial Council should be labelled CCF.[35]

The relationship between the UFA and CCF remained shaky throughout 1937 and 1938. CCF leaders, who had made the transition from the UFA, acted from a position of presumed strength. They could not accept the kind of structural constraints that the UFA wanted to have established between the two organizations and its membership. As CCF local organizations were being established in every federal and provincial constituency under the mandate of the CCF Clubs section, the UFA continued to stress the need for a structural relationship that would reduce the membership drain. In the confrontation with the UFA, the Provincial Council called on the National Council for assistance. On 24 July 1937 the federal body unanimously passed a resolution criticizing the UFA leadership for the position taken at the January convention.[36] The Council openly sided with the provincial CCF arguing that the Clubs section had excellent opportunities for "building an effective organization which will be able to recapture the confidence of the people of Alberta in both provincial and federal elections."[37] Moving away from a position held during the early 1930s, the Council noted that the

> building of any effective party for federal purposes is clearly dependent on an effective party in the provincial field, and vice versa. The two are inseparable and are governed by the same general conditions.[38]

As a political ploy, the National Council pointed out to the CCF leadership that the Clubs section was growing at such a rate that it could overtake the UFA within two years.[39] Though these membership reports tended to be more optimistic than pessimistic, it made the UFA provincial and local leadership keenly aware of the organizational and structural existence of a potentially rival political party. All indications pointed to increased support for the CCF and decreased support for the UFA as a provincial party.[40]

Several political problems caused concern to both federal and provincial CCF leaders. The rise of the Unity League presented considerable obstacles to CCF extension efforts into UFA territory. The concern over Social Credit legislation disallowance in the autumn of 1937 and the introduction of the "Accurate News and Information Bill" prompted provincial leaders to reconceptualize their immediate tactics and long-term strategies.[41] While strenuously opposed to the Social Credit administration, the Alberta CCF was in the difficult position of defending Aberhart over the disallowance crisis.

On the one hand, provincial CCF leaders felt it necessary to present an united opposition to the Social Credit legislation, indicating to the public that the provincial schemes were both foolhardy and impractical. On the other hand, they also opposed federal intrusion into provincial affairs. At the same time, the CCF risked being shoved into a marginal position due to the formation of an anti-Aberhart popular front formed by the Liberals, Conservatives and remaining UFA leaders who had not joined the CCF. In an attempt to confront this situation, several meetings were arranged by the UFA and CCF in areas where the "political pot is boiling."[42] The involvement of the communists was an unknown element and their repetition of the popular front plea caused the party some problems.[43]

Edward Garland was increasingly worried about the impact of the Unity League on the CCF and UFA. He noted in a special report to the National Executive that the "popular front" organized against Social Credit was "playing the duce [sic] with our UFA and the Liberal Party seems to be coming back strong."[44] The League had been active in contacting UFA constituency officials but according to initial reports to the CCF, not much success. "However the [Provincial] Council felt that it is time the CCF point of view be more personally and effectively presented to the same Constituency officials."[45]

The National Council agreed with Garland's assessment and decided to hold the fourth national convention of the CCF in Edmonton in June 1938 to prop up the provincial organization in view of hesitant supporters, members and leaders of the UFA and CLP. Media attention was focused on CCF leaders, both federally and provincially. Moreover, the National Council could see first hand the situation in Alberta and appraise it better. At the end of the convention, the federal leadership passed a resolution condemning the UFA for its political inaction. In their view, the "present affiliation of the UFA with the CCF is incomplete and conditional" thus making CCF organization in Alberta "extremely difficult" and with the likelihood of serious conflict between affiliates. Moreover, without a "strong CCF organization, uniting farmer, labour and other workers, the field of progressive political action in

Alberta may be captured by non-progressive forces" [Unity League].[46] Lewis was further instructed to pressure the leaders of the UFA concerning the "complete affiliation with the CCF and full acceptance of the responsibilities of membership under its constitution."[47] To add subtle pressure on the UFA, the National Council authorized the CCF Clubs section to continue their organizational work throughout the province.[48]

Provincial CCF leaders, in their reports to the national leadership, tended to overemphasize the success the CCF was having in organizing local organizations and clubs. In 1938, provincial organization under the control of the CCF Clubs was under way "very rapidly" in twenty rural constituencies, with "constituency organizations and poll committees doing an active and effective piece of work."[49] Provincial organizer Edward Garland was much more pessimistic than Roper in his assessment of the state and future of the Alberta CCF at the beginning of 1939. It was "hardly worth while to spend too much effort in Alberta in the present chaotic condition of all political thought and movement."[50] Garland still entertained some hope that the UFA would back the CCF as its political vehicle thereby making a separate organization untenable. However, the political future of the Alberta CCF and the social relationship between the two organizations were sealed with the decision by the UFA to withdraw from provincial politics and from the CCF. By an overwhelming vote, the UFA convention in January 1939 decided to "cease from direct political action as an organization."[51] This policy was drafted reluctantly by Norman Priestley and Robert Gardiner on instruction by the UFA Executive.[52] The UFA Board recommended that the organization "cease all our direct political activity." [53] Moreover, no individual, local or association could be allowed to "use any part of the UFA machinery to endorse or promote the interests of a political party or movement."[54] In effect, those leaders and members who had remained with the UFA after the 1935 debacle opted to withdraw from politics without providing a clear political alternative, contrary to previous UFA policy. It was difficult for those within the UFA, either as members or leaders, to retain their positions of authority or responsibility while also working for or supporting the CCF. David Lewis wrote Priestley expressing his sincere hope that UFA leaders who had an interest in the CCF "will now do everything in their power to bring the general membership of the UFA directly into the CCF."[55] With the collapse of the UFA, the CCF remained the only political party through which the farmers of Alberta could "win their emancipation."[56] This hope faded completely when it became apparent that the UFA Executive and Board of Directors had decided to disengage completely and ban any political involvement of its leaders or members at the provincial or local level.

National CCF Chairman M.J. Coldwell, in reassuring the provincial CCF, noted that the final break would result in increased organizational preparedness for the upcoming provincial and federal elections.[57] Duplication of effort by both parties made organization increasingly difficult at both the local and constituency level. The UFA could return to its original role as an economic association and the CCF would become the "unified political expression of the farmers and workers of Alberta."[58]

The decision of the UFA was understandable given the unique political situation. The party suffered from organizational dysfunction and social disintegration in the aftermath of the Social Credit victory. Social Credit had polarized the members and leadership of the UFA into protracted pro- and anti-CCF camps. Those who had supported the CCF since its inception in 1932 gradually, over a seven-year period, made their way into the CCF either through the CLP Membership-At-Large branch or the CCF Clubs section. What remained of the UFA in 1939 were members and leaders that could not, or would not, be integrated into the CCF. On another level, however, the Alberta CCF relied more on the UFA for its organizational structure and tactics. In the rural areas, CCF organization developed structurally and functionally along lines determined by the UFA. Constituency and local organizations were ultimately the same. The importance of local organizations, clubs and study groups, evident in UFA organizations during the 1920s and 1930s, was transferred to the CCF.

Social practices and relationships that existed within the UFA during the 1930s, and which had not been disrupted by Social Credit, were similarly reproduced within the CCF. The success of this integration depended in large measure on the intrusion of Social Credit (the extent of system/social integration between the UFA and Social Credit), personalities and regional alignment. A low level of social integration between the UFA and the CCF occurred in provincial constituencies south of Red Deer. In the provincial election of 1940, CCF candidates ran in only two out of the eighteen southern ridings (11%). Wes Scott and J.H. Coldwell ran as candidates, successfully making the transition from UFA to CCF. In Olds and Warner, two former UFA candidates ran as Independents instead of under the CCF banner. Notwithstanding the arguments of the Independents having an united front against Social Credit in 1940, it appears that a number of UFA leaders and prominent members in southern Alberta refused to cross over to the CCF. The organizational restrictions placed on individuals and local organizations acting for the CCF by the UFA Executive in 1939 made this social integration more difficult, if not impossible. By contrast, the degree of social and system integration in central and northern Alberta between the UFA and CCF was much closer.

The abandonment of the UFA as the second affiliate of the Alberta CCF left the CLP in a precarious situation. Ultimately, between 1935 and 1939, the CCF had increased its support in urban areas.[59] Members of the General Membership section of the CLP moved out of the CLP into the CCF Clubs section after the latter had been set up by the Provincial Council in 1935. Prominent Labour Party spokespersons and leaders, such as Roper and Walter Mentz, switched their allegiance to the CCF. Long-time labour leaders from the 1920s, such as Carl Berg, Fred White, S.A.G. Barnes and Alf Farmilo, were superseded by younger more militant party leaders. In particular, the activity of the CCF Clubs in forging an united front with Social Credit and the Communist Party of Canada in 1937 at both the provincial and municipal level alienated some party leaders who sought to maintain the organizational integrity of the CLP.[60] The extent to which the CLP would co-operate with the CCF depended in large part on the latter's success at the polls in 1940. The Party in 1940 had 11% of the provincial votes and 13% percent of the federal votes. The party ran fifteen federal candidates and thirty-six provincial candidates.[61] The general lack of membership integration from the UFA to the CCF by 1940 was a key factor in the party's inability to nominate in southern

Alberta. Moreover, "independent farmers" ran in two constituencies - Beaver River and Stony Plain.[62] In Calgary and Edmonton, the left put up independent candidates.[63] The candidature of Barnes sent a warning to the provincial CCF leaders that they had to quicken the pace of amalgamation with the CLP. Although the division of the left and labour in certain areas of Alberta indicated a lack of social integration between the two forces, it tended to accelerate the system integration of the CLP into the CCF.

A large number of members and supporters of the CLP in urban areas (e.g., Edmonton, Calgary, Lethbridge and Red Deer) tended to see themselves as being politically polarized between Social Credit and the Independent forces. The daily newspapers were not sympathetic to the provincial CCF, either at the federal or provincial level. Provincially, they perceived the CCF as "vote-splitters" and urged their readers to vote Independent if they were anti-Aberhart or anti-Social Credit instead of voting CCF.[64]

For certain progressive and left-wing elements within the province, labour included, concern was expressed that Social Credit was moving away from reformism and progressivism towards the right and that the Independents stood for real progress. The debate in the press surrounding the comparison between the New Zealand Labour

Party and the Social Credit Party in Alberta tended to convince more than a few leftists that Social Credit had to be supported.[65] The division between the CCF and the CLP was evident in Calgary as Fred White, the official CCF candidate, pitted himself against Duncan Mitchell, the Independent Labour candidate and president of the Calgary Council of the Canadian Confederation of Labour. One labour supporter noted that he "had always supported Labour in the past regardless of who the candidate was and I shall do so in this election."[66]

The Alberta CCF's lack of success in the elections can be attributed to the fact that the party was not adequately prepared. CCF leaders attempted in the months after the 1939 UFA convention to revive and stimulate interest in the CCF throughout rural Alberta. William Irvine's bitter attacks on the provincial government combined with general disenchantment succeeded in reducing Aberhart's support. However, all the organizational efforts did not translate into support for the party. The provincial and federal campaign was polarized between Social Credit and the anti-Social Credit coalition. The party was ignored by the major newspapers and criticized by independent candidates for splitting the opposition vote. The lack of effective leadership (divided between CCF Clubs and CLP sections) and party organization, the ambiguity of the federal party's stand on the war, and the ineffective social integration between the UFA and CCF were significant factors in the party's inability to make a better showing. Party leaders recognized the importance of consolidation and social/systems integration between all sections of the party. The CCF Clubs section was instrumental in organizing provincial and federal constituency associations at the local level. The direct member section of the party became increasingly larger until it exerted a major influence on the organizational structure and activities of the party. The CLP viewed these developments critically. The CLP was declining as a political organization in terms of membership and leadership strength. Labour representation on the Edmonton and Calgary city councils diminished significantly. Canadian Labour Party leaders who remained tied to the party (e.g., Mary Crawford and Alf Farmilo) saw the urban decline of CLP strength as a direct consequence of the relationship between the CLP and the CCF. In response, they asked the National Council to allow the CLP to have full control over the political organization in urban areas. This led to a crucial turning-point in CCF political and social history, as members within the CLP had to make a clear choice between their party and the CCF.

In the summer and fall of 1941, a movement began to consolidate the CCF forces into an unified party. At a provincial Council of the CCF in July, a motion was passed

> authorizing the calling of a special joint convention of the Labor Party and the General Membership [section] for the purpose of amalgamating the two groups into one Alberta section of the C.C.F.[67]

The Labour Party met in convention in September and resolved to remain a separate political entity within Alberta municipal and provincial politics.[68] Left-wing labour in Alberta would be organized entirely by the CLP.

Roper felt that it was an impossible situation "to allow the Labor Party to be half in and half out of the CCF" leaving other units "hamstrung by [the] necessity" of obtaining CLP approval for any political activity.[69] He believed that the CCF would never become developed in Alberta unless a definitive Alberta section was organized "capable of making decisions without having to get the approval of a small and not influential appendage."[70]

The CCF Clubs section, meeting in October 1941, was firm in their refusal to adopt the Labour Party's proposal and forwarded to the Provincial Council an alternative. They called upon the provincial leadership to abolish the federal form of organization and set up a "single Alberta section of the CCF by the amalgamation of the Labor Party and the General membership groups.[71] They recommended, however, that there would be no interference into CLP municipal politics.

The Provincial Council of the CCF met on 1 November in Red Deer to consider the possible consolidation of the CCF in Alberta.[72] The General Membership section of the CCF "unanimously endorsed the proposal to form a single Alberta section of the CCF".[73] It was acknowledged that the federated system in which the CLP and the CCF operated separately was "seriously hampering the work of the movement in the province."[74] Conversely, CLP delegates argued that the Labour Party, as a separate entity, would "have a stronger appeal in industrial areas than the CCF".[75] A moderate position was presented to the convention that the Provincial Council meet to abolish the "federation form of organization ... and the setting up of a single Alberta section of the CCF by the amalgamation of the Labour Party and the General Membership Section."[76] The Council agreed to meet on 29 November in order to make a final decision regarding the organization of the Alberta CCF on a single party basis.[77]

The resolution of the CLP called for the participation of one party federally (the CCF) and one party provincially and municipally (the CLP). Irvine considered the proposal absurd and noted that it would "make matters very much worse" than the already complicated situation.[78] The CCF Clubs section was firm in their refusal to adopt the proposal. The Labour Party received a month delay in order to take the matter back to the membership. Irvine believed that such a period was designed to "stall any action in the hope that if they can stall it long enough they will retard our progress and thus win their point in the end."[79] Irvine doubted that the CLP would agree to the new proposal but questioned the tactics of moving forward without them. The Labour Party "is as much CCF as we are under the present set-up. **But it is equally certain that we can't proceed with them.**"[80]

Another thorny problem which developed was the insistence of the CLP to change the name of the proposed united party from the "Co-operative Commonwealth Federation" to the "Farmer-Labour Party".[81] Irvine recognized the constitutional problems associated with such a name change, but approved it regardless.

> My view is that we have the power to call ourselves a Farm-Labor Party affiliated with the C.C.F. Also I think that name would be very much better for us. But it might be inadvisable to make that change now after years in which we have become known as C.C.F. On the other hand if the whole national movement were to adopt the name Farm-Labor party at our next annual convention such action might be in the long run be the best course to take. However, that might be, I am quite sure that we shall have to face such a proposal here if and when there is a convention to consider abandoning the federation set-up.[82]

Irvine was concerned that the difficulties between the two organizations might escalate into a full-fledged crisis. CCF work had been "absolutely blocked" in Calgary, Medicine Hat and Lethbridge because of the factional warfare waged between supporters of the CLP and CCF. Particularly in Calgary the CLP "managed to sabotage the function of a joint council in these cities since 1935".[83]

Within the CLP there were leaders who were in favour of completing the structurational process for the CCF. Mary Crawford, of the Edmonton CLP, criticized the Calgary CLP for "holding out against one party."[84] There had always been a strong Labour group in Calgary and "they have never been able to arrive at a working arrangement as we have in Edmonton."[85] Crawford was convinced that the time had come

> when we must form one party, and let the chips fall where they may. I believe the CLP may realize that too and would go the whole way if they could find the name 'labour' somewhere in the title.[86]

In times of crisis the provincial CCF and CLP turned to the national CCF leadership for guidance and advice. David Lewis was convinced that quick action had to be taken to get the Alberta party on the correct path. In November 1941, the National Executive met and prepared a decision on the Alberta situation, which was not made public.[87]

All affiliated sections in Alberta recognized that the federated structure was "confusing, cumbersome and inefficient."[88] Even though the CLP acknowledged this conceptualization, it continued to see itself as a vital and vibrant political organization in the urban areas in structural contradiction to the CCF. Their continued existence merely added to the "present confusion and inefficiency" and would create two provincial parties. Their proposal would "destroy one of the basic objectives of the CCF, namely to unite the farmers and industrial workers in one political instrument."[89] As a compromise to the CLP, the National Executive suggested that an appropriate subtitle be applied to the official name to indicate the political unification of agrarians and workers. With these considerations, the National Executive supported the resolutions of the CCF convention and the Alberta Provincial Council without reservation. It was convinced, moreover, that the amalgamation was the only way "in which the present situation can be improved and the CCF placed on a sound basis." Adding a subtle warning, the Council stated that

> If the progress of our movement is hampered now by unnecessary obstacles, then we may well be jeopardizing the welfare of the Canadian people not only during the war but also when peace and victory have been achieved... Should the Alberta Section fail to achieve the necessary unity as outlined earlier, the National Executive will consider its duty to advise the National Council **to use its powers, and to take whatever steps may be necessary to adjust the situation in Alberta once and for all.**[90]

The National Executive was not prepared to allow the situation in Alberta "to drag on" and promised the CCF leaders that they would take "whatever drastic action [that] may be necessary to achieve the unification you desire."[91]

Lewis indicated that he would acquiesce to any decision made by the Provincial Council in order to alleviate the situation, but the name change to the "Alberta Farm-Labour

Party" would not be accepted. On principle, he felt that the use of the term "Farmer-Labour Party" as an official subtitle of the movement appearing on all campaign literature would "achieve, partially at least, the purpose in view without changing the name itself nationally or in any province." But changing the name would be a "grave disadvantage" in view of the tradition and reputation of the title and letters of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation.[92]

The more conservative CLP leadership, buttressed by membership support, refused to accept the statement of the National Executive. According to Irvine, the Labour Party "planted their feet firmly in front of them, raised their tails, laid back their ears and assumed the well-known attitude of the donkey."[93] Using the threat of the National Executive to take unilateral action, the CCF managed to obtain from the CLP "their unanimous decision to call a convention." The ultimate objective of the 24 January 1942 convention was to "form a single party with or without the acquiescence of the Labor rump."[94]

The "unity" convention of 23-24 January 1942 succeeded in bringing together the General Membership Section and the CLP under the veiled threat from the national CCF leadership. According to Roper, "There was not so much unanimity as there was determination that differences would not be permitted to interfere with the purpose for which the convention was called."[95] The convention decided that the present organizational form for the Alberta CCF was "cumbersome, unwieldy and confusing". In its place the Canadian Labour Party and the General Membership Section of the CCF combined to "form a single political party to be known as the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation - The Alberta Farmer-Labour Party."[96]

The process that occurred between 1935 and 1942 can be generally described as system integration. Two founding organizations of the Alberta CCF were incorporated structurally into a new organization. However, the success of system integration depended largely on the extent of social integration between the members and supporters of the UFA and CLP. The Alberta CCF, in the initial period before 1935, attempted to base its organizational strengths on the established structure of the UFA and CLP. This process was complicated due to the organizational structures of the founding parties tending to overlap. A structured political relationship existed between agrarians and labour political establishments in Edmonton and Calgary. This process attempted to be reproduced in rural areas when the General Membership Section of the CLP extended into predominantly UFA constituencies. Ultimately, the CCF was the structured reproduction of these social and institutional relations. Structuration of the CCF along these lines provided for the social integration of leaders, supporters and members of the UFA and CLP into the Alberta CCF. The formation of the CCF Clubs section in 1935 institutionalized the structured developments that had loosely existed since 1932. The three-pronged access to the CCF (farmer, labour and citizen) was designed to make social integration easier. However, institutional structuration within the UFA and CLP over twenty years had caused the continued reproduction of organizational solidarity and integrity on the part of some leaders and members. As a result, a contradiction between the two processes (structuration of the CCF and structuration of the UFA or CLP) affected the degree of social integration. System integration between the UFA and CCF was affected by the forced withdrawal of the agrarian organization from politics thereby freeing leaders, members and supporters. System integration between the CLP and CCF was effected by the organizational linkages between the two organizations in 1942. In both cases, a clear split between party leaders over system integration weakened the extent of social integration. This split had more to do with personal attitudes and desires than anything else. The desire to maintain organizational integrity within the CLP or UFA coincided with individuals' leadership role or status. Other subsidiary leaders, having a desire to maintain or escalate their leadership roles, made the switch from the old party to the new.

Members and supporters of the affiliated parties may have held the same psychological attachment to the party. The continued social reproduction of the CCF as a political arrangement between farmers and labourers made the transition easier for members and supporters. The unpredictable element in any systemic model was Social Credit and William Aberhart. This external force affected system integration at the expense of equitable social integration. Faced with a political organization that tended to attract the same social milieu as the CCF, the UFA and CLP moved closer to each other institutionally, but not socially. The formation of the Clubs Section in 1935 was a structural consequence of the provincial election of 1935. The various attempts by National CCF leaders to assist in the system integration of the UFA into the CCF between 1936 and 1939 was a response to a difficult political situation in which Social Credit consolidated itself after the backbenchers' revolt in 1937. While system integration was essentially successful at a structural level, it was ineffective at a social level. When the CCF was formed in 1932, it was commonly assumed that leaders of the affiliated sections had the consent and approval of the membership and supporters of the party. When the leaders implemented a system integration, they further assumed that the membership would follow them into the new political organization. The emphasis on leadership within the UFA-CLP-CCF triad suggests that an incorrect assumption had been made leading to dysfunctional consequences. UFA members and supporters did not follow their progressive leaders into the CCF.[97] The debacle of 1935 (federally and provincially) can be seen as a membership and supporter revolt against their leadership. For CLP members, there was also a dysfunctional relationship between major leaders and the membership.[98] Through the structural mechanism of the General Membership section, CLP members and supporters provided the incentive by which CLP leaders shifted their allegiance to the CCF.

The organizational framework cemented by the 1942 amalgamation between the CCF and the CLP provided the means for uniting the various strands left abandoned by the UFA decision in 1939. The organization went through several shifts in structural orientation from 1935 onwards. In 1935, Alberta CCF leaders felt that the movement had to undergo a revolutionary change in structure to appeal more directly to the Alberta people.[99] This represented a significant departure from the form of organization that had been set up in 1932 and from the UFA model of organization.[100] The organization of the CCF Clubs section replicated the structural dynamics of the CLP. Moreover, the constitution of the CCF Clubs section formed the prototype structuration for the Alberta Farmer-Labour Party in 1942.[101]

In 1935, the CCF Provincial Council authorized the formation of clubs in rural and rural areas, independent of the other affiliated bodies, and citizens could thus join on an individual (as opposed to collective) basis.[102] Any individual "subscribing to the platform and manifesto of the organization and not being a member of any other political organization shall be eligible for membership."[103] Local clubs were formed by ten or more individuals in urban and rural localities.[104] The structure of each club followed regulated procedures. An executive would be elected by the membership consisting, where numbers warranted, of a chairman, secretary and/or treasurer and three other members.[105] Procedures and other essentials of organization and the political conduct of the clubs were provided for by local by-laws, and submitted to and approved by the next higher body, the provincial Constituency Central Council. There were cases, however, where the provincial constituency association had not yet been formed and responsibility for the clubs was undertaken by the provincial executive.[106] Where numbers warranted a provincial constituency association was formed consisting of a central council of representatives of all affiliating clubs. Following along lines similar to that of the UFA constitution, representation on the central council flowed from the principle of one delegate for every ten members.[107]

At the provincial level, on a par with the UFA and CLP provincial executives, was the central committee of the CCF Clubs of Alberta that consisting of officers, such as president, vice-president and secretary-treasurer, elected by the annual provincial convention.[108] A reproduction of the UFA political practice was the autonomy of district or constituency councils to handle their own organizational and political affairs. Disciplinary control, for example, was delegated to local leaders.[109]

In 1939, the CCF Clubs section of the Alberta CCF was transformed into the "Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, Alberta General Membership Section." This organizational act amalgamated the UFA clubs and locals, CCF clubs and the general membership section of the CLP into one provincial organization.[110] The restructuring of the party at the local level reproduced the relationships between the local and provincial leaders that had developed during the period after the Social Credit victory in 1935. More importantly, the party had structured itself with a view towards competing at an electoral level. The local CCF club (or UFA or CLP club) became, in essence, the local poll organization composed of members of the CCF who carried out political activities between and during election campaigns. While constituted organs such as the provincial and federal constituency association executives and boards acted as intermediaries between the party's leadership and the members and supporters, organization of locals and polling organizations necessitated, not simply another bureaucratic level within a complex political organization, but an organized entity through which leaders could interrelate with members. Fundamentally, the party operated on provincial and federal constituency basis thereby obscuring the demarcation between provincial and federal poll organizations. In cases of difficulty or confusion, the central (provincial or federal) or constituency executive could decide to organize more substantial organizations, such as CCF clubs, that transcended polling boundaries.[111] The purpose of these local organizations were threefold: to organize political campaigns during elections, to stimulate political interests between elections and to elect delegates to provincial or federal nominating conventions and to annual constituency conventions.[112] The poll and local organizations were fundamentally responsible for the structuration process that reproduced the social and political interrelationships that tied together party supporters, members and leaders. Although the CCF was initially organized as a political party operating at the federal level, the organization of the CCF and later the General Membership section reflected provincial political orientations. The basis of the political structuration occurred at the provincial level. Deprived of any federal Member of Parliament (unlike between 1932 and 1935), the

CCF structure and organization, and hence the reproduction of social processes, were provincial in scope. The provincial constituency model became the structural model for the organization primarily because it reinforced the social relationships at the local level between the CCF, UFA and CLP.[113]

The provincial executive provided for the organization of constituency associations in all provincial constituencies but these were not artificial creations. In areas where the CLP and other affiliates (trade union, agrarian or municipal parties) existed, CCF constituency councils were formed composed of equal representation from each affiliate organization to reproduce political co-operation between progressive forces.[114] The constituency executive was responsible for the

> general administration of the affairs of the constituency at all times between conventions and shall also be responsible for the complete organization of all the polls in the constituency.[115]

The provincial constituency convention was the major democratic institution within the local party and was composed of representatives of the polling organizations and clubs on the basis of members.[116] The business of the constituency convention was to review the political and party work of the constituency, approve the financial report, suggest amendments to the provincial platform, elect constituency executive and board members and elect delegates to the annual provincial convention.[117]

Federal constituency associations were provided for by the provincial executive depending on political conditions. In areas where CCF affiliates (provincial and local) were active, a co-operative federal council could be formed for reproducing harmonious political relations and co-operation. However, from the beginning, there was no strict demarcation between federal and provincial party organizations. More precisely, the only federal organization that existed was the sum of corresponding provincial organizations. The only political force the federal constituency council had was to co-ordinate provincial associations within the federal constituency "into one effective federal unit to handle the federal campaign."[118] More importantly for the reproduction of social relationships and processes at the local party level, the composition of the federal executive was exactly the same as that of the provincial executives.[119] The calling and purpose of the federal constituency convention generally followed that of the provincial, except for the federal political slant. The administration of the federal constituency between elections, insofar as this did not involve the selection of a candidate (i.e., mundane political tasks), was handled most appropriately by provincial constituency leaders.[120] This ensured, more often than not, a high degree of social integration between

CCF members, leaders and supporters, across constituency boundaries. This also ensured a high degree of political effectiveness insofar as external political conditions allowed for greater effectiveness and significance.

Another important structuration process that was completed at this stage in the organic development of the Alberta CCF was the process of nominating candidates for federal and provincial elections. Previously, as forms of social reproduction, CCF candidates were chosen through negotiated compromises with affiliated groups that made up the Alberta CCF. In 1939, after the withdrawal of the UFA, the procedure was tightened to ensure that the basis of representation for elections remained within the party. Moreover, no nomination convention would be valid unless at least one-third of the polling organizations or locals had representatives at the meeting. This ensured crucial local autonomy over the selection of the running of candidates. No dead constituency organization (one in which there was no functioning party apparatus) could be driven to nominate a candidate. The procedure by which candidates were nominated was specifically spelled out. Unlike other political parties, through the established rules and norms, no candidates would be accepted as "CCF candidates" unless selected by a accredited nominating convention. Thus, it was a physical impossibility to have independent CCF candidates in the field. This process merely reinforced the reproduced norm to protect the name of the party so its use could not be used by fringe or independent candidates.[121]

The constitution of the General Membership section of the Alberta CCF stemmed from that of the other province where a formalistic CCF structure had been developed, without the hindrance of affiliates. The essential difference between the 1936 and 1939 constitutions was that the provision allowing the party to "cooperate with other organizations having similar aims and objectives" was removed. Any candidate who before or after the nomination agreed to accept an endorsement from, or formed an alliance with any other political party, would be automatically dropped as a CCF candidate.[122]

A significant difference between the two structural forms of the CCF involved the delicate issue of CCF clubs. Originally conceived as part of Woodsworth's concept of a federated party, the clubs became more of a nuisance than an aid to the federal party leadership. They quickly took on a character of their own, in terms of organization and ideology. As the party became more centralized and affiliated groups were either replaced or superseded by the CCF, the need for such clubs became redundant.[123] These clubs, however, took on a life of their own and refused to die out. They were remnants of UFA locals or study clubs that had merely changed their names after the UFA decided to vacate politics. These clubs simply reproduced themselves within the new conceptual structure of the CCF.[124]

Along with this structural restraint, the objectives of the CCF in Alberta changed. In 1936, the CCF was designed to

> promote through political action and other appropriate means the establishment of a co-operative commonwealth based upon the common ownership and democratic control of the means and instruments of production and distributing wealth in which the basic principles will be the supplying of human needs and not the making of profits and to Co-operate with other organizations having similar aims and objectives.[125]

Three years later, the Alberta CCF substantially reduced the passage taking out reference to co-operation with other groups and watering down the substance of the policy from "common ownership and democratic control" to "regulating production, distribution and exchange."[126]

After the constitutional change in 1939, the Alberta CCF had become a highly structured and centralized political party. The CLP continued to maintain its hold on the urban centres through their central committees, but the shift of members, supporters and leaders from the CLP to the CCF General Membership Section drained whatever organizational strength the CLP had left after the 1935 debacle. Most significantly, this process involved the personal committment by dedicated CLP leaders and members to move away from the Canadian Labour Party towards a newer and unfamiliar political party. The political commitment of leaders such as Harry Ainlay, Mary Crawford, Roper and Mentz towards making the CCF a "united front party" negated any organizational relationships they may have had to the old CLP. However, the possibility of unique individual designs, ambitions and emotions that may have motivated them to switch their allegiance away from the CLP towards the CCF cannot be discounted. The tests of the political unity would only come through an examination of crises in which supporters, members and leaders participated.

Chapter IV

Towards Crisis: The Alberta Farmer-Labour Party, Social Conflict and System Contradiction, 1942 - 1949

The creation of a united political organization, such as the Alberta Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, necessitated the structural reproduction of political relationships that existed between members, supporters and leaders. In particular, new forms of organizational structures were designed to support the structuration process. At the top of the organizational structure were the central party establishment and apparatus.[1] The Provincial Board was enlarged to allow for equal representation from both the ex-UFA and ex-CLP leaders and members within the CCF. The election of Elmer Roper as a MLA in 1942 separated the party leader from the president. A demarcation in party tasks and perspectives resulted. Two perspectives emerged, both complementary and contradictory - the party as an organizational entity, and the party as a political and legislative force. The Provincial Board straddled both these perspectives, in much the same way as the old UFA Board did in sorting out the disjunction between the demands of the local constituencies and those of the government.

The provincial executive was chiefly concerned with the continuing structuration of the CCF in Alberta. Assisting them in their organizational tasks, and reproducing the organizational perspectives of the party was the Provincial Office, controlled by the Executive, not by the provincial convention.[2] The establishment of a Provincial Office by the CCF in 1939 did more than just centralize a growing bureaucratic political organization. Haphazard party procedures that had been adopted from the UFA and CLP were redesigned and reproduced to give the party a semblance of legitimacy. The institutions of membership dues, subscriptions, donations, balance sheets, financial record keeping, auditing, membership and subscription drives, and organizational drives were all designed, not only to support the party's organizational structures, but also to reinforce the political existence of an institution called the Alberta CCF within the consciousness of supporters and members. Few critical observations have been made of the normative every-day institutional occurrences that transpired at both the local and provincial level of the political party, but the conclusion is these practices helped to establish the CCF as a viable political organization and force in Alberta.

The Provincial Secretary, for example, was responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the party. At Edmonton, the secretary was the vital link between the national and provincial parties, between the provincial executive and the constituency organizations, and between the leaders and members. The secretary was responsible for the communication and information flow and directed the implementation of decisions. The secretary's task was to co-ordinate the activities of federal, provincial and local CCF organizations.

The other important position within the party was the provincial organizer, whose duties were to help in the operation of constituency organizations, plan and participate in local membership, subscription and election fund-raising drives, and co-ordinate the nomination of candidates and election campaigns. Regional organizers were invariably hired to cover southern and northern Alberta.[3] Moreover, to maintain ties with local areas, provincial leaders were required to act as regional and constituency organizers in the areas from which they came or represented.[4]

At the local level of the party, the structural complexities necessitated by the centralization and bureaucratization of the party after 1942 did not infringe lower level organization of supporters and members. Within each provincial constituency, the constitution provided for the organization of clubs, locals and groups. With the approval of the constituency executive, six or more members in any locality could form a CCF Club for social, educational and political purposes.[5] However, for the purpose of nominating candidates and conducting election campaigns, members of all clubs and locals within the constituency had to act through the constituency associations.

Slowly, local party units were organizationally superseded by other institutions. The local social interactions between individuals in different clubs were supposed to be transposed to the constituency organization level. However, with the introduction of the poll organization - a sublocal group - composed of four or more members for the purpose of holding meetings, the reproduction of social relationships and processes shifted to the local level, rather than crystalize at the constituency level. Party organization at the constituency level was formalized only by its institutionalization. Structuration took place at the local level between individual members, supporters, sympathizers and local leaders. The party constitution imposed certain structural and social constraints upon local party operations by addressing what could transpire and by whom.

The constitution stipulated that poll organizations had to exist during election campaigns. However, at a social level within the local party, poll organizations became the nucleus around which the party functioned between elections.[6] Official sanction for this development was legitimized by the private inter-relationships between provincial and local leaders that by-passed federal and provincial constituency executives and boards.

The formal structure of the Alberta CCF was completed in 1944 shortly before the provincial general election. The constitution adopted at the annual convention in November 1944 was the culmination of five years of organizational development that had begun in 1939. Despite all the structural implications of a provincial executive and leadership, provincial office, party functionaries, and strict conformities to roles and formalities, there was a certain adherence to informal political and social relationships that had been reproduced since 1932 between significant individuals and groups in Alberta. The emphasis upon local and constituent autonomy, from the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA), was incorporated into the structure of social practices and relationships within the new CCF. This was similarly reciprocated at the national level when the CCF provincial leadership made it clear to federal CCF leaders that they would not tolerate any interference into provincial party autonomy.[7] Provincial leaders realized from the beginning that they could not impose their wishes upon local party organizations. When unique local conditions suggested a relaxation of ordinary rules and norms, the Provincial Executive generally reversed the modifications to ensure that they did not contravene the spirit of the constitution or provincial conference decisions, or alter the standards of recruitment, procedures for selecting candidates, or relationships between the local party organization, the provincial and the national structures.

To some critical observers, the provincial executive and office staff could be seen in a machiavellian sense as oligarchical instruments of party power. They were entrusted with the constitutional right to conduct inquiries into alleged breaches of prescribed party procedures and to apply sanctions against disobedient groups and individuals. Accordingly, the Provincial Board had the power "to discipline any CCF member by warning, reprimand or suspension for any cause by it deemed sufficient."[8] However, the power wielded by party executives was not uni-directional. Even with the adoption of a unified and rigid party structure in 1942, the Alberta CCF remained a loosely constructed political party. Party leadership was decentralized throughout the province and the central establishment tended to rely more on regional, constituency and local leaders for information and political incentive in day-to-day affairs. The provincial executive was composed of individuals who had been politically and organizationally shaped at a local level within the UFA and CLP. Through their out-going personality and commitment to the party, provincial leaders interacted with the members of the party on a daily basis either by sifting through incoming correspondence or by visiting party locals throughout Alberta. The relationship between the leaders and party members was close, as demonstrated by the correspondence that flowed into the provincial office. The party could not operate in an organizational vacuum despite the continued reproduction of its populist foundations. However, unlike the other political parties in Alberta, including Social Credit in the 1950s, the CCF continued to maintain a cadre approach to party building.

Inherent within the structuration of the Alberta CCF in the 1940s were the seeds of its destruction. Part of the failure of the party to succeed politically in an adverse political climate centred on the long-term effects of the initial structuration process that occurred between 1932 and 1942. These traditions sharpened normal political party problems of differences of opinion, tactical orientation and strategic perspectives regarding what the party was, how it would be structured and function, and its future direction. There were organizational differences between supporters of the UFA and the CLP, and political differences between radicals and moderates. These differences crystallized in a series of intensely political debates and crises within the Party between 1939 and 1956. An examination of these crises indicates that there were significant social conflicts among leaders and party members that led to system contradiction in the 1950s. At that point, the party became largely irrelevant to the external environment, the product of constant squabbling between interparty factions and groupings of leaders and members.

The basic disagreement between various members and groups in the late 1940s and early 1950s hinged on whether the Alberta CCF was conceptualized as "cadre party" or a "mass membership party".[9] The former was upheld by socialists and radicals within the party such as Nellie Peterson, William Irvine and Harold Bronson; the latter viewpoint of the federal leadership and the more conservative provincial leaders such as Roper, Neil Reimer and Ivor Dent. An organization, such as the Alberta CCF, could not be forged and consistently reproduced socially and structurally in the face of serious theoretical flaws emanating from a difference of perspectives regarding the processes. The structuration process succeeded in the 1930s in reproducing the social and political coalition between the UFA and CLP leaders, and members and supporters, but in so doing it had produced contradictory conceptions of what it was that was being replicated. Social conflict developed within the party when various individuals attempted to put into practice their concept of the party-building practice. Moreover, political conflict was accentuated by personal conflict in which individual motivations, emotions and limited awareness affected internal consciousness of reality at the local level.

Political conflict became personalized and personal conflicts became politicized.

Party Unity and the Elections of 1944-45

The Alberta CCF emerged from the November 1942 annual provincial convention united as a political party. A provincial program was prepared for the upcoming provincial election expected in late 1943 or early 1944. Two external and unknown factors made future plans of the party uncertain. Firstly, the direction of the Aberhart administration during its second term in office was indeterminate. Secondly, the nature of the popular front coalition of Liberals and Conservatives under the "Unity League" remained unclear. By mid-1943, with the death of Aberhart and the succession of Manning, the political situation appeared clearer for the CCF in Alberta. The unexpected election call in March 1944, following soon after the Saskatchewan election, left the Alberta CCF moderately unprepared, and federal CCF finances, manpower and resources had been channelled into Saskatchewan. Despite the expectations, extensive material and personnel committment to the provincial party by its members, the party only managed to increase its legislative membership by one.[10] On the popular front, the party managed to obtain 25% of the votes compared to 11% in 1940.

The provincial election of 1944 was a watershed in the history of the Alberta CCF. Called unexpectedly by

Manning, the electoral strategy of the Social Credit government was to "knock out" the opposition by undermining the strength of the CCF in western Canada.[11] Irvine, as provincial organizer, was extremely optimistic in his reports to the National Secretary and asked for substantial federal financial assistance.[12] When the election call came on 3 July for 8 August, provincial officials began asking the National Office to send organizers and leaders to Alberta. National leader M.J. Coldwell came out in mid-July while the two provincial CCF leaders, E.B. Jolliff of Ontario and Harold Winch of British Columbia, came out at the end of July.

Organizational difficulties plagued the party from the beginning. Twenty-two constituencies had not held nominating conventions when the campaign began; the last of these was held at Grande Prairie on 21 July. Irvine was concerned about the lack of organizational readiness and authorized the holding of special conventions under emergency rules.[13] The election call was denounced by Roper as a "shabby trick" on the people "solely out of panic caused by the victory of the C.C.F. in Saskatchewan."[14]

Provincial CCF leaders, such as Roper, Harry Ainlay, Sig Lefsrud, Irvine and Peterson, travelled extensively throughout the province attending rallies and nominating conventions.[15] Radio was used almost equally by the CCF and Social Credit, but the government had a special edge because it tended to use radio to make official government announcements, while the CCF had to work through the official Wartime Information Board.[16] A series of local meetings involving M.J. Coldwell were held between 18 July and 21 July to lift morale among the members and electoral supporters and to promote Alberta to a more prominent position within the national CCF, similar to Saskatchewan and Ontario.[17] According to a campaign report prepared by Clifford Lee, Provincial Treasurer, the meetings "look too good to be true; I am sure they could not be typical of the province as a whole. But Roper and Coldwell had 2 000 at Medicine Hat and 1 500 at Lethbridge on the last two nights."[18]

A major disappointment was the reluctance of David Lewis, the National Secretary, to participate. Irvine had asked Lewis to assist in the campaign, but the National Secretary noted that he had other pressing matters to attend to. This was particularly awkward as Lewis had joined Coldwell in Saskatchewan only weeks previously.[19] The provincial elections in Quebec and New Brunswick required a French-speaking national leader and Lewis and F.R. Scott had to concentrate their attention on these two provinces.[20] Lewis promised that the national office would do everything in its power to assist in the Alberta campaign, but funds were limited in a year in which there were five provincial elections and a upcoming federal election.[21]

Roper's assessment of the provincial campaign hinged on his involvement as party leader and MLA. He was optimistic, but the Alberta outcome was far from certain:

> It is impossible to forecast any result. That we have made very great gains is evident but whether or not they have been great enough gains in any of the constituencies to win is still uncertain. We could treble our vote in the province and still not win a seat. However, we are greatly encouraged by what is happening in a number of places and you need not be surprised at anything.[22]

Moreover, Roper gave the impression to Lewis that the Alberta party organization could not adequately deal with the attention it was receiving from the electorate or the press. By March 1944, the provincial secretary was reporting that the party had 10 000 members on its lists, up from 4 000 the year before. The Provincial Office appeared to be swamped with membership requests and enquiries from newly formed constituency associations.

The National Office was concerned about the state of the provincial organization and its capacity to wage a fully fledged election campaign in the midst of great public and media attention. Moreover, Roper had concerns about Irvine's capabilities as provincial organizer and about the role of the Labour Progressive Party (LPP).[23] From such a long distance, it was difficult for Lewis to "form any reliable impression" of what was going on in

Alberta.[24]

Clifford Lee's assessment was more optimistic. Coming from the CLP, Lee had replaced Lorne Ingle as provincial treasurer in 1942 and was one of the youngest leaders within the CCF. His appraisal of the organizational readiness of the party to the election call was that the Alberta CCF had not sufficiently built upon the changing sentiment in the province since the death of Aberhart and was not able to raise large sums of money from members, supporters and sympathizers.[25] However unprepared the organizational vehicle was, the political machinery was prepared to "make this a real campaign." For the provincial leadership, the effects of a win in Alberta, following that of Saskatchewan, would reverberate throughout Canada.[26] Irvine thought that anything could happen:

> If things keep on growing one may defeat the government. One thing is sure - our advance will be great. The swing towards the CCF is most pronounced. Our meager skeleton of an organization cannot cope with the extensive possibilities of the swing. This is our weakness. If we had just six months to consolidate our gains we could here wipe out S.C. without a doubt. As it is I am hoping for a strong opposition at the least.[27]

Irvine and Lee thought that such a breakthrough could occur if the National Office had sent out more assistance and financial support. Lewis, on the other hand, refused to budge and relied on Roper's rather less optimistic assessments.[28] Still, optimism spread out from the provincial office to the local level. Lorne Ingle reported back to Margaret Telford, secretary at the National Office, that "things sure are looking much brighter than I expected when I arrived. It is practically a straight fight between the Social Credit and the CCF and I think we have a chance to win."[29]

The electoral strategy of the Alberta CCF, resting on the assumption that the contest was between the two major parties (CCF and Social Credit), called for a comparison between the Social Credit program and that of the CCF. It continually emphasized in advertisements, literature and campaign speeches that Social Credit was "purely a local movement" that could not achieve its program except on the national field.[30] The choice for the Alberta electorate was between the CCF, which could achieve its programme within provincial boundaries, and Social Credit, which could not achieve its program "except in a [federal] field in which it has no support at all."[31] The problem with this analysis was that the provincial CCF had trouble in rationalizing its programme as anything other than national. Until the Saskatchewan CCF won power, few party leaders understood how the party could put its policies into practice at the provincial level.

The election results were not inconclusive.[32] Social Credit obtained 51.8% of the popular vote and 51 seats while the CCF obtained 24.9% of the vote and two seats.[33]

The third-placed Independents obtained 16.8% of the vote but became the official opposition with three seats. The CCF had nominated candidates for all 49 constituencies, covering the entire province, even in ridings where there had been minimal CCF organization.[34] Party candidates came in second in 30 out of 47 rural ridings. In three constituencies (Clover Bar, Lac Ste. Anne and Stony Plain) CCF candidates ran alone against the Social Credit candidate and obtained an average of 39% of the popular vote. In 14 constituencies the party obtained more than 30% of the popular vote. In 25 ridings the CCF was faced with competition from the LPP; in only six constituencies the LPP a threat.[35] In Pincher Creek, the CCF candidate was opposed by a Labour United candidate who received 37% of the popular vote to the CCF's 20% and 43% for Social Credit. The supposed electoral interference from the LPP, feared by Lewis, never materialized. Only three constituencies would have gone over to the Alberta CCF if enough LPP supporters had designated the CCF as their second choice.[36] On the other hand, the CCF used the transferrable vote in three other constituencies to deny the Independents' victories over Social Credit.[37] The party had to look elsewhere for faults and problems as explanations for the electoral defeat.

After the provincial election, a series of post-election analyses were performed by provincial CCF leaders.

Jack Cook, provincial president, noted that the provincial election was not a "knockout blow for the CCF in Alberta."[38] There was a recognition of the fact that the party was "somewhat amateur in the political arena against professionals."[39] Since 1935, the CCF had to "struggle against a political organization which sometimes used identical words and phrases, but mean something different, thus making confusion more confounded in honest minds searching for an answer to a perplexing social conundrum." Social Credit was described as a political organization that used the term "social" in its title, but then denied that it was meant to "social-ize [sic] anything - even credit."[40] It was, according to Cook, a political organization that claimed to be radical, but opposed change.

The Alberta CCF, on the other hand, could not be defeated. Founded on truth, "nurtured in sacrifice and struggling in a righteous cause it does prevail." It was " an irresistible force, legitimate offspring of the age old struggle for individual and human justice for the human man."[41]

Lorne Ingle had a different, more pointed, analysis of the electoral defeat.[42] CCF leaders, members and supporters had to accept that the party had lost the election. In attempting to get the party to assume a more critical appraisal of its organizational and political weaknesses, Ingle noted that "we gain most by realizing wherein our shortcomings lay and strengthen our cause by making plans which will avoid them in the future."[43] There were two forms of sentiments among party members: complacency after a victory and despair after a defeat. Members in Alberta and Saskatchewan faced these two extremes. The provincial election saw

> a tremendous line-up of forces against us. The Social Credit government had the backing of the oil companies (through their Alberta Petroleum Association) and all the daily newspapers in the province. The individual Liberals and Conservatives practically abandoned their protege, the Independent Party, and many of them actually stumped for Social Credit. Even the communists urged their supporters to give the government candidate their first choice, or their second choice where there were Labour Progressives in the field. Such an array of forces is hard to beat any time, anywhere.[44]

Ingle believed that the single transferrable vote system in the rural areas further worked against the CCF.

The party could blame external conditions and factors as causes for their electoral defeat, but it also had to turn inward to find some answers. There were a number of factors over which the party had a degree of control. The party could have been more prepared for the "snap election". Nominations were held too late in the campaign. Given the short period between nomination and election, many candidates could not cover their constituencies adequately. The party depended too much on centralized public meetings and ignored local and smaller house meetings as a means of introducing the party's candidate to sympathizers and supporters.[45]

Criticism of the National Office accompanied that directed at the Provincial Office. Lewis sent out Sandy Nicholson to assist in the organizational framework for the provincial election. One criticism Ingle noted was the erroneous introduction of Ontario CCF structuration practices into the Alberta party, without taking into consideration local conditions and requirements. The kind of campaign activity that Ingle desired in Alberta focused more readily on local needs and conditions. It required more initiative from local members and "more imagination and drive on the part of the central office."[46] Moreover, it required good organization of local polls throughout the province. This requirement, Ingle believed, "won the election in Saskatchewan, and the lack of it lost the election in Alberta."[47] He did not believe that "no amount of good organization" could change the result if the "swing" vote was against the CCF. According to Ingle,

> **This is dangerous and fallacious platitude.** The voting in Alberta was very much closer than the results would indicate. **12,000 people voting CCF instead of Social Credit in certain ridings would have given Alberta a CCF government.** It was within the power of the CCF to accomplish that switch.[48]

Faced with these two post-election analyses, party leaders and members had sufficient reason to feel optimistic. The CCF appeared to be on the upswing across the country as the effects of the Saskatchewan victory sunk in. In Alberta, despite the electoral loss, the party had shown itself capable of running a province-wide electoral campaign with support everywhere in Alberta. Party membership had reached 12 000 in 1944.[49] The party had two sitting MLAs in the provincial legislature, a weekly newspaper and two provincial offices (Calgary and Edmonton). The mistakes made by the local and central political organizations would be corrected before the next provincial election. As Lorne Ingle enthusiastically pointed out, "There will be no turning back."[50]

The federal election of 1945 was a success for the CCF across Canada; a failure for the party in Alberta.[51] The party obtained 18% of the popular vote compared to 13% in 1940. In six constituencies, the CCF popular vote was above 20%.[52] The provincial leaders were not at all hopeful that the CCF could make a substantial breakthrough in Alberta, and this view was sustained by national leaders who tended to bypass Alberta to concentrate on Saskatchewan and British Columbia. Irvine's decision to accept a nomination in the Cariboo, British Columbia was a popular hint that the CCF could not win federally in Alberta. This pessimism seem to have affected the highest leadership of the Alberta party. In March 1945, Roper noted to Lewis that the CCF had only an outside chance to win a seat or two.[53] Lewis, in response, was depressed by

> the conviction which all of you seem to have that the CCF condition in the province is poor that our chances in the federal election are hopeless. I am finding it rather difficult to understand why there should be this hopelessness in view of the tremendous advance in popular vote which you made during the last provincial election. However, I am sure that your determination to be realistic about
> the situation will not interfere with the public presentation of great confidence, nor with the work that needs to be done.[54]

The political reverses of the CCF in the provincial election of 1944 and federal election of 1945 dampened the ardour of "even the most enthusiastic" supporter and member of the party. However, at the annual convention in Edmonton in November, delegates accepted Ingle's report and endorsed one of the most ambitious organizational plans ever undertaken by the provincial party. The three-year plan called for the full employment of at least two provincial organizers and funding for further expansion. The organization was to be extended and solidified.[55] In January 1946, Jack Griffin was appointed a provincial organizer.[56] Local constituency leaders were approached through the provincial office to ensure that local CCF clubs were reorganized to become "the backbone of our organization effort throughout the province."[57] It was the intention of the Provincial Office to ensure a closer working relationship with local clubs to work out projects by which local members could "actively take part in the building up of our movement."[58]

The withdrawal of Irvine from Alberta as the new CCF

MP from the Cariboo in 1945 dealt the Alberta organization a crucial blow. It necessitated a change in leadership.[59] The position of provincial organizer and secretary was transferred from Irvine to Jack King. Moreover, Henry Spencer, a close Irvine associate and fellow UFA MP, left Alberta to undertake a diplomatic posting. The ramifications of the leadership shift meant that the Alberta party would not have a capable party organizer.

Towards Disunity 1944-1949

Central Autocracy and Local Autonomy

The Alberta CCF was a political party in 1942. The political unification that melded the CLP with the CCF at the beginning of 1942 resulted in a structured political party. The structuration process between 1935 and 1942 within the Alberta CCF attempted to integrate socially and functionally members, institutions, forms and rules of both the UFA and CLP into the new party. However, in forging a new political party, certain organizational and political elements were released that resulted in system dysfunction. In particular, the relationship between the centre and the periphery within the party became ossified, resulting in political disputes and crises. In these social conflicts and system contradictions, individuals became entrenched in their organizational positions. In Alberta, the party was faced with the conflict between centralized autocracy (from Edmonton) and local autonomy. At the national level, the

Alberta CCF defended peripheral autonomy (Alberta) as opposed to centralized autocracy, as represented by the national leadership of the CCF. A distinct system dysfunction prevailed as provincial leaders defended their provincial autonomy from federal interference, while interfering in local party decision making. At the heart of this structurational deficiency was the debate over proper methods of building a party.

In 1946, a crisis erupted within the CCF organization in Calgary over the nature and purpose of the CCF as a political party in Alberta. Throughout its party-building period, between 1939 and 1944, the Alberta CCF had not been immune to factionalism.

In 1939, over half of the Calgary CCF membership were expelled from the party because they refused to adhere to the proper structuration process as defined by the Provincial and National Executive.[60] In that situation, the CCF local was split vertically into two factions, each of which claimed to represent the legitimate membership and leadership of the Calgary CCF. The basis for the crisis rested on deficiencies within the structuration process during the 1930s. The legitimization of the CCF Clubs in 1935 resulted in the reproduction of new structures and mechanisms for social relationships among various political groupings in Calgary. Although this process structured the relationship between the CLP, UFA and CCF along lines recognizable by provincial leaders (who had come from the UFA or CLP), there was an inherent contradiction between what the structuration was designed for and what would be the ultimate outcome. The inevitable result of the post-1935 structuration process involved a revision, not a consolidation, of the social and institutional relationships between the UFA, CCF and CLP. Through social integration, the system components were altered and integrated. The social conflict took place in Calgary in 1939 as a contradiction between the degrees of social integration and system integration within the local environment. Popular conceptualization of the future development of the CCF included the absorption of the UFA and CLP into the CCF, and the structuration process initiated in 1935 moved towards this goal. However, provincial leaders of the CLP and CCF were hesitant about accepting the social and system integration processes taking place around them. They reacted out of personal motivation to safeguard their own structural positions.[61] The conflict in Calgary was between members of the CCF who were responding positively to the structuration process by pushing forward social and system integration at a local level, and provincial leaders who desired to control local situations in order to perpetuate the status quo.

At the local level, there was a contradiction between the conceptualization of how to build a political party and those of the leaders. The dissidents desired to accelerate the structuration process by setting up a CCF constituency association in Calgary and incorporating social elements of the UFA, CCF Clubs and CLP without involving, at an institutional level, the Labour Party. This was contrary to the rules of the federated Alberta CCF as interpreted by Roper and Edward Garland in Alberta, and Lewis in Ottawa.[62] There was, however, a clear realization among members of the Calgary CCF that the CLP was not interested in submerging its identity into the CCF, and was only interested in maintaining its organizational structure intact at the expense of creating a mass left-wing movement opposed to Social Credit. The Calgary CCF attempted to establish a CCF party irrespective of the structural relationships that existed between the CCF Clubs and the CLP. Moreover, social integration that was continuing since 1932 would be facilitated by a system integration initiated by the complete takeover of the CLP by the CCF. The actions of the majority of the membership in Calgary to restructure the political dynamics within the local whereby the organizational relationship between the CCF Clubs and the CLP was redefined were negated by the imposed structure from the provincial leadership. This maintained the system dysfunction which the restructuring attempted to solve. The organizational weaknesses in the Calgary section were accentuated by the imposition of an artificial structuration. The contradiction between the established relationship between the CCF and CLP at the provincial level, and the imposed, structured and rigid relationship at the local level resulted in a serious crisis, which was artificially resolved by expulsion.

In 1946 a similar crisis occurred in Calgary when a group of CCF members attempted to redefine the relationship between the CCF and the Civic Reform Association (CRA), a municipal political organization. As in 1939, their efforts at restructuration would have resulted in a redefinition of organizational boundaries between groups at a systems level as well as a heightening of political and social relations at the local level. Views concerning the party-building process of one group contradicted the views of the party establishment, both locally and provincially. The contradictions led to a structural impasse resulting in social conflict.

Buttressed by a substantial membership and electoral support in 1944, the CCF turned its focus in 1945 to municipal politics.[63] To counteract the influences of the conservative Civic Government Association (CGA), the CCF worked with Social Credit, the LPP and the Calgary Trades and Labour Council in forming the CRA.[64] The electorate in Calgary responded to the new leftward trend and elected Alderman James Watson, a CCF leader, mayor.

The difficulties of preserving a united front in municipal politics between the LPP, Social Credit and CCF became evident in 1946. Buoyed by a victory at the polls in 1945, the communists began becoming more involved in municipal politics, making Social Credit and trade union leaders increasingly uneasy about continued support for the CRA. Moreover, CCF leaders in Calgary were under pressure from members to disengage themselves from the Association. At a special meeting on 2 October 1946, the Calgary CCF Constituency Association, supported by Alderman P.N.R. Morrison, withdrew from the CRA and entered municipal politics directly as a political party.[65]

The Calgary local was torn apart by the question of party-building in urban areas, but most of the local leaders were also provincial leaders.[66] Moreover, questions were raised in the party and press as to the organizational and political tactics of the Calgary CCF leadership in reversing a democratic vote to withdraw from the CRA.[67] On the direction of the National Executive, the Provincial Council under Roper and Jack King intervened to settle the dispute.[68]

The party leadership recognized that the split within the Calgary organization extended deeper than mere disputes over strategy and tactics. What was at stake was an attempt by a CCF local to change the organizational and institutional relationships that had been carefully restructured between the CCF and the remnants of the CLP after the 1939 crisis. P.N.R. Morrison understood that the Alberta CCF emerged from the war with a consolidated structure, two sitting MLAs and at least 25% of the popular vote in Alberta. To build organizationally and socially, the party had to disengage itself from other organizations and to promote itself as a distinct political entity at federal, provincial and municipal levels. Moreover, Morrison believed that the time had come in Calgary, and elsewhere in Alberta, to "get rid of the old girls", implying the removal of aged office-staff and leadership held over from the pre-1942 period.[69] Frustrations were felt within the Calgary CCF at the continued structuration process that permitted the same political and social processes that had occurred in the 1930s to continue in the late 1940s without regard for newer forms of structurations.

The Provincial leadership faced the dilemma of supporting the younger faction, under Morrison who felt that the time was ripe to push onwards, or remaining tied to the older UFA-CLP establishment group centred around Aemilia and Norman Smith. If the leadership sided with Morrison, Smith warned, then the "co-operatively minded people" would conclude that there was nothing "more that they can do ... and retire from the field."[70] If the leaders endorsed the establishment, then the party risked losing some of its youthful and more energetic supporters.

Unilateral intervention by the Provincial Board into Calgary party affairs began on 20 October 1946 when the local was officially dissolved and the provincial leadership took over the political and administrative functions to mediate between the two factions.[71] After a period of investigating, the Provincial Board mechanically constructed a new organization under direction and control from the Provincial Office in Edmonton.[72] Part of the plans of the provincial leadership plans included the restoration of limited local autonomy in the Calgary CCF through the controlled election of a new constituency executive.[73] After a four month trial period in which the Provincial Board and Council were directly involved in the day-to-day operation of the Calgary CCF, twelve new executives were unilaterally confirmed.[74]

Although the Calgary CCF organization had been reconstituted and reorganized along lines dictated by the Provincial Board, a sense of demoralization affected members and supporters in Calgary. The organization, which had been one of the most vital and consistently energetic in Alberta during the 1930s, decayed to an old remnant of the pre-1940 CCF.[75] While an official constituency association had been created by the provincial leadership, adhering to the established structurational practices, the process undertaken destroyed the party local socially leaving an organizational shell. The imposition of a set, defined structure with accompanying social and political relationships by the provincial leadership resulted in a system dysfunction between what the CCF was supposed to be - a grass-roots socialist/labour party - and what it had become - a bureaucratically defined and structured monolithic organization.

Towards Disunity 1945-1949: External Pressures and Organizational Collapse

In the post-war period, the Alberta CCF was faced with two serious problems. The party had to respond politically and organizationally to the growing anticommunism and antisocialism of the Cold War period, and to the re-entry and resurgence of the Liberal party into provincial politics. The external effects of the cold war upon the Alberta CCF cannot be dismissed in this analysis. As with other socialist and labour parties in western democracies, the difficulties of pursuing an independent democratic socialist line became apparent as the Cold War escalated. No socialist party could ignore the basic international issues of the day, such as the Berlin blockade and airlift, the Czechoslovakian coup d'etat, the Yugoslav-Soviet split, the creation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the gradual rearming of Germany as part of western security.

Immediately after the war, socialist and labour parties pressed forward their socialist ideals. The Labour government of Clement Atlee (1945-1952) was held up as the model socialist government, and its achievements in nationalization and health care were eulogized. However, by 1947, alarming trends within these parties were noticed as members turned their attention from domestic to international concerns. At this point party leaders hesitated about taking doctrinaire viewpoints on international issues. Roper firmly believed that the primary emphasis of the Alberta CCF had to be upon domestic policy. Writing to Lewis in January 1947, Roper noted that

> for us to continue to devote almost every statement that is made by our national leaders to learned, and in my view, completely correct analyses of international affairs may mean to miss the boat in the practical down-to-earth job of winning an election. Unless we can have some sort of dynamic policy that will appeal strongly and even strikingly to the imaginations of the Canadian people, we are going to be in exactly the same position as we were in 1940.... I do suggest that the time and thought and energy of our National and Provincial organization should be devoted to consideration of such issues.[76]

The group to whom Roper referred were members who were the "backbone of the organization, who are very passionately interested in foreign policy, and anxious that the CCF work out one in line with general socialist objectives the world over."[77] It would be a mistake, according to Lewis, to ignore these individuals. Furthermore, party leaders had the responsibility to balance domestic concerns with international issues that "the core of our movement may retain its faith and vitality."[78] Regardless, it was this group that began to concern Roper in Alberta.

The provincial leadership's concern about the leftists within the Alberta CCF in the late 1940s was overshadowed by organizational problems stemming from a sudden decline in membership and finances. In the pre-1945 period the Alberta CCF was capably managed by a number of highly profiled individuals - Chester Ronning, William Irvine, Edward Garland and Lorne Ingle. By 1946, they had all left. Both Ingle and Garland were appointed to the National Office, Ronning went into the diplomatic service and Irvine retook his seat as a CCF MP. With these capable leaders gone from the provincial scene, the Alberta organization began to decay. The failure of the Alberta CCF to take advantage of the Farmers' Union of Alberta (FUA) strike in 1946 turned guarded optimism into fatalistic depression. Jack King's initial perception of the Alberta situation was that the people were "ready to move politically" to the CCF.[79] Four months later, after the strike, he noted that the party had gained some strength but "not enough to materially change the situation."[80] By 1947, with the official re-entry of the Liberal Party. King's observations became more pessimistic. He counselled the National Secretary not to be overconfident of the possibilities of electoral success.[81] Although there was no tendency on the part of the Alberta CCF "to slacken our efforts", only normal re-organization of party forces occurred between 1946 and 1948.[82]

The realities of the party's organizational situation became clearer when the provincial election was called for August 1948. Several provincial and federal constituency organizations were nonfunctional in the interval period, and Lorne Ingle blamed the Provincial Office for their inefficiency. The federal constituencies were "deader than doornails."[83] Moreover, some members began shifting their allegiance to Harper Prowse's Liberal Party in an effort to defeat Social Credit. Roper knew that attempts were being made in several constituencies across Alberta to forge an electoral united front with the Liberals, but he did not repudiate their actions, much to the chagrin of the left wing.[84]

The 1947 provincial convention was supposed to be the turning point for the Alberta CCF.[85] In preparation for the upcoming provincial election, the party announced a new membership drive and new provincial platform. The membership drive was designed to rejuvenate interest and financial support for the Alberta CCF. Party membership had declined between 1945 and 1947 from 13 000 to 3 339.[86] The new platform was designed to wean away supporters of the LPP and Social Credit.

The provincial election of 1948 was expected by many areas of the Alberta CCF community to produce a dramatic upset over Social Credit.[87] When CCF popular support actually declined from 25% to 19%, many leaders, including

Ernie Cook, believed that the lack of an efficient and effective organization played a significant part in the electoral failure of the party.[88] Although Roper and Liesemer were able to hold onto their legislative seats, popular support for the party dropped by one-quarter. The pre-election and campaign organization and membership drives increased party membership to 4 920 but this was hardly translated to votes in the election.[89] Across the province, the Liberals overtook the CCF in terms of popular support. The CCF placed second in 26 ridings while the Liberals came second in 16. Seven constituencies excluding Calgary and Edmonton went to second counts.[90] In all of these constituencies, the Social Credit candidates would have been defeated by the CCF or Liberals. In all cases, however, extensive plumping (not marking 2nd choices) by CCF supporters and a tendency to support Social Credit as a second choice rather than the CCF or Liberal candidate led to Social Credit winning all seven ridings.[91]

The electoral loss of 1948 affected the organizational potential of the Alberta CCF immediately. Morale was considerably damaged among the leadership and hasty decisions were made days after the election. Jack King terminated the employment of three provincial organizers, including Jack Griffin of Macleod. Moreover, King seriously doubted whether the party would be able to keep the Provincial Office open.[92] He noted that "obviously after the disaster of yesterday we are no longer in a position to maintain an organization staff..... I guess we will be forced by circumstances to lay low for the next two or three years."[93] Griffin realized that the closing down of the party organization would be a tragic mistake and approached Roper for confirmation. He noted that

> this is not a time to retreat, but a time to dig in. In the face of the impending federal election we cannot afford to leave the field to the SoCredible [sic] liars and run for cover like a bunch of beaten pups. It just cannot be that there are not enough supporters in the CCF movement to maintain the kind of organization that you and Bill Irvine had in the first days of our existence. Retrench yes! Dig in if need be, but I will not believe that the defeatist tone of this letter represents the sentiments of C.C.F.ers with whom I have been working for the last four years, or the sentiments of a fighter like Elmer Roper.[94]

Griffin continued to offer himself as an organizer in southern and central Alberta so the party could "hold our beach-head against the encroachments of Fascism in this Province."[95] Roper's response as provincial leader testified to the extent to which the post-election pessimism had affected the decision making process. It was, according to Roper, best "for all of us to face up to the possibility [of electoral defeat]."[96] Writing to Irvine later, Griffin noted that Roper "did his part in the above letter" by washing his hands of party organization at the local level.[97]

The situation at the local level within the Alberta CCF became increasingly desperate. Members informed the

Provincial President (Peterson) that either the local party organization was "at a standstill" or had disintegrated completely.[98] In some areas, federal constituency associations ceased to exist and local leaders moved taking with them vital party records.[99] The Provincial Organizer (Ernie Cook) noted in 1949 that the Provincial Board had decided after the 1948 election it was "not prepared to consider a full programme of organization for 1950 until the membership, or such part of it as can be contacted has signified a willingness to finance such activity."[100] Party leaders came to the conclusion that if there was no party activity at the local level, there would be no membership, interest or understanding.[101] However, the attitude of some provincial leaders appeared to be that the party had to concentrate its limited resources on areas and sectors that would generate the highest support for the party. The emphasis continued to be on central Alberta, with northern and southern Alberta practically ignored.[102] When party members around Medicine Hat requested some central assistance in holding provincial constituency conventions, Cook argued against this because of the lack of potential party support.[103] With the federal election looming a few months after the provincial election, provincial party leaders were in a defeatist mood. In response to a request from Blairmore for organizational help, Ernie Cook wrote

> What can we do? Is it possible to have home meetings? Or any meetings that might stimulate activity? Or must we content ourselves with making calls on definite people who may set up some activity of their own? What is the point.[104]

At the November 1948 provincial convention in Calgary, the decision was made to "reduce our budget for provincial organization and office staff to a minimum, and by the same token ... placed the responsibility for immediate organization in the hands of constituency associations."[105]

Provincial leaders realized the Alberta party was seriously lacking in organizational capacity, membership was falling and finances dwindling.[106] According to a post-election report drafted by the Provincial Board in April 1949, the Alberta CCF had the lowest paid-up membership in several years primarily caused by a significant decline in electoral support. The party was "at a low ebb."[107] Maintaining party membership was a significant problem for the organization, as was declining interest in local party organization and activities.[108] However, from provincial leaders, particularly Roper, the People's Weekly received a higher profile than local organizational work as an effective means for rebuilding the party. It was considered "the most effective instrument in the maintenance and building of our movement and is an indispensable link between organization and the membership."[109] Organizational party work, essential for maintaining and rebuilding the structurational process within the Alberta CCF, was relegated to a minor role in 1949 "to the extent that funds are specifically subscribed for the purpose, and should consist of a concentrated rather than a general effort."[110]

The emphasis placed on the People's Weekly and minimal organizational work outside the central region resulted in deficient structuration. Although the Provincial Office attempted to maintain regular contact with provincial constituency associations, party organizations at the local level became non-existent. Since the provincial and federal constituency organizations were paper institutions, leadership forms had to be created. The withdrawal of local organizational structures and processes, which had been built up over the late 1930s and early 1940s, almost destroyed the Alberta CCF in terms of membership and support.[111]

Chapter V

The Alberta Farmer-Labour Party in Crisis: Social Conflict and System Dysfunction 1949-1962

The federal general election of June 1949 had two important ramifications for the Alberta Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF): the national CCF began an immediate reappraisal of its position within the political environment, and William Irvine returned to Alberta after losing his federal seat in the Cariboo. The results of the federal election necessitated an awareness of structurational problems within the CCF. The gap in political education and political activism made it impossible for the national and provincial party offices to make effective contributions (financial, personnel and informational) to the local political units. Inadequate communication and educational programming at the constituency and local level was further complicated by the ineffectual contact between the provincial office and the local party. The provincial leadership of the party was "at least twice removed from the grass roots where the main job has to be done."[1] The program designed by Donald MacDonald called for "mass education" of party workers and members through various innovative forms of mass communication to facilitate "dynamic socialist education."[2] Since educational activities were the key to building and maintaining active local party units, the emphasis had to be on building local party organizations.

Irvine returned to Alberta as provincial organizer and to undertake the organizational and educational programs drafted by the National Office. The national party leadership had not yet written off Alberta and believed that the province was fertile ground for expansion.[3] Elmer Roper and Jack King had reservations about the usefulness of the federal plans for Alberta and believed that accepting the programs in their entirety would be wasting valuable party money.[4] Irvine, however, accepted the plan and conducted the organizational drive of 1950 personally.[5]

Irvine's involvement in the reorganization of the Alberta CCF is crucial to an understanding of the social conflict and system contradiction which occurred within the party in the 1950s. Differences of opinion in terms of correct party-building approaches, strategies and tactics permeated the relationship between the provincial and national party leadership and within the provincial leadership. For the national leaders, membership became the criterion by which to measure growth or decline in a party. Lorne Ingle was confident that the number of party members in Alberta would increase when the Alberta CCF fulfilled their obligations and carried out their provincial responsibilities with respect to the organizational and educational plans drafted by the

National Office.[6]

Irvine's approach to party-building rested squarely on developing local organizations, bringing forward the issues and teaching socialism from the "policies which we advance in respect to such issues."[7] His efforts were directed towards forming "our old members who are scattered over the country into local groups so that they may be able to work together in an effective way to extend our membership."[8] The fact that these members had been driven away by the inadequate organizational work of the provincial party in his absence only increased the antagonisms within the provincial leadership. Instead of using negative tactics for motivating potential support for the party, Irvine felt that a "decidedly positive program" had to be emphasized. Moreover, the party's organizational approach had to be reinvigorated by highlighting specific ridings and areas where CCF support was substantial.[9]

In attempting to reverse the organizational approach of his predecessor, Irvine discovered the real reasons for the collapse of the party after 1945. Jack Griffin, who was deprived of organizational services after the 1948 electoral defeat, briefed Irvine that

> By the squandering of funds in the prodigal amounts of election literature sent out after it was too late to be of any use, by the loose and inaccurate acknowledgements and records kept of membership moneys, and of [People's Weekly] subscriptions, by the inaccurate and, as it turned out, untrustworthy accounts given of election possibilities, the Provincial Office has

> in my opinion largely forfeited the confidence of the members. I am sure that their loyalty to the CCF is unimpaired, but I fear that it will take a long time to restore the confidence in their leaders which is necessary for the success of the movement.[10]

According to Irvine, the decision to terminate the organizers, the close the Provincial Office and to cease local organizational activity was made unilaterally without authority.[11] The party failed in the post-1945 period to present itself organizationally and functionally as a credible political party, and that provincial and constituency leaders "had better look steadily at our mistakes and rectify them in the days to come, if we are to make the CCF in Alberta the instrument it ought to be."[12]

In an effort to rectify the situation, Irvine restructured the leadership within the party. Nellie Peterson relinquished the Presidency to Robert Carlyle to become Provincial Secretary (a position she held until 1961). New faces were added to the executive: Harold Bronson (an University of Alberta graduate and party organizer in northern Alberta), Roy Jamha (trade union leader), John Liss and John Liebe. Long-standing local party workers such as Sig Lefsrud (Viking) and Joseph Sykes (Calgary) joined the new activists. A rejuvenated Co-operative Commonwealth Youth Movement (CCYM), led by Carol Weenas, was promoted by Irvine, as was the Women's Section of the party. Gone were the old UFA leaders such as Ernie Cook and Henry Young. Irvine noted to David Lewis that the

Alberta party had to concentrate "all available effort in encouraging the young people who are with us to make the appeal for their generation".[13] Roper eventually had to acknowledge that during the five years between 1945 and 1949 organizational work in Alberta had deteriorated. He could not forget that "when Bill [Irvine] left us we had more than three times as many members as we now have and the best organization we ever had."[14]

Despite Irvine's organizational campaigns and drives throughout selected areas of Alberta during 1950 and 1951, party membership and electoral support for the Alberta CCF continued to decline, although not at the same rate as in the late 1940s. These indicators of party strengths (or lack thereof) caused the party to undergo social conflicts and system contradictions. The result of these tensions, involving party supporters, sympathizers, members and leaders, was continued decline in membership and electoral support. It was a vicious circle that tore apart the Alberta CCF in the 1950s.

The Alberta Farmer-Labour Party saw their popular support in provincial elections dwindle from 19.1% in 1948 to 4.3% in 1959.[15] Over a 10-year period party electoral support decreased 77.4%[16] In every sector of the province the electoral support for the Alberta CCF declined over the period. The rate of decline was less in urban than in rural areas, and greatest where the party had hinged its fundamental support - northern and central Alberta. In the south, CCF support had dwindled from 22% in 1944, 11% in 1948 to 2% in 1952 and 1955 and 1% in 1959. This was largely due to the insufficiency of party organization in the region and the failure to nominate candidates.[17] The party strategically placed most of its resources in central and northern Alberta.

Party membership declined at a steady rate between 1948 and 1959. Between 1949 and 1959, membership in the Alberta CCF decreased from 3 329 to 1 110. Party membership actually increased in 1954 and 1955 due to the influences of Irvine's organizational methods and the provincial election campaign of 1955 and 1959.[18] While the membership loss was discouraging, examination of the statistics reveals that most of the losses occurred during the 1946-1949 period.[19] The membership dropped 74% (a loss of almost 10 000 members, in four years. After 1950, the party lost only 2 219 members. Thus, the Alberta CCF was able to retain the hard-core membership of the party, but it lost individuals who had joined the party at the height of its popularity between 1942 and 1945.

The importance of party membership was highlighted by the adoption of a paid membership fee and the keeping of adequate records by provincial and national offices in 1947. For David Lewis, membership reports became a weather-vane to determine the success or failure of the party at specific times. However, the membership approach to party-building was adapted in Alberta by Irvine connecting local organizational techniques with education and information. Irvine emphasized providing party members with educational material and literature to extend their knowledge of socialism and to keep them involved in the cause. The membership, because of this strategy, became more cadre-based than mass-based.

The ramifications of the membership and electoral decline during the 1950s took their toll on the party membership and leadership. Sectors within the Alberta CCF began questioning where the party was headed and whether current organizational strategies were appropriate. Questioning of party-building approaches led to questioning party policy, accelerating the divisions between the left and right wings of the Alberta CCF and causing social conflict and structural dysfunction.

The return of Irvine to Alberta also coincided with the renewal of protracted struggle between the left and right within the party. According to the leftists, the setbacks of 1948 and 1949 were proof to some within the CCF of the disastrous results of recent right-wing shifts of the party. It was necessary to transform the party into "an aggressive fighting force promulgating a new society and economic doctrine with vigour and persistence."[20] The attempts of federal and provincial leaders, such as David

Lewis, Angus MacInnis, Roper and M.J. Coldwell, to lead the party to the right to placate elements within Canadian society who would never accept socialism would result in complete oblivion for the party.[21] The traditionalist argument that election defeats were suffered because of the cold war was rejected as defeatist by leftists who argued that organizational deficiencies had to be blamed. By August 1950, the debate on party policies and organizational tactics resulted in the formation of "Socialist Fellowship" in British Columbia.[22] Colin Cameron and Rod Young's socialist faction within the British Columbia CCF was eventually disciplined and expelled by the party, but not before attracting sympathy and support from other provincial CCF groupings.

At the end of the 1940s, criticism of the CCF's foreign policy began creeping into the party press, alarming provincial and federal leaders. Roper's concerns over articles in the People's Weekly by Walter Mentz and Jack Griffin attacking the foreign policy of the CCF National Council convinced the 1948 provincial annual convention in Calgary to adopt two general policy resolutions, one guiding the provincial leadership in policy formulation, the other restricting the editorial comments in the People's Weekly. In both cases, CCF speakers and writers were requested to "bring constantly to the attention of the public" conceptions supporting "democratic co-operative socialism" and opposing monopoly capitalism and communism.[23] Moreover, the editorial policy stipulated that the purpose of the Alberta CCF press was to "interpret and give publicity to the program and philosophy of the CCF". No material could be published in the People's Weekly in letters to the editor or contributions, "in conflict with this purpose."[24] The provincial leadership, consisting of Roper, Jack Cook and Jack King, was increasingly concerned about the image being projected by the Alberta CCF through the People's Weekly in the midst of hostility towards the Soviet Union, communism and socialism.[25]

The beginning of the Korean War in 1950, the debate over the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, and the issue of collective security provided fertile ground for leftists within the CCF to attack the moderates within the national and provincial leadership. While Coldwell and Lewis believed that important international issues had to be discussed by the party's rank and file, they were more concerned about attacks by Mentz in the party press.[26] The National Executive wanted firmer control by the Alberta leadership over editorial comments, and the Provincial Executive assumed the powers of editorial board of the People's Weekly.[27]

The Alberta CCF Executive, controlled by the left, was not prepared, however, to act as censor in the manner that Lorne Ingle desired. By 1951, the national party leadership had become dissatisfied with the lack of control exerted on the editorial policy. Although a resolution was passed by the Provincial Board authorizing the Provincial Executive to undertake some form of censorship, leniency was practiced. On the one hand, the National Council noted that only by "the fullest possible discussion can the democratic process be made fully effective.. [for] the well being and the progress" of the CCF".[28] Walter Mentz, on the other hand, disagreed with the CCF foreign policy and felt that he "should be free to express his views with a view to influencing those who are now enshrouded in darkness."[29]

The national party leadership was concerned that, with the "Socialist Fellowship" crisis becoming worse in British Columbia, the Alberta party would not accept restrictions. Under subtle pressure from the National Executive, the Provincial Board approved the editorial guidelines adopted by the National Council and previous provincial conventions on 7 April 1951.[30] Statements and correspondence from national leaders made it clear to the Provincial Board that the national leadership was not going to tolerate deviation. According to Lorne Ingle,

> It is one thing to have freedom of discussion through the policy-making channels of the CCF, i.e. local clubs, constituency, provincial and national conventions, and quite another to have

> what amounts to anarchy in presenting the CCF viewpoint to the public through the columns of publicly-circulated CCF papers and through the statements of CCF spokesmen on the platform.[31]

The editorial policy adopted by the National Executive provided that provincial councils and executives were responsible for taking necessary measures to ensure that the editorial policy in CCF provincial papers "express national and provincial policy." Coldwell and Ingle reserved the right to bring to the attention of the provincial convention failures of the provincial leaders to observe the policy.[32] Ingle warned Roper and the Alberta CCF leadership that the National Executive

> will simply not tolerate the development in Alberta of any situation comparable to that which arose in B.C. Action should have been taken there promptly to deal with dissidents instead of letting the matter drag on until it has sapped nearly all the strength out of the organization.[33]

Discussion over the CCF foreign policy continued unabated in the press throughout 1951 and 1952. To defuse any rank and file dissent, the Provincial Executive approved the formation of a provincial foreign affairs committee to solicit opinions from the membership and to prepare a report for the 1951 provincial convention.[34] The committee was slanted towards the left, and the report delivered to the Provincial Council in November testified to that ideological orientation.[35] Committee member John Liebe submitted to the Provincial Board in March 1951 suggestions for the "reorientation of the CCF program on international affairs". He noted that

> the present stand of the CCF on foreign affairs can not be reconciled with the Regina Manifesto. Unqualified support of the Marshall Plan, the European recovery program and the Atlantic Act [NATO] amounts to neglect of an international socialist program. Our program on foreign affairs needs reorientation; it must be brought into line with our ideals in the domestic field.[36]

Discussion of the party's foreign policy had to be carried out within local discussion and study groups, and in "our party press to educate our membership so it will endorse ... a program on international affairs that applies our ideals to the international scene."[37] Other members of the committee had the same concerns as Liebe that free discussions had to be held within the press.[38]

In the discussion relating to the foreign policy committee's recommendations, Roper believed that he was losing editorial control of the People's Weekly. Although the Provincial Board had gone on record as endorsing the national editorial policy, Irvine had promised Liebe total access to the People's Weekly for discussion of foreign policy.[39] Given this situation, after the adoption of the foreign affairs report at the 1951 convention, Roper began making plans for the cessation of the People's Weekly. At a meeting of the Provincial Executive in October 1952, the party press was terminated and incorporated into The Commonwealth, published in Saskatoon.[40] Although financial problems were said to be the reason for the dissolution of the People's Weekly, the failure of Roper to assert editorial control over the press was the underlying motivation.

The debate over CCF foreign policy, which Roper believed should never have affected the Alberta CCF, became increasingly personalized in the early 1950s. For Roper and Ingle, Walter Mentz and Irvine represented the fundamental obstacles to normalized relations within the party. Mentz was described as "openly advocating a fellow-travellerish [sic] line" doing his best to "undermine CCF foreign policy and giving aid and comfort to the willy-minded [sic] fellow travellers we unfortunately have in our midst."[41] Mentz believed that Roper, Ingle and the rest of the national party leadership, were "toadying to U.S. capitalism."[42] Roper had no illusions as to the left-wing viewpoints of Irvine and Mentz. After dealing with them on a day-to-day level, he counselled the National Council to be prepared to take immediate action "when the Communist-line began [sic] to manifest itself in articles by Bill and Walter."[43] The Alberta leftists were, according to Lorne Ingle, "skating on thin ice."[44]

The internal debate on foreign policy between the establishment and the leftists affected the organizational and structurational parameters of the Alberta CCF. Lorne Ingle observed that the policy debate was not part of the "general decline" of the CCF nationally.[45] The difficulties of the Alberta CCF were not due to Alberta's unique political climate, but rather to the

> pessimistic outlook which Bill [Irvine] and Nellie [Peterson] have at the moment and which is due perhaps chiefly to the international situation.... it must surely reflect itself in the work they do. I don't know how they can stimulate organization, bring in membership, sell subscriptions or arouse any enthusiasm in what I judge to be their present mood.[46]

Ingle believed that the Alberta CCF was "a bit ingrown" and needed fresh organizational blood from elsewhere.[47] The leftists' obsession with international affairs was having a negative impact on organization. Ingle cited Peterson as noting that the "people of Alberta were simply not interested in provincial or national issues because they were so perturbed at international events."[48] Roper understood, however, that while the leftists' preoccupation with international issues had resulted in pessimism,

> the cold, blunt fact is that nearly everybody, including very many C.C.F. supporters, are satisfied with the present government. There is not the slightest chance of any gain and our people know it. So they can't be roused to put any effort into the movement.[49]

On the other hand, there were justifiable criticisms of the way the party establishment had denied open discussion of party policy, both at provincial and federal conventions and in the party press. Bronson, then organizer in the Jasper-Edson region, warned party leaders that "unless there are marked changes in trend within the CCF" he would not stand for nomination.[50] He accused the party leadership of abandoning "original democratic practice to the extent that there is misuse of influence and position, as per old-line party techniques, to steamroller leadership opinions into policy and strategy."[51] This process had resulted in a modification of CCF program, organization and presentation in a manner

> to pander to existing capitalistic-minded public opinion rather than to educate the public to our own basic philosophy. Under pressure, lip-service only is paid to the Regina Manifesto. In actual practice, a CCF government elected today in Edmonton or Ottawa would be a repeat of Brownlee or Ramsay MacDonald.[52]

The Party in Crisis, 1956-1961: Structurational Contradiction

The crisis that brought together the social conflict between the leftists and rightists within the Alberta CCF and the system contradiction between the cadre and mass conceptions of party-building was sparked by the visit by Irvine and four other leaders (Harold Bronson, Floyd Johnson, Otto Wobick and B.C. Tanner) of the Alberta CCF to the Soviet Union in July-August 1956.[53] The trip, made without National CCF approval, was significant because of the repercussions of several controversial comments that Irvine made inside the Soviet Union, and which were used against the CCF in Canada. The national CCF forced the right-wing leadership within the Alberta CCF, headed by Roper and Ivor Dent to discipline the Irvine and the leftists. The controversy over Irvine's statements and the struggle to remove him from power as party president almost resulted in the withdrawal of a significant minority of CCF leaders and members from the party. Had that split occurred organizationally and structurally, the Alberta CCF would have been permanently destroyed, and the chances for a rejuvenated Alberta NDP dashed.

The visit to the Soviet Union by the five leaders in July 1956 was recognized by national CCF leaders as having serious ramifications. The group would be regarded by the Canadian press and the Soviet authorities as an official delegation of the Alberta CCF to the Soviet Union. Before the trip commenced, Roper managed to obtain from Irvine a guarantee that the group would say or do nothing to jeopardize the party.[54]

The purpose of the visit was to determine the chances of world war, to investigate the possibilities for increased trade and compare and analyze the different political systems.[55] The tour was not "a pilgrimage to Moscow" but rather an opportunity to investigate and compare the state of society and government of "capitalist-democratic" western Europe, "socialist-democratic" Scandinavia and communist Eastern Europe.[56] Bronson, noted that it was the duty of responsible officials of a political party to "know the facts."[57] This implied that Bronson and Irvine intended to act in their capacity as executive officers of the Alberta CCF.

Once in the Soviet Union, the Alberta group was given first-class treatment by Ukrainian and Russian officials. Meetings were arranged with local trade unionists, city leaders and Communist Party officials. Throughout the visit, the Soviet press saw the group as social-democratic party leaders. In Kiev and Moscow, Irvine made statements that were transcribed by TASS and published in Pravda and Ivestiia.[58] While visiting the opening of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, Irvine noted that the Soviet legislature was "a remarkable example of democracy in action."[59] The item was translated for the Moscow Daily News, picked up by Reuters in London, rerouted to Canadian Press in Toronto and published in Canadian newspapers.[60] The appearance of Irvine's statement on the "democratic nature" of the Soviet legislature "matched by few Parliaments in other democratic countries" stunned CCF leaders. Coldwell, in a press release, denied that Irvine had made the statements.[61] While other comments were reported in the Soviet Press by Irvine and Bronson, according to the national party leaders the damage had already been done.[62]

David Lewis and Lorne Ingle sought to have Irvine investigated by the National Council and disciplinary action taken.[63] This was difficult because Irvine was a respected elder in the party and had considerable rank and file support in western Canada.[64] A purge of the Alberta party, contemplated by Ingle, would have resulted in a "major schism" leading to the destruction of the Alberta party.[65] Ingle finally recommended that Irvine be removed as Provincial President and organizer by the provincial leadership.[66]

In Alberta, a significant minority within the party leadership, including Jack Leavens, Edmonton CCF Secretary, and Ivor Dent, Provincial Treasurer, agitated for Irvine's resignation.[67] A special meeting of the Provincial Board was called to handle the leadership crisis as quickly and quietly.[68] A personal meeting between Roper and Irvine to resolve the crisis at the beginning of September only intensified the crisis. The personal and political relationship between the two provincial leaders came to an abrupt end with neither Irvine nor Roper attempting to back down from their stated positions.[69]

Despite continued pressures from the National Council to intervene in the crisis to submit Irvine and Bronson to party discipline, Roper continued to uphold provincial autonomy.[70] Throughout, Lorne Ingle did not let Roper question the motives of the national party leadership. The crucial issue was "whether or not the Board is prepared to have the officers of the CCF in this province make use of the facilities of the movement as a medium for the dissemination of pro-Soviet information." A statement to this effect was prepared for adoption by the Provincial Board. Any official or member who disagreed with it would be asked to resign from the Alberta CCF. As with the "Socialist Fellowship", Lorne Ingle and Roper were preparing the groundwork for mass expulsion from the Alberta party.[71]

On the other side, Irvine and Bronson were unprepared to back down in the face of organizational pressure from the provincial leader and the National Council. In a letter to Norman Finnemore, Irvine noted that

> ... there does not appear to be any valid reason why anyone should have taken objection to our visiting Russia. Indeed, we should have been sent as a C.C.F. delegation. But it seems as if our leaders, in particular, have soaked up American propaganda like sponges and when one impinges on their prejudices they ooze poison like a Dulles.
>
> You may be interested to know that we are all on trial before the provincial board which meets on November 10th. This was inspired by Mr. Roper, who I believe is acting under the urgings of Coldwell and Lorne Ingle. So we are prepared for western-style liquidation.[72]

On 10 November 1956, the Provincial Board met to discuss Roper's request for disciplinary action against Irvine.[73] After protracted debate, the Board decided not to continue with the charges against Irvine. Irvine remained as President with no disciplinary action taken against him. The meeting was "somewhat inconclusive" and the emotional factor was a dominating feature, as Roper feared.[74] It was clear from the statements delivered at the Board meeting and from the results that Irvine, Bronson and Peterson had scored a victory over the National Executive.

Immediately after the Provincial Board meeting, a number of young party leaders, who had supported Roper in his efforts, met at the Corona Hotel in Edmonton to plan an open revolt. Headed by Provincial Treasurer Ivor Dent, the group included a number of leaders within the party such as Bert Ryan, John Liss and Jack Leavens.[75] The group requested that their party membership be transferred from the Alberta CCF to a another provincial body. Dent felt that to

> remain with this party in the province of Alberta would be tantamount to endorsing the action of our provincial triumvirate (Irvine, Bronson, Peterson) and the leadership given can only result in continued defeat at the provincial polls. I have a strong desire to remain in the C.C.F. but when a group of "leaders" of a political movement proceed to perform a series of actions deliberately designed to split off the majority of the present members and to replace them with a non-thinking rabble whose thoughts (if any) follow the "party line", then it is time to reassess one's personal position and to take steps to correct it.[76]

A new political party was needed in Alberta that was interested in "getting votes and not in trying to place party members in political cold storage." The present party leadership had no conception of the methods required to win political support. Dent suggested that the actions of the current leadership were tantamount to destroying the CCF in Alberta and that the situation was desperate enough to suggest either a constitutional split or the establishment of a new party.[77] Dent believed that his group could bring into existence "in a very short time" a faction that would be a more "potent political force (than the present organization)."[78]

The National Executive, although they strongly disagreed with decision of the Provincial Board to exonerate Irvine, understood that Dent's actions were "not the way to handle the matter." There could not be two rival CCF organizations in any province.[79]

The leadership crisis of 1956 affected political and organizational work throughout the party. Until the situation in Edmonton was resolved, little work could be done at various party levels. Party members themselves were not unaffected by the crisis. Both the National and Provincial Offices began receiving letters from CCF members and supporters in Alberta expressing their concerns about the crisis. John Milner, an old CCF member in Edmonton, wrote Coldwell a long "anguished" letter in November about the situation. He noted that the "virus of pro-Communism that has destroyed the CCF in Alberta" was working in other provinces and would "annul any effort of those who support democracy to remove pro-Communist infiltration."[80] According to John Milner, the crisis in Alberta had been accumulating for 17 years ever since 1939. The party's leadership had changed drastically with moderates being replaced arbitrarily by those ideologically aligned with Irvine and Peterson. The provincial leaders

> by ordinary political trickery have established themselves in a position of direction and control

> from which only a complete exposure can remove them.[81]

He cited cases where the Alberta leftists attempted to extend their power base in expectation of a purge by taking over local leadership positions.[82] Other members of the party sided with Irvine and his attempts to bring to the fore debate on party policy and organization.

The repercussions of the crisis began to affect Irvine mentally and he slipped quietly into the background. The national leadership was still concerned about the activities of Peterson and Bronson. In December 1956, Lorne Ingle held a private meeting with them about the party crisis. Their statements on the internal crisis shocked the National Secretary:

> I had almost to pinch myself to be sure that what I was hearing was real, that it was coming from prominent C.C.F.'ers [sic] and that this was really Peterson in front of me. Nellie and Harold did a better job of excusing the Russian brutality in Hungary than anything I have read in the Commie [sic] press or have heard coming from Moscow. They referred to the refugees as rats who were really fascists, had started the fighting and were now running away instead of facing the music. They spoke with scorn of the Social Democrats who had been maltreated behind the iron curtain, who had plotted with fascist elements and who got what was coming to them. At one point Nellie, in discussing the coming federal election spoke of the good prospects in Vegreville and said "There are a thousand communist votes in that riding which we cannot afford to offend".[83]

The national leadership was also concerned by the extent to which prominent Alberta CCF leaders had deviated from the social democratic path. To settle the crisis definitely and to keep the Alberta CCF from sliding into oblivion, the National Secretary urged the right-wing dissidents "to move in, to take greater responsibility and a much more active role, and clean up the situation themselves."[84] He singled out a number of individuals as future leaders of the party: Ivor Dent, Robert Wright, Neil Reimer and Bert Ryan.[85] Elmer Roper himself, after losing his seat in the 1955 provincial election, withdrew paving the way for young leaders.

Roper's withdrawal from the leadership left a vacuum that was soon filled by more neutral and moderate people. The threat by the dissidents to set up a rival CCF organization evaporated. The National Executive never sanctioned this independent approach to internal party crisis. Their solution was simpler and neater. Beginning at the leadership level and extending downward through the ranks, the leftists would be replaced by younger moderates. Irvine was chosen to be Honorary President of the Party, a titular position. Peterson and Bronson were slowly edged out by the upwardly mobile Neil Reimer and Ivor Dent. Provincial leadership on an interim basis was provided by Stanley Ruzychi and Floyd Johnson. The party would be rejuvenated by an influx of new urbanized leaders with a distinct trade union background. The group that threatened to split away from the CCF and set up a rival organization in Alberta took over the leadership in the period leading to the inauguration of the Alberta New Democratic Party in 1962. Moreover, towards the end of the 1950s the new party movement in Alberta included a number of individuals that became prominent leaders in the party. Included in this group were labour leaders such as Henry Tomnaschuck, Roy Jamha, Ivor Dent, Howard Mitchell, Jim Russell, Jack Hampson and Neil Reimer, and young student leaders such as Keith Wright, Edward Chudyk and Grant Notley.

The Alberta CCF, faced with electoral and membership decline throughout the 1950s, an increasingly hostile population susceptible to media influences concerning communism and socialism, the resurgence of the Liberal Party, and a divisive internal debate over foreign policy, organizational strategies and conceptions of the party, underwent a structurational dysfunction. The party disintegrated.

Chapter VI

Conclusion: Towards an Historical Ontology of Political Parties: The Case of the CCF in Alberta

The examination of the Alberta Co-operative Commonwealth Federation from its inception in 1932 through to its collapse in the late 1950s centres around an understanding of this political party as a social institution, structured and restructured through the determined and persistent involvement of individuals and groups of individuals. It is clear, however, that any discussion of the CCF in Alberta must include reference to the other great social institution of the 1930s - the Social Credit League of Alberta. The three significant works on this phenomenon are C.B. Macpherson's Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System (1953), John Irving's The Social Credit Movement in Alberta (1959) and David Laycock's Populism and Democratic Thought in the Canadian Prairies, 1910-1945 (1990). Closely associated with the first two works is Seymour Lipset's Agrarian Socialism: The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan (1950). All four works present a dominant interpretation in Canadian historical tradition - Social Credit and the CCF are populist social movements instead of political parties.

Within the CCF historiographical tradition, Walter Young and Leo Zakuta presents the Co-operative Commonwealth

Federation as a social movement in the throes of becoming a political party.[1] Only Dean McHenry sees the CCF as it really was, from an institutional perspective - a political party.[2] The difficulties of following the "protest becalmed" tradition has been examined elsewhere.[3] The populist movement tradition in historical and political writing is one that is fundamentally North American in origin. It rests upon several assumptions about the dangers of party politics and organization. It makes a basic assumption that movements are good and parties are bad. Even when movements become institutionalized, organizationally and functionally, as political parties, as in the case of the CCF, there appears to be an unquestioned understanding of the oligarchical nature of political parties in terms of organizational and institutional frameworks, functions and operations. Certainly political parties are structured and functions differently than social movements, but the definitions applied to each category may obscure more similarities than differences. Walter Young's definition of a political party as an organization committed primarily to winning elections in order to control the government as opposed to a social movement which is a group effort to inaugurate changes in thought, behaviour and social relationships, suggests an preordained theoretical bias.[4] Moreover, even when concepts and analogies are employed that suggests that a political party exists, historians tend to stamp these organizational, functional and structural factors as essential to the development of a social movement. In John Irving's Social Credit Movement in Alberta, great detail is given on the strategies and tactics utilized in the path to political action and power. Analysis of the modern political party clearly suggests that the elements which made up Social Credit in the 1930s were those of any modern political party. Yet, Irving, Laycock and Macpherson continue to regard Social Credit as a social movement. Laycock suggests that the anti-party conception was instrumental in the formation of both Social Credit (plebiscitarian populism) and the CCF (social democratic populism).[5] But with the latter a contradiction appears between what the CCF was supposed to be and what it was - a political party. Even Laycock admits that the CCF "was a party that 'dared not speak its name' in its early years on the prairies."[6] He goes on to reiterate CCF documents that the "new movement's federated character" was a logical extension of previous agrarian and labour organizations, but "not a political party such as the two traditional parties."[7] Citing electoral and strategic attempts to forge united fronts with Social Credit, Communists and other political groupings, Laycock concludes that "no self-respecting party would have engaged in such political follies, temporary as they were."[8] It is quite possible that Laycock misinterprets the original conceptualization of the CCF - it would not be a political party like the Liberals or Conservatives, but it would be a **new** type of political party. Following William Irvine's conceptualizations of a group government, the Alberta CCF was intended to become not an unitary political party but a group party.[9] Even Laycock acknowledges that there was a widespread recognition of the "need for a party as a political instrument of social change."[10]

Alternative hypotheses surrounding the emergence of the CCF and Social Credit in the 1930s require a theoretical reorientation in looking at documentary evidence and ordering it in a manner that will reflect upon the social forms, institutions, functions and structures which existed within those two political entities. A reexamination of sociological concepts such as organizational institutionalization, structure, functions and evolution needs to be conducted. Moreover, a shift in perspectives, from the macro to the micro level of analysis, from the collective to the individual, and from the centre to the periphery of an organization may reveal insights in to whether or not Social Credit or the CCF were what they were supposed to be.

The Alberta CCF was a social system composed of individual actors and actresses who were cognizant and aware of political and social realities. Collectively these "actors and actresses" formed the basis of party structures and functions, through which the party operated as a social unit in an external environment. The study of the CCF involved the study of conditions governing the continuity, change or dissolution of the party as a social system. As a social system, the CCF had to be studied in terms of the relationships between individuals and groups of individuals.

The Alberta CCF was historically continuous as a social unit. It was the result of the reproduction of specific social relations between individuals and groups of individuals throughout the 1920s. The structure, functions, programme, policies, bureaucratically defined positions and tasks, rules and regulations, and day-to-day mechanics of party building were the result of previous productions of social relations within a political framework. The individuals who were the party came with specific conceptualizations of what the Alberta CCF was supposed to be, how it should function within an external environment, and how it should be reproduced organizationally and structurally. By the 1950s, when these preconceived conceptualizations failed to be reproduced as expected social conflicts developed between sets of individuals. This led to a structurational dysfunction - a contradiction between two or more sets of social reproductions. On the one hand were those within the Alberta CCF who saw the party as a fabianistic-socialist enterprise linking grass-roots cadres together. On the other hand were those who saw the party as a mass membership vehicle for political power. Both had different conceptualizations of the opposite group. Elmer Roper, Ivor Dent and Grant Notley saw the Alberta radicals as the "7th Street Bridge Clique".[11] To Notley, the leftists had given up on political activity and had become a debating society.[12] The leftists wanted to construct an ideal socialist political party. In shifting policy and organizational parameters, national and provincial leaders were accused of sacrificing the CCF to petty political considerations. Ultimately the Alberta CCF contained inherent contradictions, inherited from previous structurations of the UFA and CLP, that caused significant social crisis and system dysfunction in the late 1940s and 1950s. It was a party divided within itself.

The Alberta Co-operative Commonwealth Federation was a failure, not from a political point of view, but from a structural and organizational perspective. The circumstances which permitted the party's structuration and development throughout the early 1930s was not unique, compared with other democratic socialist parties, but the circumstances surrounding its continued structuration in the latter 1930s, 1940s and 1950s led to disunity and contradiction within the party. This ultimately led to the political isolation and insignificance of the party in the external political and electoral environment. It is a contention of this thesis that, given a completely different structuration process - one more solidifying - the Alberta CCF, as a party of the left, could have challenged more directly the hegemony of Social Credit in the 1940s and 1950s. In the final analysis, the "rise and fall" of the Alberta CCF between 1932 and 1962 had little to do with the political orientation of Albertans, or the historical assumption that parties of the left could not survive in such a right-wing populist province. There is fundamentally no difference between Alberta and Saskatchewan in terms of political culture. However the structuration process of the Saskatchewan CCF was substantially different than that of its Alberta counterpart.

The situation which allowed for the formation of the Alberta CCF in the early 1930s, before the ascension of Social Credit, benefitted the developmental and structuration process of the party. It was an organic and structural union of several political parties and forces, each with different developmental histories, leadership and aligned membership. Slowly, but surely, the structuration process provided for the "weaning" away of old organizational attachments from the UFA, CLP and DLP towards the CCF. At a certain point, it was expected, the

CCF would replace the existing progressive parties as the united front party of the left in Alberta. However, by 1935 this process had become stuck by specific structurational deficiencies present in the UFA. Faced with double loyalties, some CCF leaders such as Norman Priestley and Henry Garland, prevented the ongoing process to continue by refusing to sanction the formation of alternative membership bodies in addition to the established affiliates. Progressive leaders within the CLP, such as Mary Crawford and Walter Mentz, understood that the process had to continue and thus promoted the development of a General Membership Section within the CLP. It was this section which ultimately became the CCF Clubs section after 1935. By the federal and provincial elections of 1935 the structuration process had been halted because of the untenable relationship between Social Credit and the UFA. The failure of UFA, CCF and CLP leaders to truly estimate the power and momentum of Social Credit damaged the organizational and structural potential of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in Alberta.

The political dynamics in Alberta between 1935 and 1952 indicated that the Alberta CCF could have developed into a much fuller and potentially more powerful political opposition party to Social Credit. The failure of the CCF to do so hinged more on its organizational and structural deficiencies than on its politics. Despite the establishment of a clubs section in 1935, the structurational deficiencies which appeared before the elections continued to plagued the party. Only with the removal of the UFA in 1939 and the amalgamation with the CLP in 1942 was the party able to come into its own, structurally, organizationally and politically. The process which led up to the creation of the Alberta Farmer-Labour Party (Alberta CCF) bears more crucial examination. It is significant that, although there was a high level of leadership integration between the UFA, CLP and CCF, there was a low social integration at the membership level. Thus, while the structuration process resulted in systems integration (UFA and CLP into the CCF), social integration was minimal. If UFA and CLP members were following their leaders into the CCF, where were they going? Voting patterns seem to suggest that there was a high level of voting instability in terms of party identification between 1935 and 1952. It was not uncommon for many Albertans to vote for Social Credit in 1935, shift allegiance to the Independents in 1940, then to CCF in 1944 and finally to the Liberals in 1952. Perhaps it was not so much one of political identification as organizational satisfaction and awareness that made voters shift their electoral allegiance from one party to another. This assumption, which remains to be analyzed, makes the Alberta political environment more volatile than previously believed.

The pressures on the leadership and membership of the Alberta CCF between 1942 and 1945 were intense from an organizational and structural point of view. The sudden attractiveness of the party increased membership from 4,000 to 12,000 in two years with little organizational preparedness. More significantly, the reluctance of the party to consummate an electoral alliance with the Labour Progressive Party in 1944-45 meant that significant left-wing support migrated to Social Credit. The loss of strong leadership, such as William Irvine and Chester Ronning, left the Alberta CCF in the hands of leaders with strong UFA connections. Elmer Roper, preoccupied with a printing business and a legislative career, could not put his efforts into continued organizational and structural work. Thus the party decayed between 1945 and 1949, lost three-quarters of its membership and organizationally dwindled to a centralized party office with outreach concerns extending no more than one hundred miles beyond Edmonton. The return of William Irvine in 1949 sparked renewed interest in organizational development, but the decay suffered in the late 1940s could not be reversed. The party divided into two sections, each of which blamed the other for the structurational decline. The development of the New Party had to begin with a clean break from the older party and with a newer structurational process.

This thesis understands that the marxist conception that political parties, like other political and social institutions, are the product of social, political and intellectual life based fundamentally and foundationally on the relations of production, has remained the predominant ontological hindrance to the study of political parties as social units. To fulfil the ontological premise, historical and political scientists have denigrated the role of individuals and primary social relations within political parties to a macroscopic analysis of party and electoral systems.

Analyses of political parties of the left tend to emphasize structure and functions as if they were two independent variables operating in a common system. Such analysis does allow for cross-party comparisons and examinations of party systems in a given space and time, but hardly does justice to the basic conceptualization of the political party as a conglomerate of interests, realities and beliefs.

This thesis has raised a number of ontological questions and concerns regarding the history of the Alberta CCF that must be discussed. Primarily, an ontological conception of the structural and functional elements of the party ascribes a distinct priority to a given set of structural factors or properties which are deemed to be of fundamental importance in these institutions. Structures and positions are more important than the individuals who inhabit them. Despite the fact that these structures, functions and institutions within the organization of the political party may exhibit a certain degree of historical variation over time, the conceptual priorities focusing attention on them serve as a theoretical restraint upon this analysis. The CCF has been seen fundamentally within the historical literature as an institution possessing the same set of structures and functional forms as other political parties, but not necessarily in the same space or time. This makes it easier for all political parties to be examined in relationship to each other as in a system. This approach seriously limits the perspectives.

The second problem emanating from an ontological definition of political parties leads to an ordering of factors which are considered generically fundamental to the evolution of these institutions. The accepted definition of political parties separates it from other forms of social organizations and institutions which either precede or follow political parties in an evolutionary framework (i.e. movements and super-parties). This allows observers to consciously or subconsciously rank political parties in terms of their state or stage of evolutionary growth. Described as a historical approach, this analysis suggests an ontological premise attached to the study of political parties. In the case of the CCF this historiographical tradition emphasizes the "protest becalmed" approach in which the CCF evolves from a political movement to a political party. Acceptance of this interpretation, or even consideration of the methodology limits the comprehensiveness of the party.

Structurational theory accepts that political parties, conceptualized as societies, may be examined in terms of their differentiation. Every political party is distinct in terms of its structure, functional arrangements and organization. These factors change significantly over time and space, thereby making comparisons more difficult. An acceptance of these factors as historically valid tends to develop the basis for a theory of institutional alignment in any and all political parties. Hierarchical or evolutionary ranking is an empirical problem that defaces many studies of political parties.

The examination of political parties, such as the Alberta CCF, as social institutions, from a structural and functional point-of-view is historical in that one tends to look backwards at any point in that institution's history. This, connected with an historical consciousness of technological progress and evolution, observes that the party has been changed, transformed, evolved, or progressed. This perspective is illusionary since certain subconscious assumptions have been made about the direction and extent of change over time. Observing the structural properties of a political party from a position in the past looking forward (i.e. examining the CCF of the 1950s from a 1920s vantage-point) will demonstrate discontinuities in societal and organizational forms. Some structural and functional elements may appear in the future or past organizations as familiar to the observer, but these act as bench-marks or psychological terms of reference in order to guarantee an historical orientation.

The fundamental ontological premise of structurational theory applied to political parties is the respect for the human potential to generate historically specific variations in the institutions of social life. There will be disagreements about the nature of human conduct within historically defined organizations, such as political parties, but such debates must remain rooted in an analysis of social life.

Political parties are not rigid institutional organizations which impose their functions and structures upon leaders, activists, members and supporters. Analysis of this kind leads to a denunciation of the individual and rejection of any contributing social aspects as a role within the organization. It leads moreover to an artificial and stigmatized examination of how political parties interact with each other within a political-party-electoral system, thus treating individual political parties as organic units, evolving structurally and functionally over time, independent of social influences.

It is far easier, at an empirical and epistemological level, to make certain assumptions about how political parties, such as the Alberta CCF, operate within a macro-system (i.e. Alberta political culture) than it is to examine the motivations, roles and participation-interaction (consciously or unconsciously) of individuals within political parties.

The study of a political party, such as the Alberta CCF, as an social unit of study involves a clear reorientation of research strategies. Assumptions and presumptions about parties at the outset of research must be submerged by an understanding of social life at the basic level within the organization. Connection between mutual knowledge (and assumptions) and consensus beliefs must be examined together with an understanding of the role played by social scientific knowledge in promoting new points of view.

An examination of the interests of social actors (acknowledged or unacknowledged) must be considered. A study of discourse would reveal insights into the workings of political parties that would have been untouched by traditional methods of analysis. The application of critical theory to the study of political parties and activities remains untried. Political parties were and are one of the mechanisms through which social change could be effected. The party represents, within social theory, both the organizational vehicle of the dialogue for social change, and the dialogue itself. The party is not an organization of reality, constructed through the ordering of social agents, but rather the social product of social agents who, through their praxis, construct the party as an expression of their social reality in circumstances inherited and reproduced from the past. The party, its institutional forms, structure, functions and modes of social production and reproduction - structuration - is nothing more than a localized production of social life.

REFERENCES

CHAPTER I

1. This is not true for Europe where a rich tradition of combining sociological research and political party history has survived almost intact since the 1920s. An excellent recent example of this kind of work includes Mary Norton's work on the Social Democratic Party of Germany during the Weimar Republic, *Social Democracy and Society: Working Class Radicalism in Dusseldorf, 1890-1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). An excellent, perhaps somewhat experimental work is Jane Jenson's study of the French Communist Party - *The View From Inside: A French Communist Cell in Crisis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). Also see W.L. Guttsman, *The German Social Democratic Party, 1875-1933: From Ghetto to Government* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981).

2. M. Y. Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties* (London: Macmillan, 1902); Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1922); Robert Michels, *Political Parties* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949); and Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (New York: John Wiley, 1954).

3. See for example Randall Collins, *Theoretical Sociology* (Orlando: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988), chapter 13 for a discussion of organizational theory interpretations.

4. This is particularly the case with Leo Zakuta, "A Protest Movement Becalmed: A Study of Change in the C.C.F." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1962.

5. See for example, Wilfred Douglas Costain, "Party Competition and the Development of the Canadian Party System, 1908-1972", Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1979; Richard Gregory Johnston, "Party Alignment and Realignment in Canada, 1911-1965", Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1976; Charles Schuetz, "The Party System - The Fundamental Institution of Canadian Democracy", Ph.D. dissertation, University of Ottawa, 1961; and Conrad Winn, "Spatial Models of Party Systems: An Examination of the Canadian Case", Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1972.

6. Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Volume 1* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 61.

7. This is one of two dominant traditions in CCF-NDP historiography. The second is the "protest movement becalmed" tradition.

8. Countering Michels' and Duverger's arguments are the interpretations of Robert McKenzie, Joseph Schumpeter and notably Anthony Downs. Robert T. McKenzie, British Political Parties: The Distribution of Power Within the Conservative and Labour Parties (London: Heinemann, 1963); Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1950); and Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957). McKenzie perceives that the political party is primarily responsive to the electorate. Within the larger framework of political culture and competition, the internal workings of a political party are ignored.

9. David E. Apter, "A Comparative Method for the Study of Politics", American Journal of Sociology 64 (November 1958): 221-237.

10. Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: Framework for Political Enquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 169-171.

11. Ibid.

12. Fred Warren Riggs, Administrative Reform and Political Responsiveness: A Theory of Dynamic Balancing (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1970), p. 580.

13. Kenneth Janda, A Conceptual Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Political Parties (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1970), p. 83.

14. Ibid.

15. For example see Geoffrey Pridham, Political Parties and Coalitional Behaviour in Italy (London: Routledge, 1988). The major theorists in the field are Giovanni Sartori [Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis Vol. 1 (Cambridge: University Press, 1976)] and Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties Organization and Power (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

16. This has also been accepted by Anthony Giddens in his structurational approach.

17. Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power, p. xii.

18. See Feliks Gross, The Revolutionary Party: Essays in the Sociology of Politics (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1974).

19. Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations, A Critical Essay (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1986), p. 14.

20. Robert Michels, Political Parties, pp. 400-403.

21. Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power, p. xiii.

22. Ibid., pp. xiii-xiv.

23. See Stein Rokkan's Citizens, Elections, Parties. Approaches to the Study of the Processes of Development (Oslo: Universitesforlaget, 1970) for a discussion of studying political parties in isolation. Questions have been raised as to the extent of political modernization in Alberta during the 1930s. The literature on this question has not convinced the author that the province was sufficiently modern politically to deal effectively with untraditional multiple parties.

24. William Crotty, "A Perspective for the Comparative Analysis of Political Parties", Comparative Political Studies 3 (1970): 281. See also Crotty's "The Party Organization and Its Activities" in Approaches to the Study of Party Organization edited by William J. Crotty (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968), pp. 247-306.

25. S. Eldersveld's Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis (Chicago: McNally, 1964) is typical of this kind of research. Eldersveld rejected Michels' theory of oligarchical control by stressing a diffuse power structure at different levels of command in a party.

26. Some sociographic research has been done on Alberta political parties. See for example Owen Anderson, "The Alberta Social Credit Party: An Empirical Analysis of Membership Characteristics, Participation and Opinion", Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alberta, 1972; Frederick Hulmes, "The Senior Executive and the Fifteenth Alberta Legislature: A Study in the Social and Political Background of Membership" Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alberta, 1970.

27. According to Michels, the state bureaucracy is "representative" and receptive to the needs of its people if there is some correspondence between the social origin

of the bureaucrats and the social composition of the clients.

28. This, according to Panebianco and Sartori, is the principal cause of intra-party conflict.

29. Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, p. 4.

30. This is a considerable teleological problem with the historical literature of political parties, especially the CCF and NDP. Party histories, successes or failures, are interpreted through party objectives. Subsequent actions and organizational maneuvers are interpreted through this narrow vision.

31. Histories of socialist and labour parties tend to fall within this teleological trap. See for example K. L. Shell, *The Transformation of Austrian Socialism* (New York: State University of New York, 1962).

32. Feliks Gross, *The Revolutionary Party*, p. 75.

33. Some studies of political parties tend to overemphasize political ideology to the exclusion of all other variables. Cold war studies of communist parties tended to fall into this category. Unfortunately, this trend is also noticeable among new left studies of socialist and communist parties. See for example Norman Penner's works: *The Canadian Left, A Critical Analysis* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1977) and *Canadian Communism: The Stalin Years and Beyond* (Toronto: Methuen, 1988). A very recent example of this kind of ideologically motivated analysis is Paul Le Blanc, *Lenin and the Revolutionary Party* (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1990). Various studies have been written about the historiography of Communist Parties, especially after the creation of the History Group within the Communist Party of Great Britain. See Perry Anderson, "Communist Party History", in *People's History and Socialist Theory* edited by Raphael Samuel (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), pp. 145-156; Michael E. Brown, "Issues in the Historiography of Communism: Part One", *Socialism and Democracy* 4 (Spring/Summer 1987): 7-38; Michael E. Brown, "Issues in the Historiography of Communism: Part Two: Some Principles of Critical Analysis", *Socialism and Democracy* 5 (Fall/Winter 1987): 1-34.

34. The trend existing in the late 1960s held that parties formulated policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to implement policies. This tended to divide political parties into ideologically motivated organizations and power-motivated organizations. See A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1967); James Schlesinger, "The Primary Goals of Political Parties: A Clarification of Positive Theory", American Political Science Review 69 (1975): 840-849; and David Robertson, A Theory of Party Competition (London: Wiley, 1976).

35. Robert Michels, "Some Reflections on the Sociological Character of Political Parties", American Political Science Review 21 (1927), pp. 753-71. This analogy applies most appropriately to political parties on the left.

36. There is a dichotomy between these two views of political parties. On the one hand, electoral victory was a means to the realization of ideological goals; on the other, ideology is a means to electoral victory.

37. An organization, according to Janda, is "a set of people who interact in pursuit of a common goal, displaying division of labour and role differentiation in their interactions." Janda, Conceptual Framework, p. 20. According to Anthony Giddens, an organization is a "large group of individuals, involving a definite set of authority relations." Anthony Giddens, Sociology (London: Polity Press, 1989), p. 727.

38. S. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay", World Politics 17 (April 1965), p. 394.

39. This is the general definition applied by most functional sociologists including Talcott Parsons in The Structure of Social Action (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937), and Peter Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955). The definition of "institution" comes from Blau's later work - The Structure of Organizations by Peter M. Blau and Richard Schoenherr (New York: Basic Books, 1971), p. 187.

40. Richard Münch, "Parsonian Theory Today: In Search of a New Synthesis" in Social Theory Today edited by Anthony Giddens and Jonathan H. Turner (London: Polity Press, 1987), p. 137.

41. Ibid., p. 133. Functionalists and structuralists differ as to the need for a quasi-theory explaining relationships between purposes, actions and the overall structure.

42. Münch, "Parsonian Theory Today: In Search of a New Synthesis", p. 133.

43. Ira J. Cohen, Structuration Theory: Anthony Giddens and the Constitution of Social Life (New York: Macmillan, 1989), p. 24. See Anthony Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretative Sociologies (London: Hutchinson, 1976), pp. 110-113; Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1984), pp. 6-13.

44. Myron Johnson, "The Failure of the CCF in Alberta: An Accident of History?" M.A. thesis, University of Alberta, 1974.

45. Bruce Monkhouse, "The Alberta New Democratic Party: Survival Without Success" M.A. thesis, University of Alberta, 1983.

46. Alvin Finkel, "Obscure Origins: The Confused Early History of the Alberta CCF", in Building the Cooperative Commonwealth: Essays on the Democratic Socialist Tradition in Canada, edited by J. William Brennan (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 1984), pp. 99-122; "The Rise and Fall of the Labour Party in Alberta, 1917-1942", Labour/Le Travail 16 (Fall 1985): 61-96. Olenka Melnyk, "Dreaming a New Jerusalem in the Land of Social Credit: The Struggles of the CCF in Alberta", in Socialism and Democracy in Alberta: Essays in Honour of Grant Notley, edited by Larry Pratt (Edmonton: NeWest Press, 1986), pp. 40-56. Larry Pratt, "Grant Notley: Politics as a Calling", in Socialism and Democracy in Alberta, pp. 1-39. Robin Hunter, "Social Democracy in Alberta From the CCF to the NDP", in Socialism and Democracy in Alberta, pp. 57-87. Frederick C. Engelmann, "Grant Notley and Democracy in Alberta", in Socialism and Democracy in Alberta, pp. 172-185.

47. An introduction to the historiography of the CCF and NDP in Canada can be obtained from Alan Whitehorn's "An Analysis of the Historiography of the CCF-NDP: The Protest Movement Becalmed Tradition", in Building the Co-operative Commonwealth: Essays on the Democratic Socialist Tradition in Canada, pp. 1-24.

48. Dean E. McHenry, The Third Force in Canada: The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation 1932-1948 (Toronto: Oxford University press, 1950); Frederick C. Engelmann, "The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation of Canada: A Study of Membership Participation in Party Policy Making", Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1954; Leo Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed: A Study of Change in the CCF (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1964); Ivan Avakumovic, Socialism in Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978); and Walter Young, The Anatomy of A Party: The National CCF, 1932-61 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969).

49. According to Clarence Fines, "At our founding convention in Calgary in 1932, we had expected and hoped for more enthusiastic leadership and support from Alberta. At that time the UFA government was in power there and the majority of federal members from Alberta, known as the "ginger group," were UFA members. It appeared certain that Alberta would be the centre from which the CCF would spread to the rest of Canada." Clarence Fines, Impossible Dream (Regina: Saskatchewan Archives Board, nd.) cited in Olenka Melnyk, "Dreaming a New Jerusalem", p. 42.

50. The basic work on Irvine is, of course, Anthony Mardiros' William Irvine: The Life of a Prairie Radical (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1979). See also John Hart, "William Irvine and Radical Politics in Canada" Ph.D. dissertation, University of Guelph, 1972; Mary M. Smith, "The Ideological Relationship Between the United Farmers of Alberta and the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation" M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1967; Peter D. Smith, "The United Farmers of Alberta and the Ginger Group: Independent Political Action" M.A. thesis, University of Alberta, 1973; Leif Stolee, "Parliamentary Career of William Irvine, 1922-1935", M.A. thesis, University of Alberta, 1969.

51. See the studies sponsored by the Social Sciences Research Council under the collective title: "Social Credit in Alberta: Its Background and Development" published between 1950 and 1959 by the University of Toronto Press.

52. Myron Johnson, "The Failure of the CCF in Alberta: An Accident of History?", pp. 136-143.

53. Ibid., p. 138. Emphasis mine.

54. Ibid., p. 139.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid., p. 113.

57. Ibid., p. 118. See Bob Hesketh, "The Abolition of Preferential Voting in Alberta" Prairie Forum 12:1 (Spring 1987), pp. 123-145.

58. Johnson, "The Failure of the CCF in Alberta: An Accident of History", p. 120. The Saskatchewan CCF also tempered its "socialism" in its provincial platform in 1936, whereas as late as 1942, the Alberta CCF still maintained "socialization of land" as a policy. Johnson avoids discussing the British Columbia CCF where the party was much more radical than in Alberta.

59. Ibid., p. 127.

60. Monkhouse, "Alberta New Democratic Party", pp. 1-2.

61. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

62. Ibid., p. 4.

63. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

64. Ibid., p. 5.

65. Ibid., pp. 17-18.

66. Ibid., p. 19. Emphasis mine. An important element underscored by both Johnson and Monkhouse is not what the CCF and Social Credit were, but what they appeared to be from the viewpoint of the Alberta electorate.

67. Ibid., p. 26. Emphasis mine.

68. Ibid., p. 27.

69. Ibid., p. 31.

70. Ibid., p. 33.

71. Ibid.

72. See David Elliott, "William Aberhart: Right or Left?", in The Dirty Thirties in Prairie Canada. 11th Western Canada Studies Conference edited by R.D. Francis and H. Ganzevoort (Vancouver: Tantalus Research Ltd., 1973), pp. 11-31; Larry Hannant, "The Calgary Working Class and the Social Credit Movement in Alberta, 1932-35", Labour/Le Travail 16 (Fall 1985): 97-116; and Alvin Finkel, "Alberta

Social Credit Reappraised: The Radical Character of the Early Social Credit Movement", Prairie Forum 11:1 (Spring 1986): 69-86; Alvin Finkel, "Populism and the Proletariat: Social Credit and the Alberta Working Class", Studies in Political Economy 13 (Spring 1984): 109-136.

73. The components of the Alberta CCF in 1933 were the United Farmers of Alberta, the Dominion Labour Party (DLP) and the Canadian Labour Party (CLP). Lethbridge and Calgary sections of the DLP merged into the CLP by 1935, and the Canadian Labour Party instituted a General Membership Section in 1933. The latter became the Clubs Section of the Alberta CCF in 1936.

74. CCF Provincial Office to Margaret Telford, CCF National Office, 4 November 1944. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, Box 5, f. 42.

75. See David R. Elliott and Iris Miller, Bible Bill: A Biography of William Aberhart (Edmonton: Reidmore Books, 1987), pp. 250-265.

76. Finkel, "Alberta Social Credit Reappraised: The Radical Character of the Early Social Credit Movement", p. 81.

77. For a social examination of the membership of the League, see Owen Anderson, "The Alberta Social Credit Party: An Empirical Analysis of Membership, Characteristics, Participation and Opinion" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alberta, 1972).

78. Finkel, "Obscure Origins: The Confused Early History of the Alberta CCF", in "Building the Co-operative Commonwealth", pp. 99-122.

79. Alvin Finkel, "The Rise and Fall of the Labour Party in Alberta, 1917-42", Labour/Le Travail 16 (Fall 1985): 61-96.

80. Finkel, "Obscure Origins", p. 99.

81. Ibid., p. 99.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid., p. 104.

84. Ibid., p. 109.

85. Ibid., p. 109.

86. Ibid., p. 110.

87. Ibid., p. 111.

88. The combined left-wing vote (CCF and LPP) could have succeeded in four constituencies.

89. Finkel, "Obscure Origins", p. 115.

90. Ibid., p. 115.

91. Finkel, "Rise and Fall of the Labour Party", p. 91.

92. Ibid., p. 92.

93. Ibid., p. 94.

94. Olenka Melnyk, "Dreaming a New Jerusalem", p. 43.

95. Ibid., p. 43.

96. Ibid., p. 44.

97. Ibid., p. 49.

98. Ibid., p. 52.

99. Ibid., p. 53.

100. Robin Hunter, "Social Democracy in Alberta: From the CCF to the NDP", p. 57.

101. John Richards and Larry Pratt, Prairie Capitalism: Power and Influence in the New West (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979).

102. Ibid., pp. 107-8; Hunter, "Social Democracy in Alberta", p. 58.

103. Ibid., p. 59-61.

104. Ibid., p. 59.

105. Larry Pratt, "Grant Notley: Politics as a Calling", pp. 3-9.

106. See T. C. Pocklington, "Intraparty Democracy and the Alberta NDP" in Socialism and Democracy in Alberta, pp. 146-171; and Gurston Dacks, "From Consensus to Competition: Social Democracy and Political Culture in Alberta" in

Socialism and Democracy in Alberta, pp. 186-204.

107. Frederick Engelmann, "Grant Notley and Democracy in Alberta" in Socialism and Democracy in Alberta, pp. 172-186.

108. Ibid., pp. 178-9.

109. The terms "micro" and "macro" are taken from sociology. The debates between macro and micro levels of analysis and sociological approaches are important to the discussions in this thesis. See Collins, Theoretical Sociology for more information on these approaches.

110. The definition of "society" obtained from Anthony Giddens denotes it as a "group of people who live in a particular territory, are subject to a common system of political authority, and are aware of having a distinct identity from other groups around them." Anthony Giddens, Sociology (New York: Polity Press, 1989), p. 732. Moreover, according to Immanuel Wallerstein, human beings are "organized in entities we may call societies, which constitute the fundamental social frameworks within which human life is lived." Immanuel Wallerstein, "World-Systems Analysis" in Social Theory Today (1987), p. 315. Use of the term involves considerable conceptual problems because of its restrictiveness and concreteness. Today, however, social and marxist theories have redefined the term to imply the basic social entities within which social life is conducted.

111. Structuration theory has been summarized by Cohen, Structuration Theory (1989).

112. Giddens, Constitution of Society, p. 2.

113. Ibid., p. 3.

114. Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 56-8.

115. Giddens, Constitution of Society, p. 16.

116. Ibid., p. 25.

REFERENCES

CHAPTER II

1. W.N. Smith, "The Twenty-Fifth Annual Convention of the UFA", *The U.F.A.* February 1, 1933, p. 6.

2. The idea of group government was an early extension of the reproduction of farmer-labour political co-operation. According to William Irvine in *The Farmers in Politics* (1920), "When the representatives of the various industrial groups meet around one common government table, each with his, or her, responsibility, both to the group and to the nation as a whole, cooperation will open the door to a new era of Canadian liberty." Quotation from Alvin Finkel, *The Social Credit Phenomenon in Alberta* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), p. 19.

3. A good example is the refusal of the UFA government in 1926, led by John E. Brownlee, to incorporate into the cabinet a member of the Labour group in the legislature. However, relationships between the UFA caucus and the Labour caucus extended beyond institutional practices, such as those instituted in 1921.

4. For a summary of these events, see Martin Robin, *Radical Politics and Canadian Labour 1890-1930* (Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, 1968), pp. 83-87. See also the *Calgary Herald* December 14 to 17, 1907.

5. Robin, *Radical Politics and Canadian Labour*, p. 89.

6. *Calgary Herald* December 14, 1907.

7. *Calgary Albertan* December 16, 1907.

8. *Calgary Herald*, December 17, 1907. According to F.G. Kiyit of Cooking Lake, "the adoption of the platform under the name [Socialist Party of Alberta] would be too destructive among the farmers. They have been educated to look upon socialism as something akin to anarchy." Ibid., December 16, 1907.

9. The history of labour in Alberta, especially the labour parties, has been outlined in Warren Caragata's *Alberta Labour: A Heritage Untold* (Toronto: Methuen, 1979); Alvin Finkel, "The Rise and Fall of the Labour Party in Alberta, 1917-42", *Labour/Le Travail* 16 (Fall 1985): 61-96; Henry C. Klassen, " The Bond of Brotherhood and Calgary Workingmen"

in Frontier Calgary: Town, City and Region 1875-1914 edited by Anthony W. Rasporich and Henry C. Klassen (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1975), pp. 267-271; and Elizabeth A. Taraska, "The Calgary Craft Union Movement" (M.A. thesis, University of Calgary, 1972).

10. See Ronald Grantham, "Some Aspects of the Socialist Movement in British Columbia, 1898-1933" (M.A. thesis, University of British Columbia, 1942), p. 20.

11. See the Western Clarion, May 1913, p. 2.

12. The crucial shift of allegiance from the Socialist Party to the Liberal Party was spearheaded by Clem Stubbs, President of District 18 of the United Mine Workers of America. This was an attempt to nominate a labour representative to the legislature in order to counteract the "strength of the Socialist sentiments amongst the miners of the Lethbridge District." Western Clarion April 18, 1913. Other labour leaders followed suit and this development was acknowledged by the Trades and Labour Council in Edmonton.

13. Robin, Radical Politics and Canadian Labour, pp. 188-9.

14. Proceedings of the Alberta Federation of Labour Convention, 1919. PAA. Alf Farmilo Papers.

15. Alberta Labour News, January 24, 1920.

16. Ibid., January 8, 1921.

17. Ibid., January 22, 1921.

18. Ibid., April 2, 1921.

19. Several factors can be noted here for the eventual breakdown of institutionalized farmer-labour co-operation: the refusal of the UFA to appoint a member of the labour legislative caucus in 1926 to the cabinet, the UFA hesitancy to associate with the CLP/DLP in the wake of internal faction fighting among labour parties, the influence of the Communist Party upon both the CLP and the UFA, a series of bombings in Edmonton against two justices in 1926 and its security implications, and the continued antipathy of Henry Wise Wood towards increased farmer-labour co-operation at the governmental or organizational level.

20. Structural contradiction within this social system implied inconsistencies in the institutional alignments of the systems. These contradictions are structural as the inconsistencies are conceived as chronically reproduced properties of societies. According to Giddens, contradiction involves the disjunction of structural principles of system organization. He separated two forms of contradictions that occur within social systems: primary contradictions (those which enter into the constitution of societal totalities), and secondary contradictions (those which are dependent upon or brought into being by primary contradictions). See Giddens, Constitution of Society, pp. 193-199.

21. Constitution of the Independent Labour Party. [1919] PAA. Ernest Brown Papers 74/173.

22. In preparation for the 1921 provincial election, the ILP invited the DLP and the UFA to submerge their differences in an united front for electoral purposes. Both the united front appeal and the compromise at sharing a joint-electoral slate was rejected by the Dominion Labour Party, citing traditional craft unionist arguments against farmer-labour co-operation. See S.A.G. Barnes to the Executive Committee of the Independent Labour Party, June 23, 1921. PAA Ernest Brown Papers PAA 74/173. The compromise rejected by the DLP was designed to put the two labour parties on equal footing. "Independent Labour Party's Appeal to All Labour for Support" [June 1921]. Ernest Brown Papers PAA 74/173.

23. "Constitution of the Alberta Section of the Canadian Labour Party", Alberta Labour News November 26, 1921.

24. The interpretation contradicts that of Alvin Finkel who contended that the constitutional change "meant little more than a name change for the province's only labour party of consequence, the Dominion Labour Party." See Finkel, "Rise and Fall of the Labour Party in Alberta", p. 74. Crucial to the understanding of political history in Alberta, and to the CCF in particular, is the fact that there was a primary contradiction between radicals and socialists on the one hand, and labourists in the DLP/CLP on the other. When these two elements were incorporated into the CCF, the contradictions continued to be reproduced.

25. The Dominion Labour Party in Calgary reversed its decision and affiliated with the CLP in June 1924. Alberta Labour News April 26, 1924; April 2, 1924. Nevertheless, the divisions persisted throughout the 1920s and 1930s.

One chapter each in Calgary and Lethbridge continued to call itself the Dominion Labour Party. An understanding of the fundamental contradiction between the various elements within the ILP and CLP is important when considering what internal contradictions hampered the structural reproduction of the CCF in the 1940s and 1950s.

26. Alberta Labour News, November 4, 1922; June 30, 1923.

27. Labour leaders echoed the words of the TLC leader Tom Moore who stated in Edmonton in September 1926 that "the Labour Political Party is in no way representative of organized labour in Canada. The officials of this party cannot speak for labour; they are extremists and little importance is attached to their utterances." Alberta Labour News September 20, 1926; March 29, 1924; March 6, 1925; March 28, 1928; November 9, 16, 1929. See the resolution of the Executive Committee dealing with the relationship of the Communists to the CLP in Alberta Labour News November 9, 1929. Amendment 1 to the CLP constitution. Alberta Labour News November 16, 1929.

28. Elmer Roper, "Parting of the Ways", Alberta Labour News November 16, 1929, p. 4.

29. It was, in a sense, contradictory, for Roper to talk about constructing an "united front" party which would include farmers, labourists and socialists, when he was at the forefront of expelling communist party members from the CLP.

30. "Walter Mentz in Radio Talk Presents Labor's Plans for a Co-op. Commonwealth", Alberta Labour News, January 23, 1932, pp. 1, 3-4; "Common Ground" by Margaret Donnelly, Ibid., January 23, 1932, p. 4; "The U.F.A. Opportunity", Ibid., p. 4. "The Third Party", Ibid., March 5, 1932, p. 4; "A New Organization", Ibid., May 7, 1932, p. 4.

31. Minutes of the 1931 Western Conference of Labour Political Parties. PAA. Alf Farmilo Papers. Groups represented at this conference from Alberta included the Dominion Labour Party of Lethbridge, the Canadian Labour Party (Alberta section), Edmonton Labour Party, Trades and Labour Councils of Edmonton and Calgary, the Dominion Labour Party of Calgary, and the Alberta Federation of Labour.

32. Norman Priestley and Edward Swindlehurst, Furrows, Faith and Fellowship (Edmonton: Co-op Press, 1967), p. 108.

33. The parliamentary decision by James S. Woodsworth and ten other Progressive and Labour MPs in May to form a "Canadian Commonwealth Party" merely intensified the attempt to forge a new organization.

34. "Goal of the U.F.A. movement defined by Annual Convention" The U.F.A. 1 February 1932, p. 8.

35. Economic Conference [proceedings], Labour Temple, Calgary, Alta., August 1, 1932. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 5.

36. Ibid.

37. Cited in McHenry, Third Force in Canada, pp. 25-26.

38. From Alberta were the United Farmers of Alberta, the Canadian Labour Party (Alberta section) and the Dominion Labour Party. The Socialist Party of Canada came from British Columbia. The United Farmers of Canada (Saskatchewan), Independent Labour Party and Co-operative Labour Party came from Saskatchewan. The Independent Labour Party represented Manitoba.

39. This was especially true of those who came from a "Non-Partisan" party background, such as William Irvine.

40. The composition of the provisional National Council of the CCF in 1932 consisted of representatives of the various organizations: George Williams (UFC), John Queen (ILP), J R Mosher (CBRE), Mrs George Latham (CLP), Angus MacInnis (ILP), J.S. Woodsworth (LSR), Norman Priestley (UFA), William Irvine (UFA) and Louise Lucas (UFC). Some individuals, such as William Irvine (UFA/CLP) and James Woodsworth (LSR/PP) spoke for more than one organization The ILP, UFA and UFC were represented by two members each, while the CLP and LSR were represented by one member each. Neither the DLP or the Co-operative Labour Party received any representation.

41. We have defined the transition period as that which existed between the founding convention in Calgary in 1932 and the decision in 1935 to establish a clubs section.

42. Archibald Key, "Creating a National Federation", Alberta Democrat 9 (Summer 1982), p. 8. [A Reprint of the Canadian Forum 1932 article]. Gardiner's statement is strange in that it was made at the convention shortly after the UFA agreed to help form the CCF. He was the first to make a public pronouncement warning of the dangers of

submerging individual founding identities into the new organization.

43. Alberta Labour News, August 5, 1932; Edmonton Journal August 8, 1932, p. 5.

44. Alberta Labour News, August 5, 1932.

45. Alberta Labour News, August 5, 1932.

46. Edmonton Journal August 5, 1932.

47. See M. Smith, "The Ideological Relationship Between the United Farmers of Alberta and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation" (M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1967).

48. Edmonton Journal August 8, 1932, p. 5; August 15, 1932, pp. 1, 13.

49. Roper was president of the Edmonton Central Council of the Canadian Labour Party. Alberta Labour News October 29, 1932, p. 2.

50. "The Economic Position of the White Collar Wage Earner and His Relations to the Labour Movement." Alberta Labour News January 9, 1932, pp. 1, 3-4.

51. Ibid., October 29, 1932, p. 2.

52. Ibid., p. 2.

53. Alberta Labour News November 5, 1932, p. 10.

54. Mentz, Crawford and Alexander were three of the most significant Labour Party leaders in Edmonton who enjoyed sizeable popularity largely through their columns in the Alberta Labour News and later in the People's Week, the organ of the CCF. Mentz was an electrician union leader, Crawford was a public school board teacher and member of the Alberta Teachers Association (ATA) executive, and William Hardy Alexander was a professor of Classics and History at the University of Alberta.

55. Alvin Finkel's contention that the CLP did not respond to the growing ranks of the unemployed movement in Edmonton and Calgary is essentially correct. However, it must be emphasized that the "Membership-At-Large branch" of the CLP was designed to be a separate entity from the normal rank and file unionists belonging to the CLP. Finkel's argument that "the Labour Party appeared more interested in pushing

the Communists and the national unions out of the party than in attracting new elements to the party, particularly the unemployed" bears some reexamination, especially in light of the creation of the new section. See Finkel, "Rise and Fall of the Labour Party in Alberta, 1917-42", Labour/Le Travail 16 (Fall 1985), pp. 84-85.

56. According to the report of the educational committee, the Membership-at-Large section of the CLP was responsible for arranging speakers, providing books and other resource materials for study, and organizing the educational activities throughout Edmonton on a geographical-political basis. The resolution called for the Canadian Labour Party to give serious consideration to meet growing demand from outlying rural areas. Alberta Labour News December 24, 1932, p. 1.

57. Alberta Labour News, December 12, 1932, p. 1.

58. Alberta Labour News January 9, 1932, p. 3-4.

59. In an editorial in the Alberta Labour News Roper stated that "while there may be some doubt as to the permanence of the C.C.F. in its present form, it is readily conceded that the Federation idea is the only method by which the more or less loose ends of radical political thought in Canada could had been gathered together in anything like cohesive form." Alberta Labour News, January 7, 1933, p. 4.

60. Alberta Labour News November 26, 1932, p. 4.

61. Ibid., January 7, 1933, p. 3.

62. Ibid., December 12, 1932, p. 2.

63. Ibid., November 19, 1932, p. 4.

64. Ibid., December 3, 1932, p. 4. Mentz wrote in the column under the his pen-name "DeBunker."

65. Ibid.

66. The Camrose by-election was the first indication for both the government and the UFA organization of grass-roots support for the CCF. It was, firstly, a safe UFA seat, having sent a UFA representative to the Legislature since 1921 and also deep in the federal constituency of Wetaskiwin, belonging to Progressive-UFA MP William Irvine. In the 1930 federal election, the UFA won the seat by a comfortable 1,051 vote margin with 60.1% of the votes as

opposed to the Liberals' 39.9%. In the 1932 by-election UFA proportion of the votes decreased to 45.1% with the entry of a Conservative candidate. The Liberals obtained 35.3% while the Conservative candidate received 19.6% This may suggest a degree of voter resentment of UFA government with respect to the economic depression. One quarter of expected UFA votes shifted to the Conservatives combined with 51% of the Liberal votes.

67. "New Times Demand New Measures and New Men ...", Alberta Labour News, November 5, 1932, p. 2.

68. Elmer Roper to J.S. Woodsworth, January 14, 1933; C.L. Gibbs to Norman Priestly, February 6, 1933. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74 f. 6; Norman Priestley to Elmer Roper, February 3, 1933. NAC MG 28.IV CCF Papers, Vol. 74 f.6. "Alberta and the CCF" (editorial) Alberta Labour News January 7, 1933, p. 4; "The Labor Party and the CCF", Alberta Labour News December 31, 1932. p. 4. The Edmonton Central Council of the CLP unanimously endorsed the resolution from the Executive Committee approving of the affiliation of the CLP with the CCF. Alberta Labour News December 31, 1932, p. 1. The Edmonton Trades and Labour Council agreed on December 19, 1932 to approve the affiliation. Alberta Labour News December 24, 1932, p. 1. For the UFA, the UFA Executive reported to the Board meeting on January 14, 1933 of the action taken in Calgary on August 1, 1932, The affiliation was officially approved by the UFA Board. However, questions were still raised by UFA Board members at the January 16th and 23rd meetings regarding the role of Norman Priestley within both organizations. At the meeting of January 24th, formal application was made of the affiliation of the UFA to the CCF. GAIA UFA Papers, Minutes of the Board Meetings and Executive Meetings of the United Farmers of Alberta.

69. The Dominion Labour Party, with its one branch in Lethbridge, dissolved in January 1933. Minutes of the CCF Council Meeting, January 24-26, 1933. GAIA Norman Smith Papers. It could be argued that the CLP used the CCF in order to construct an "all-Albertan" Labour Party, thus incorporating the various independent Labour Parties into the Canadian Labour Party.

70. Representing the United Farmers of Alberta were Norman Priestley, Mrs. R. Price, Jack Sutherland, George Church, H.B. Macleod, and Norman Smith. Representing the Canadian Labour Party were Fred White, Andrew Smeaton and Elmer Roper. It should be noted that neither Alf Farmilo nor Carl Berg, both executive members of the CLP and AFL

attended the meeting. Minutes of the Joint Executives of the CLP and UFA, February 18, 1933. NAC 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 75, f. 2.

71. Norman Priestley to National Council, February 2, 1933. NAC MG 28.IV.1, CCF Papers Vol. 5, f. 2. Roper won over Fred White and Andrew Smeaton. This might have fueled some resentment in labour circles in Calgary as both White and Smeaton were DLP leaders, whereas Priestley was the UFA leader there. Taking into account later problems of unity within the Calgary organization of the CCF it could be noted that it was the CLP-DLP who initiated the CCF in Calgary.

72. This was another reproduction of a social process, one that had been followed during the 1920s when the UFA and CLP worked together to co-ordinate electoral campaigns in rural-urban constituencies (federal/provincial).

73. Young, Anatomy of a Party, p. 142.

74. Form Letter sent out to all Provincial Councils from Norman Priestley, January 1933. GAIA. Norman Smith Papers.

75. Ibid. One of the reasons why the CCF National Council was so adamant about maintaining strict control over what groups could become affiliates to the CCF was that they wanted to avoid the "independent" label sometimes used by unofficial party candidates. Thus from 1932 there has never been independent-CCF or independent-NDP candidates. A second more crucial reason was that the National Council could guard against communist or trotskyist groups becoming affiliated with the CCF as it had with the Canadian Labour Party in the 1920s.

76. Minutes of the Meeting of the Joint Executives of the CLP (Alberta Section) and the UFA, February 18, 1933. NAC MG 28.IV.1. CCF Papers. Vol. 5, f. 3.

77. Minutes of Meeting of Joint Executives of the Canadian Labour Party (Alberta Section) and the United Farmers of Alberta, Saturday, February 18, 1933. NAC MG 28.IV.1. CCF Papers. Vol. 5, f. 3.

78. "The Plan of CCF Organization for the Province of Alberta." This was adopted at the meeting of the joint executives of the Canadian Labour Party (Alberta Section) and the United Farmers of Alberta, February 18, 1933. NAC MG.28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 5. f. 3.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.

81. The UFA had clubs in urban areas such as Edmonton and Calgary and the CLP had a membership-at-large section, created at the beginning of 1932 under the leadership of Mary Crawford.

82. Towards the middle of 1933 it became apparent that both organizations had negative aspects which repulsed progressive individuals and groups. For the UFA, it was the organization's association with the now unpopular government; for the CLP, the repercussions of the hunger march and the response of the Labour Party leaders (Carl Berg and Edmonton Mayor Dan Knox).

83. This policy was instituted in section 4 of the CCF tentative constitution providing that the "name or initials of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation" should not be used. Elsie Wright to Norman Priestley, June 19, 1933. NAC MG 28.IV.1 Vol.5. Norman Priestley to Elsie Wright, June 24, 1933. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 5. This preoccupation with the name and initials of the CCF was result of experiences with the Canadian Labour Party and its rivals, the Independent Labour Party, Dominion Labour Party and Federated Labour Party.

84. Minutes of the Provincial Council, September 23, 1933. NAC MG 27.III.D7 Norman Priestley Papers.

85. Ibid.

86. Norman Priestley to Robert Skinner, May 5, 1933; Norman Priestley to D. M. LeBourdais, Secretary of Ontario Association of CCF Clubs, November 8, 1933; George Williams to Norman Priestley, November 22, 1933. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 5, f. 3.

87. The rumours were essentially true. In March 1933 the Provincial Council officially endorsed a group of one hundred University of Alberta students who had formed a local Economic Reconstruction Association club. They were subsequently given affiliate status within the CCF. Johnson, "Failure of the CCF in Alberta", p. 97; The Story of the Alberta CCF 1932 to 1948 and 1948 Provincial Convention Program (Edmonton: Commercial Printers, 1948), p. 4. GAIA M1722. Alberta CCF Papers, f. 2. R.A. Cooke (Lethbridge ERA) to Norman F. Priestley, June 15, 1933; R.A. Cooke to J. Gaule, Secretary C.C.A., Calgary, June 19, 1933. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 5.

88. R.A. Cooke to J. Gaule, Secretary C.C.A., Calgary, June 19, 1933. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 5.

89. R.A. Cooke to Norman F. Priestley, June 15, 1933. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 5.

90. R.A. Cooke to J. Gaule, Secretary C.C.A., Calgary, June 19, 1933. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 5.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid.

94. R.A. Cooke to Norman Priestley, June 15, 1933. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 5.

95. Norman Priestley to J. Gaule, June 24, 1933. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 5.

96. Norman Priestley to R.A. Cooke, June 24, 1933. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 5.

97. Norman Priestley to Secretaries of all CCF Affiliation Applicants. May 23, 1933. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 5, f. 2. The Provincial Council in Ontario authorized the establishment of a CCF clubs section in March 1933 without waiting for the National Council to make a decision.

98. Emphasis mine. CCF National Constitution 1933, cited in Young, Anatomy of a Party, pp. 141-142.

99. McHenry, Third Force in Canada, p. 29.

100. Alberta Provincial Council C.C.F. Provisions for Groups Other than Farmer or Labor in Alberta. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 5. Present at the September 23rd meeting of the Provincial Council were: Robert Gardiner, Norman Priestley, Mrs. Price, Jack Sutherland, H.H. MacLeod, George Church and Norman Smith representing the U.F.A., and C.L. Gibbs, Chris Pattinson, Andrew Smeaton, Elmer Roper and James Watson representing the C.L.P. Watson substituted for White as representative of the Calgary Central Council of the C.L.P.

101. Alberta Provincial Council C.C.F. Provisions for Groups Other than Farmer or Labor in Alberta. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 5. Local groups and clubs which made up the ERA had to take the name "Economic

Reconstruction Association Local No. -- " permitting a clause stipulating that it was "affiliated with the CCF".

102. Norman F. Priestley to Secretaries, Provincial Council. October 6, 1933. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 5.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid.

105. Minutes of Meeting of the Alberta Council of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation Held in the Offices of the U.F.A., Lougheed Building, Calgary on Saturday, September 23 [1933]. NAC MG 27.III.D7 Norman Priestley Papers.

106. Two applications were received by January 1934 regarding affiliation to the E.R.A. A Calgary branch with fifty-three members was constituted as ERA Calgary Local No. 1, while the Edmonton local of forty-four members became E.R.A. Edmonton Local No. 2. Minutes of the Alberta Provincial Council, January 11, 1934. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 75, f. 2.

107. Minutes of the CCF National Council, July 14, 1934. NAC 27.III.D Norman Priestley Papers, f. 7.

108. Second Annual Report of Norman Priestley, Secretary-Treasurer, July 15, 1934. NAC MG 27.III.D Norman Priestley Papers, f. 7.

109. Second Annual Report of Norman Priestley, Secretary-Treasurer, July 15, 1934. NAC MG 27.III.D, Norman Priestley Papers, f. 7.

110. The Workers United Council in Calgary would not abandon their name and their affiliation to the ERA was denied. C.H. Carter to Norman Priestley, July 11, 1933. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 5.

111. Norman Priestley to Robert Gardiner and Provisional Council, December 12, 1933. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 5.

112. Norman Priestley to Provisional Council, December 20, 1933. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 5.

113. Norman Priestley to Robert Gardiner, December 12, 1933. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 5.

114. Resolution re Dual or Multiple Membership. NAC MG.28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 5. Dual or multiple voting or membership resulted in "a disturbance for the balance of influence proper to each adherent, and a consequent tendency to disturbance of the goodwill existing between affiliates."

115. Alvin Finkel, "The Rise and Fall of the Labour Party in Alberta, 1917-42", Labour/Le Travail 16 (Fall 1985): 61-96; and Larry Hannant, "The Calgary Working Class and the Social Credit Movement in Alberta, 1932-35", Ibid., pp. 97-116.

116. For the minutes of the Calgary CCF Committee, see GAIA M1157 Norman Smith Papers, f. 108. One obvious consolidation factor was the results of the provincial by-election on 19 January 1933 when the Independent candidate (N. Hindsley) defeated a group of three left wing candidates to win a seat in the Legislature. The official labour candidate, running on a CCF-Labour-UFA ticket was Aemilia Turner who obtained 38% of the votes. Opposing her was R.A. Parkyn of the Independent Labour Party. Parkyn had been the Independent Labour MLA for Calgary between 1926 and 1930 before being persuaded to step aside in the interests of left-wing unity in favour of Fred White. He obtained 7% of the votes with the communist picking up 2%. A united front of labour, farmer and communists would have been enough to win the by-election. The repercussions of this fact for the ILP probably forced them to reconsider their orientation to the CCF and participate in Aemilia Turner's 1934 campaign.

117. Minutes of the CCF Committee, January 25, 1933. GAIA M1157 Norman Smith Papers, f. 108.

118. Minutes of the meeting of CCF Educational Committee, February 10, 1933. GAIA M1157 Norman Smith Papers, f. 108.

119. Minutes of the Meeting of CCF Educational Committee, March 1, 1933. GAIA M1157 Norman Smith Papers, f. 108.

120. Minutes of Meeting of CCF Educational Committee for Calgary, November 29, 1933. GAIA M1157 Norman Smith Papers, f. 107.

121. Aylmer Liesemer was one of the organizers of the Calgary Labour Club, and John Gaule one of the leaders of the defunct CCA.

122. The involvement of both the Calgary Labour Club and the Central Council of Unemployed Organizations in the CCF Educational Committee, contrary to the dictates of the CCF Provincial Council, was an indication of the contradictions between the two forms of structurations.

123. Story of the Alberta CCF, pp. 4-5.

124. As in the case of Edmonton and Calgary.

125. Minutes of the Meeting of the Alberta Council of the CCF, September 23, 1933. NAC MG 27.III.D7 Norman Priestley Papers.

126. Ibid.

127. Ibid.

128. Elmer Roper to J.S. Woodsworth, January 14, 1933. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 6.

129. Ibid.

130. Ibid.

131. Norman Priestley to Elmer Roper, February 3, 1933. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 6.

132. Conversely it could be argued that social integration between UFA members and supporters and Social Credit increased throughout 1934 and 1935.

133. J.H. Coldwell to N.F.Priestley, October 7, 1933. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers Vol. 103.

134. Christian Opp to Norman Priestley, November 7, 1933. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 103.

135. Norman Priestley to Christian Opp, December 14, 1933. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 103.

136. Norman Priestley to W.M. Parmenter, April 18, 1934; W.M. Parmenter to Priestley, March 26, 1934. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 103.

137. Norman Priestley to W.M. Parmenter, April 18, 1934. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 103.

138. Frank Phillimore to Norman Priestley, October 2, 1934. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 103.

139. Norman Priestley to Frank Phillimore, October 17, 1934. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 103.

140. Ibid.

141. Norman Priestley to George Johnson and George MacLachlan (UFA MLA), January 8, 1935. GAIA M1187 Norman Smith Papers, f. 9.

142. Ibid.

143. Duncan B. Fraser to M. J. Coldwell, June 19, 1935. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 5.

144. Jack King to Duncan Fraser, June 21, 1935. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 5.

145. Sidney H. Old to M.J. Coldwell, September 2, 1935. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 182.

146. The Commonwealth (Regina), 30 August 1935.

147. The CLP in 1935 lost 83% of its support in Edmonton as compared to 69% in Calgary. Cross-voting analysis suggests that in 67% of CLP support in Edmonton went to the Social Credit candidates while in Calgary 55% went to Social Credit. It is also crucial to examine who were the CLP's candidates. In Calgary the CLP ran Fred White, A.J.E. Liesemer and W.G. Southern. Only White represented the leadership of the party. In Edmonton, however, Labour candidates included James East, J.W. Findlay, Carl Berg, S.S. Bowcott, Alf Farmilo and Sidney Parsons. It is interesting that the CPC candidate - Jan Lakeman - received three times as many votes as Labour leaders Berg and Farmilo combined. This may appear to be more of a vote against traditional CLP leaders than against the party itself.

148. Charles Keeley to M. J. Coldwell, August 27, 1935. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 182.

149. Norman Priestley to M. J. Coldwell, September 2, 1935. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76, f. 6.

150. Hopkins noted that Aberhart's provincial victory had frozen federal CCF rural campaign contributions. The failure of the CCF to form an alliance with Social Credit was cited as a reason. W.F. Hopkins to M.J. Coldwell, September 21, 1935. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 182.

151. M.J.Coldwell to Elmer Roper, October 18, 1935. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76, f. 6.

REFERENCES

CHAPTER III

1. Relationships between the Alberta CCF and ordinary members and leaders of the founding sections existed on a theoretical basis only. At the federal level this relationship became institutionalized. At the provincial level, the CCF, as an institution, did not exist in terms of personal or social relationships. Giddens pointed out that in any political process, a relationship had to be established between an individual and an institution or organization that can be measured in terms of social interaction and identification. Evidently, structural constraints denied the development of social relationships that took place outside the parameters of the founding organizations. Even with the creation of the ERA as the third-force of the CCF in Alberta, rank and file members could not symbolically relate themselves to the CCF.

2. "A Building Job" Alberta Labor News September 7, 1935, p. 4.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Alberta Labour News September 7, 1935, p. 1.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., p. 1.

9. Alberta Labour News September 14, 1935, p. 1.

10. Alberta Labour News September 7, 1935.

11. Ibid.

12. Norman Priestley, Furrows, Faith and Fellowship, pp. 124-125.

13. Ibid., pp. 125-127.

14. People's Weekly February 15, 1936, p. 8.

15. Ibid., April 11, 1936, p. 2.

16. Ibid., June 13, 1936, p. 5.

17. Ibid., March 28, 1936, p. 2.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., May 9, 1936, p. 3.

20. Ibid., July 18, 1936.

21. Ibid., July 10, 1936.

22. Confidential Report, E.J. Garland - UFA Convention [1937]. NAC MG.28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76, file 1.

23. Ibid. For information on the People's League and Unity League see Finkel, Social Credit Phenomenon, pp. 67-68; Harold Schultz, "A Second Term: 1940", Alberta Historical Review 10 (Winter 1962); and Meir Serfaty, "Structure and Organization of Political Parties in Alberta, 1935-1971", Ph.D. dissertation, Carleton University, 1977.

24. The options were to: (a) abandon politics and revert to a pure economic group; (b) return to the status of an economic group taking political action independent of any other group or party; (c) remain affiliated with the CCF; or (d) support a Unity Movement in Alberta. Confidential Report, E.J. Garland - U.F.A. Convention [1937]. NAC MG.28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76, file 1.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Statement of William Irvine to the UFA Convention [1937] in Confidential Report, E.J. Garland - U.F.A. Convention [1937]. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76, file 1.

28. Ibid. Of the convention delegates only 7% supported the People's League as an alternative to the UFA. 74% supported the CCF either as a federal or provincial party, and 19% desired an independent perspective. On the final ballot 46% of the UFA delegates supported the provincial CCF while 54% supported the federal CCF.

29. Confidential Report, E.J. Garland - U.F.A. Convention [1937]. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76, file 1.

30.30. Ibid.

31. Resolutions of the 1937 UFA Convention, in Confidential Report by E.J. Garland - UFA Convention. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76, file 1.

32. Ibid.

33. Confidential Report, E.J. Garland - U.F.A. Convention [1937]. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76, file 1.

34. Ibid.

35. Mary Crawford to J.S. Woodsworth, January 23, 1937. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 73, file.3.

36. David Lewis to the Secretary of the UFA, august 18, 1937. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76, file 6.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. According to CCF figures, by 1937 the Clubs section consisted of 1500 members - roughly 21% of the total UFA membership at the time. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Alberta CCF leaders believed that the Social legislation had to be disallowed. Yet they also perceived that such action would involve federal interference in provincial affairs, which they also opposed.

42. E.J. Garland to David Lewis, June 6, 1937. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 95, file 3.

43. Ibid.

44. Report of E.J. Garland to National Executive, June 1937. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 95, file 3.

45. Ibid.

46. Resolution passed by the National Council of the CCF at the Meeting in Edmonton, Sat. July 30, 1938. NAC MG 28.IV.1, Vol. 76, file 6.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Elmer Roper to David Lewis, November 22, 1938. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, file 1.

50. Edward J. Garland to J.S. Woodsworth, January 5, 1939. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 85, file 3.

51. Norman F. Priestley to David Lewis, January 31, 1939. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76, file 6.

52. The UFA Executive in 1939 contained four individuals who supported the CCF: Norman Priestley, Robert Gardiner, Jack Sutherland and Henry Spencer. The anti-CCF executives included George Church, UFWA president Marie Berger and Secretary Ellen Birch. Among the sixteen directors of the UFA, the CCF could only count on the support of six individuals including Wes H. Scott and Carl Colvin.

53. "Future Policy" Resolution of the United Farmers of Alberta Board, January 1939. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76, file 6.

54. Ibid.

55. David Lewis to Norman Priestley, February 9, 1939. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76 file 6.

56. Ibid.

57. Press interview with M.J. Coldwell, National Party Chairman, CCF [January 1939]. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76, file 6.

58. Ibid.

59. CCF-Labour Support in urban areas (Calgary, Edmonton and Lethbridge) had decreased between 1930 and 1935 from 24.9% to 8.9% (64% decrease), but increased slightly from 8.9% to 9.9% between 1935 and 1940 (11.2% increase). Liberal and Conservative support coalesced into the Independent group coupled with 14% from Social Credit.

60. People's Weekly November 26, 1938. See Finkel, "The Rise and Fall of the Labour Party in Alberta", pp. 92-3.

61. The Alberta CCF did not run candidates in Lethbridge or Medicine Hat at the federal level. Provincially, fifteen southern constituencies and one northern constituency (Peace River) did not have CCF candidates.

62. George Bevington of the UFA Ginger Group had run for the CCF in the 1935 federal election but shifted to the independents in 1940.

63. In Calgary, ILP candidate Duncan Mitchell obtained 251 votes. In Edmonton, communist candidate John MacPherson and Independent Progressive candidates S.A.G. Barnes and J.H. Green split the left-wing vote.

64. Calgary Albertan March 2, 1940.

65. Calgary Albertan March 5, 1940, p. 12; March 8, 1940, p. 14; March 9, 1940, p. 7.

66. Calgary Albertan March 14, 1940, p. 4.

67. Elmer Roper to David Lewis, October 24, 1941. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 3.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. William Irvine to David Lewis, November 3, 1941. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 3.

72. Minutes of Meeting of Alberta Provincial Council of the C.C.F., Red Deer, November 1, 1941. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 3.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. Elmer Roper to David Lewis, November 3, 1941. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 3.

78. William Irvine to David Lewis, November 3, 1941. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 3.

79. Ibid.

80. Emphasis is William Irvine's.

81. Ibid.

82. William Irvine to David Lewis, November 3, 1941. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 3.

83. Ibid.

84. Mary Crawford to David Lewis, November 13, 1941. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 3. Mary Crawford was, at this time, Treasurer of the Alberta General Membership Section of the CCF and Vice President of the CLP.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. National Executive Decision on Alberta Situation [November 1941] NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 3. Emphasis is David Lewis.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid.

90. National Executive Decision on Alberta Situation [November 1941] NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 3. Emphasis is David Lewis.

91. David Lewis to Elmer Roper, November 20, 1941. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 3.

92. David Lewis to William Irvine, November 20, 1941. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 3.

93. William Irvine to David Lewis, December 1, 1941. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 3.

94. Ibid.

95. Elmer Roper to David Lewis, January 26, 1942. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 3.

96. Ibid.

97. The relative organizational and social strengths between UFA members and their leaders is questionable. Members did not follow their leaders blindly into remaining loyal to the UFA (in 1935), supporting the CCF after 1935 or supporting the Independents.

98. Major CLP leaders included Berg, Farmilo, White, Smeaton and Barnes. Minor leaders included those who came from the socialist or left tradition instead of the labourist tradition. They included Crawford, Mentz, Turner, Smith and Alexander. Elmer Roper is an interesting case as a transitional leader. He was always part of the leadership group within the CLP throughout the 1920s, but his desire to remain a leader allowed him to make a transitional jump from the CLP to the CCF.

99. "Change in CCF Organization. CCF Clubs will be formed", Alberta Labour News September 7, 1935, pp. 1-2.

100. See C.B. Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System, pp. 62-66 for a discussion of the internal organization of the UFA.

101. Compare, for example, the "Constitution of the CCF Clubs in Alberta" (1936) with two later constitutions - "Constitution of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, Alberta General Membership Section" (1939) and "Constitution of the CCF (Alberta Section), 1944. These are all located in NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 7.

102. Constitution of the CCF Clubs in Alberta (1936), NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 7.

103. Ibid., section 2. This clause has become the standard "no other party" restriction for CCF and NDP membership. At the time, it is uncertain whether membership in the CCF Clubs and the CLP or the UFA constituted an infringement of this rule. A large number of provincial CCF leaders held dual or triple membership. In later years, this rule has become extended not only to members but also to supporters of other political parties.

104. Ibid., section 3(1).

105. Ibid., section 3(2).

106. Ibid., section 3(4),(6).

107. Ibid., section 4(1,2,3,4). According to Macpherson, each UFA local elected its own executive and sent delegates to the annual provincial convention on the principle of one representative for each ten members. The entry of the UFA into electoral activity necessitated the reorganization of the UFA along provincial and federal constituency boundaries. See Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, pp. 66-69.

108. Constitution of the CCF Clubs in Alberta (1936), section 5(1). NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 7.

109. Ibid., section 5(1); 6(1),(2); 9(1),(2).

110. Constitution of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, Alberta General Membership Section (1939). NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 7.

111. Ibid., article 9.

112. Ibid., article 6(2), article 7(5), article 10(3).

113. This process was reflected in the allocation of membership fees: out of every $1.00 fee, $.40 went to the provincial constituency association and $.60 went to the central office. Of the latter, the National office received $.10. Constitution of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, Alberta General Membership Section (1939), Article 4 (1). NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74 f. 7.

114. Ibid., Article 5 (1). This form of organization was necessary in Edmonton and Calgary where the Labour party, trade unions and municipal parties existed to complicate the political process.

115. Ibid., Article 5 (2,3). The executive consisted of the president, vice-president, secretary-treasurer and nine other individuals, at least two of whom had to be women.

116. Ibid., Article 4 (1). Two delegates from each poll organization of less than ten members, and one delegate from each additional ten members could represent the local at the constituency convention.

117. Ibid., Article 6(3).

118. Ibid., Article 10 (1). Given the relative proximity between federal and provincial elections in Alberta throughout the period, it can be seen that this provision was the only mechanism possible for effectively co-ordinating federal campaigns. Similarly, the reproduction of this process at the local level ensured a high level of social integration among several provincial constituencies that made up the federal constituency.

119. Ibid., Article 7 (3).

120. The composition of the provincial and federal associations and executive was practically the same. This has been verified by an examination of the federal constituency of Peace River and its provincial components (Peace River, Grouard, Grande Prairie and Spirit River).

121. Ibid., Articles 10 (section 7a).

122. This was the famous "united front" clause that prohibited united front electoral activities on the part of the CCF in federal and provincial politics. This provision was, however, never taken seriously in municipal areas because of the multiplicity of political parties and groupings.

123. For a discussion of the CCF clubs from a national perspective see Zakuta's A Protest Movement Becalmed pp. 46-7.

124. This was the situation of the Cherhill CCF Club. Originally an UFA club, it had refused to be converted into a Social Credit local and had transformed itself into a CCF club. The persistence of CCF clubs and locals throughout Alberta in the latter half of the 1930s and 1940s testified to the remaining strengths of the UFA. Interview with Harold E. Bronson, December 12, 1987. According to the Report of the Second National Convention of the CCF (1934) there were 11000 individuals in Alberta belonging to UFA, CLP and ERA locals and clubs in Alberta. The question that remains to be researched specifically is how many of these locals were converted into Social Credit locals how many died out or became CCF locals. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 10.

125. Constitution of the CCF Clubs in Alberta (1936), section 1(2). NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 7.

126. Constitution of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, Alberta General Membership Section (1939). NAC MG 28.IV.1 Vol. 74, f. 7.

REFERENCES

CHAPTER IV

1. Constitution of the CCF (Alberta Section), 1944, Article X(1). GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 293.

2. The provincial office was set up in 1939 on an interim basis and permanently organized in 1942. Moreover, the position of provincial organizer was attached to the Provincial Secretary during most of the early 1940s before being separated into two positions in 1944. Two observers sat on the Provincial Executive appointed by the Board to reflect continued political, local and regional input into organizational decision-making.

3. For example, Warwick Kelloway for southern Alberta, and I.V. Macklin for northern Alberta.

4. For example, William Irvine from Wetaskiwin-Camrose area, Sig Lefsrud from the Viking-Tofield area, Harold Bronson from Cherchill (Pembina) area, Nellie Peterson from Lac Ste. Anne.

5. Constitution of the CCF (Alberta Section), 1944, Article V (1). GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 293.

6. This can be demonstrated by examining the Peace River federal constituency (and corresponding provincial constituencies) where the federal and provincial constituency organizations existed only on paper, except when needed by the provincial leadership, and real social and political activity was conducted at the local poll level. This is contrary to established organizational procedures, but in the case of the CCF, it reproduced significant social practices that had existed under the UFA.

7. This will be seen in the correspondence between the federal and provincial sections over the Calgary crises of 1939 and 1946-47, and the William Irvine affair in 1956.

8. Constitution of the CCF (Alberta Section), 1944, Article XVII, Section 2. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 293.

9. The definitions of **cadre party** and **mass membership party** are derived from Feliks Gross, The Revolutionary Party: Essays in the Sociology of Politics (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1974), pp. 87-108. Using the Jacobin analysis of party typology, Gross notes the basic differences between a **mass party** and a **vanguardist** (or

cadre) **party**. The mass party consists of, in expanded concentric circles, a central committee, provincial or local committees, and the general membership of the party. The party was structured vertically (either federalistic or centralistic) and horizontally (through geography). The mass party appeals to a large audience or electorate. It is an open party accepting as new members those who simply agreed with the program or ideology. The cadre (or vanguardist) party, on the other hand, consists of a small central committee who make decisions, surrounded by party activists, whose profession is politics and party activities. Ordinary members and sympathizers formed the outer concentric rings. Their function is to give activists and the central committee financial and political support. A political party can become either a mass or cadre party, and one can be transformed into the other through the addition or elimination of bureaucratic discipline through the formation of cadre units.

10. See appendix for electoral summaries and analysis.

11. John J. Barr, The Dynasty: The Rise and Fall of Social Credit in Alberta (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), p. 121.

12. William Irvine to David Lewis, June 27, 1944. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 75, f. 5.

13. The constitutional rules stipulating at least six months' membership before being able to vote at nominating conventions were replaced by emergency provisions providing for five days' membership prior to nominations. William Irvine to CCF Members, St. Albert, July 8, 1944. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 125.

14. Reported in Calgary Herald 8 July 1944, p. 3.

15. See GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 125.

16. Provincial Secretary to Candidates, July 10, 1944. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 125.

17. The entire CCF provincial election campaign was decentralized in four cities (Edmonton, Calgary, Grande Prairie and Lethbridge) where local organizers handled literature, radio broadcasting and campaign arrangements for their specific region. Irvine to candidates, July 11, 1944. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 125.

18. Clifford Lee to David Lewis, July 19, 1944. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 75, f. 5.

19. William Irvine to David Lewis, July 11, 1944. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 125.

20. "There really is nothing I would like better, but as I think I may already informed you I simply must stick to the campaign in Quebec. I happen to know something about the province and also speak French. Most of our other people will be helping in Alberta, and Frank Scott and I will have to give our attention to Quebec." David Lewis to William Irvine, July 17, 1944. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 42.

21. David Lewis to Clifford Lee, July 17, 1944 NAC MG 28.IV. CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 3. "I am sorry that your election crosses with two others and therefore reduces the likelihood of any considerable financial assistance from Eastern Canada."

22. Elmer Roper to David Lewis, July 14, 1944. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 75, f. 5.

23. The Labour Progressive Party (LPP) was formerly the Communist Party of Canada.

24. David Lewis to Clifford Lee, July 17, 1944. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 3. David Lewis to Elmer Roper, July 17, 1944. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 103, 1944 Provincial Election file.

25. Clifford Lee to David Lewis, July 10, 1944. NAC MG 28.IV.I CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 3.

26. "I don't think I am being too optimistic in saying that a win here is a distinct possibility. There has been in parts a dramatic change of sentiment. With a real live campaign it could put us over...." Ibid.

27. William Irvine to David Lewis, July 18, 1944. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol 74, f. 5.

28. In response to a request from Irvine for another national figure to make a tour of Alberta, such as Jacques Casgrain, the National Secretary stated that "the problem we are faced here is to divide our forces to the greatest advantage between the three provinces which now are in the throes of elections." David Lewis to William Irvine, July 24, 1944. GAIA f. 42. Sandy Nicholson also requested unsuccessfully to have Casgrain come to Alberta. He argued that his visit might "decide four seats." Sandy Nicholson to David Lewis, cable, July 11, 1944. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 5.

29. Lorne Ingle to Margaret Telford, July 28, 1944. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 42. Lorne Ingle was leased to the Provincial Office by the National Office for the duration of the campaign to assist in the organizational tasks.

30. "Notes for Candidates and Speakers", GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 125. The party used the comments of Solon E. Low who noted that "It was not possible to achieve Social Credit in a single province; that Social Credit could only be achieved on the national field." Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. See appendix for electoral information.

33. Elmer Roper in Edmonton and Aylmer Liesemer in Calgary.

34. Edmonton and Calgary were multiple-member ridings.

35. St. Paul, Grouard, Willingdon, Vermilion, Redwater and Drumheller. In Drumheller, Redwater and Vermilion, the LPP candidates received more votes than the CCF candidates.

36. These constituencies were St. Paul, Vegreville and Willingdon. Seventy-four percent of LPP supporters plumped (failed to register a 2nd choice on their ballots). Of those who did register a second choice, in St. Paul there was an almost even split between the Social Credit and CCF candidates. In the two Ukrainian constituencies (Vegreville and Willingdon) only 9% supported the Social Credit candidate while 17% supported the CCF. However, if a suitable political arrangement had been made between the CCF and the LPP in 1944, as was made between the CCF and the Liberals in 1955, then the CCF would have picked up three more constituencies. In any case, the CCF won Willingdon in 1952 (under Nick Dushenski) and Vegreville in 1955 (under Stanley Ruzycki), possibly with LPP support.

37. These constituencies are Lethbridge, Okotoks-High River and Pincher Creek-Crowsnest. In these three constituencies between 55% and 79% of CCF voters plumped. Of those who did register a choice, 23% supported the Social Credit candidate while 9% supported the Independents. It is clear that many rural CCF supporters still regarded Social Credit more favorably than the Liberals, Conservatives or Independents.

38. CCF Post-Election Radio Address, by J.E. Cook, November 24, 1944. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 256.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. "Let's Face the Facts" by Lorne Ingle. [November 1944] NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 75, f. 5.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid. Emphasis is Ingle's.

49. According to party membership files and correspondence between the Provincial and National offices, party membership had increased from 2 500 in 1942 to 6 000 in 1943 to 12 000 in 1944. Over the two-year period, membership had increased 380% See William Irvine to David Lewis, June 28, 1944. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 42. The party budget had increased from $4 200 in 1942, $9 000 in 1943 to $65 000 in 1944. See "Summary of Alberta CCF", Provincial Office to Margaret Telford, November 4, 1944. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 42. The youth movement of the Alberta CCF grew from 20 members and 2 clubs in 1943 to 207 members in 11 clubs in 1944.

50. Ibid.

51. See Table 3 in the appendix for electoral statistics of the 1945 federal general election in Alberta.

52. Calgary East, Camrose, Jasper-Edson, Peace River and Wetaskiwin. Camrose scored the highest with 25.9%.

53. Elmer Roper to David Lewis, March 9, 1945. NAC MG 28.IV.1. CCF Papers, Vol. 103.

54. David Lewis to Elmer Roper, March 25, 1945. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 103.

55. "Story of the CCF", p. 8-9. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 42. Convention minutes do not exist for the 1944 convention.

56. Jack King to J.P. Griffin, January 15, 1946. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 141.

57. Jack King to Hardy Wear, Vermilion, January 19, 1946. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 141.

58. Ibid.; Jack King to C.O. Berger, Stony Plain, October 11, 1946. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 142.

59. Leadership of the Alberta CCF in 1944/45 and 1945/46:

	1944/45	1945/46
President:	Harry D. Ainlay	Jack E. Cook
Vice President:	Nellie Peterson	Nellie Peterson
Prov. Leader	Elmer Roper	Elmer Roper
Prov. Secretary	William Irvine	Jack King
Prov. Organizer	William Irvine	----------
Prov. Treasurer	Clifford Lee	Clifford Lee
Prov. Board	Henry Spencer	Jack Sykes
Prov. Board	Sig Lefsrud	Sig Lefsrud
Prov. Board	Jack Cook	Mrs. M. Wobick

Source: Minutes of the Provincial Board, 1944-1946. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 118.

60. Information on the Calgary crisis of 1938-1939 can be obtained from the National Archives of Canada, MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Volume 74, f. 1 and Volume 76, f. 5.

61. This was detailed in the last chapter on the relations between the CCF and CLP over reunification in 1942. Three years earlier, in 1939, such unification would have been impossible.

62. See the correspondence between Elmer Roper, Edward Garland and David Lewis on this: E.J. Garland to David Lewis, January 1938; Elmer Roper to David Lewis, February 11, 1939. NAC MG.28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76, f. 5. Freda Garland to Elmer Roper, June 6, 1939; E.J. Garland to Elmer Roper, May 4, 1939; Elmer Roper to David Lewis, May 12, 1939; Fred White to Elmer Roper, May 14, 1939; David Lewis to Elmer Roper, May 15, 1939; Elmer Roper to David Lewis, May 23, 1939; Freda Garland to Elmer Roper, June 6, 1939; Elmer Roper to David Lewis, June 7, 1939; David Lewis to Elmer Roper, June 8, 1939. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 1. For insights into the interpretations and viewpoints of the dissidents within the Calgary CCF see the following correspondence: Ralph Wootton to Elmer Roper, February, 1939; Elmer Roper to Ralph Wootton, February 11, 1939; Mrs. M. Turfuss to Freda Garland, May 4, 1939; Ralph Wootton to the National and Provincial Councils, May 6, 1939; William Irvine to Ralph Wootton, May 8, 1939; Ralph Wootton to William Irvine, May 11, 1939; Albert Lindley to Elmer Roper, May 29, 1939; Elmer Roper to Albert Lindley, May 30, 1939; H.W. Dalton to Elmer Roper, May 26, 1939. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 1. For a more

partisan examination of the crisis see the July 1939 issue of Socialist Action (the English organ of the Socialist Workers League, the Canadian section of the Fourth "trotskyist" International) located at the Department of Labour Library in Ottawa.

63. For information regarding municipal politics in Alberta see Jack Masson, Alberta's Local Government and Politics (Edmonton: Pica Press, 1985), chapter 10.

64. See the articles in Calgary Herald 27 September 1945, p. 1; 3 October 1945, p. 11; 6 October 1945, p. 4; 11 October 1945, p. 20; 19 October 1945, p. 11. According to G.M. Brown, the Civic Reform Association was intended to represent the "progressive or leftist element in the city", Calgary Herald 19 October 1945, p. 11.

65. See the articles in Calgary Herald and Albertan 22 September 1946; Calgary Herald 3 October 1946, p. 11; 18 October 1946, p. 11.

66. Robert Alderman, George Ellinson, Aylmer Liesemer and Mayor James C. Watson, who were on either the Provincial Board or Executive, supported continued CCF presence within the CRA.

67. "CCF'er Charges Corrupt Practices", Calgary Herald 15 October 1946, p. 11.

68. Documents relating to the internal crisis can be found in the GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 285.

69. Norman Smith to Ernie Cook, October 20, 1946. GAIA A663 Norman Smith Papers, f. 17.

70. Norman Smith to Ernie Cook, October 30, 1946. GAIA Norman Smith Papers, f. 17.

71. See the Minutes of the Provincial Board meeting, October 19-20, 1946. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 75, f. 2; letter from the Provincial Executive to Calgary CCF members, June 6, 1947. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 112. For the involvement of the federal party, see Isabel MacMillan to Lorne Ingle, October 31, 1946; Lorne Ingle to Isabel MacMillan, November 5, 1946; Isabel MacMillan to Lorne Ingle, November 22, 1946. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 182. Nothing was printed in the People's Weekly about the crisis.

72. Jack Cook to Calgary CCF Members, December 9, 1946. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 285. It was the task of the CCF rank and file in Calgary to undertake the

"practical application of CCF principles to ensure the growth of the CCF movement" as interpreted by the provincial leadership.

73. The nomination and election were strictly controlled by the Provincial Council. Accordingly, only CCF members who were on record up to and including 8 February 1946 were allowed to vote. All individuals provided membership after this date, and any executive member of the Calgary CCF between 1945 and 1946, were stripped of their party membership. All nominations had to be submitted to Provincial Secretary Jack King for approval, and the Provincial Board "reserved the right ... to eliminate from nomination any person who, through his past activities, might be considered strongly partisan to one side or another in the dispute which brought about the present situation." Provincial Board Summary of Events in Calgary, May 1947. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 285. Altogether, about 148 members were expelled from the party in Calgary.

74. Of the twelve, only H.F. Coulter had been extensively involved in the Calgary CCF before 1946. The rest were brought in from provincial constituencies surrounding Calgary. Ibid.; Press Statement by J.E. Cook and J. King (April 20, 1947); Jack King to CCF Members, June 6, 1947. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 285.

75. For example, in the 1948 provincial election, P.N.R. Morrison ran as a labour candidate collecting slightly less than half of the available CCF votes and a thousand votes more than A.J.E. Liesemer. After the 1948 election, the Calgary CCF membership substantially declined as members and supporters drifted to Social Credit, the communists or the political parties of the centre-right (Liberal and Progressive Conservative Parties).

76. Elmer Roper to David Lewis, January 17, 1947. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 103.

77. David Lewis to Elmer Roper, January 21, 1947. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 103.

78. Ibid.

79. Jack King to M.W. Svekla, Willingdon, July 24, 1946. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 144.

80. Jack King to Lorne Ingle, October 15, 1946. NAC MG 28.IV.1. CCF Papers, Vol. 73, f. 3.

81. Jack King to David Lewis, June 25, 1947. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 74, f. 2.; Jack King to Lorne Ingle, May 13, 1947. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 73, f. 3.

82. J.E. Cook to David Lewis, October 25, 1948. GAIA Alberta M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 1.

83. Lorne Ingle to David Lewis, July 21, 1948. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 75, f. 5.

84. Stewart Wright (Hughenden) to Ernie Cook, September 16, 1948. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 165; Anne Peters (Lethbridge) to Ernie Cook, October 17, 1948. GAIA Alberta M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 153.

85. Provincial Secretary to secretaries of provincial constituency associations, June 1947. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 130.

86. Report of the National Secretary to the CCF National Council, January 29-30, 1949. GAIA Alberta M1722 CCF Papers, f. 1. Official membership figures were first authoritatively collected for 1947.

87. See Tables 4 and 5 in the appendix for electoral statistics on the provincial general election of 1948. Table 5 is a comparative table of the 1944 and 1948 electoral results.

88. A.M. Nicholson to J.E. Cook, December 3, 1948. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 1.

89. Membership statistics for the Alberta CCF between 1941 and 1946 can only be estimated because no firm statistics were maintained before 1947. Estimates are based upon the reports of the Provincial Secretary prior to 1947 to the convention and National Secretary, and local estimates. Further reports are based upon membership and financial reports filed with the provincial secretary and treasurer. The same situation occurred at the national level where party membership dropped to 29 829 in 1947 from 88 216 in 1945 (a decrease of 66%). Over a one year period from 1947 to 1948 national party membership increased 30% to 38,782 before dropping to a low of 20,238 in 1950. Membership statistics are based upon the reports of the National Secretary to the National Convention, 1938-1960. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 12-21. Membership information was also obtained from financial statements prepared by the National Treasurer included an account of membership fees by province. See NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 8. Membership files are contained in NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers

Vols. 119-120 for the 1946 to 1951 periods.

90. The CCF were second in Lac Ste. Anne, Redwater and St. Paul; the Liberals placed second in Beaver River, Grouard, Pincher Creek-Crowsnest and Vermilion.

91. In ridings where a second count was needed and the CCF came in third, 81% of all CCF supporters plumped their votes. For those who signified a choice, 62% supported Social Credit instead of the Liberals. For Liberal supporters in CCF-second place ridings, only 58% plumped. Eighty-two percent of Liberal supporters indicated that their second choice was to go to Social Credit rather than to the CCF. If there was any consideration of an electoral arrangement between the CCF and the Liberals in 1948, it was not accepted by members and supporters of both parties.

92. Jack King to Jack Griffin, August 18, 1948. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 148. This letter was repeated verbatim in a letter Griffin wrote to Elmer Roper on August 21, 1948 and later reported in a letter to William Irvine in March 1950.

93. Jack King to Jack Griffin, August 18, 1948. GAIA Alberta M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 148.

94. Jack Griffin to Elmer Roper, August 21, 1948. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 148.

95. Ibid.

96. Elmer Roper to Jack Griffin, August 28, 1948. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 148.

97. Jack Griffin to William Irvine, March 17, 1950. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 143. This letter was designed to acquaint Irvine with the state of party organization at the local level during his absence from Alberta.

98. See, for example, the letter of Mrs. R.A. Price of Medicine Hat to Nellie Peterson, November 20, 1949. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 156.

99. Ibid.

100. Ernie Cook to William Hankin, September 10, 1949. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 219.

101. Ernie Cook to Jack Griffin, October 4, 1949. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 156.

102. Ernie Cook to Mrs. S. Buckland (Parkland), March 30, 1949. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 147.

103. Ernie Cook to Stewart Wright, October 26, 1949. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 154.

104. Ernie Cook to John Lloyd, March 28, 1949. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 147.

105. Ernie Cook to John G. Inglis, December 28, 1948. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 147.

106. Organizational revenues decreased from $12,285.44 in 1947/48 to $8,160.95 in 1949/1950 (a drop of 34%). Membership revenue decreased 70% over the same period. The slack was picked up by an organizational drive among remaining members and supporters. Provincial Office expenditures decreased 63% from $3,792 to $1,387. Organization and publicity expenses were kept to a minimum in the 1949/1950 period (at a mere 7% decrease) thus digging the party out a deficit situation. See Revenues and Expenditures of the Alberta CCF, 1947-1950. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, ff. 118, 276.

107. Elmer Roper's Recommendations for Future Organization to the Provincial Board, Minutes of the meeting of the Provincial Board, July 9, 1949. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 118.

108. David Lewis, in March 1949, noticed with alarm the declining membership within the Alberta party. The 70% decrease in membership renewals could not be taken lightly. "The Alberta situation worries me even more, because I understood that a membership drive has been undertaken, although I appreciate the fact that there was bound to be a pretty serious let down after the result of the last provincial election." David Lewis to John H. King, March 4, 1949. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 43. See also Nellie Peterson's response to David Lewis, March 18, 1949. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 43.

109. Elmer Roper's Recommendations for Future Organization to the Provincial Board, Minutes of the meeting of the Provincial Board, July 9, 1949. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 118.

110. Ibid.

111. An examination of the correspondence of several provincial constituencies in the Peace River federal constituency (Peace River, Grouard, Spirit River, Grande Prairie and Dunvegan) revealed that the structuration

process, inherited from the UFA during the 1930s, was drastically altered between 1945 and 1949. The essential elements of this transformation included the withdrawal of paid organizing party personnel from the local areas, the creation of core party leadership with minimal local support in major urban centres within the region, and the replication of provincial constituency leadership at the federal constituency level. The result of this process was discontinuous contact between the Provincial Office and the local members, and increased organizational and bureaucratic involvement with "self-styled" local leaders. The decline in membership at the local level can not be totally blamed on external factors, such as the cold war and depoliticization but should reflect organizational and structurational problems that existed within the party.

REFERENCES

CHAPTER V

1. Donald C. MacDonald to Elmer Roper, January 7, 1950. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 44. See also David Lewis to Alberta Provincial Executive, August 24, 1949. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 43; "Report of the Executive Subcommittee on Education" submitted to the CCF National Council, October 1, 1949. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 11.

2. Ibid.

3. Donald MacDonald to Nellie Peterson, November 15, 1949. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 44.

4. Elmer Roper's handwritten comments on letter from Donald C. MacDonald to Elmer Roper, December 13, 1949. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 44.

5. Nellie Peterson to Donald C. MacDonald, January 31, 1950. GAIA Alberta M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 44. Minutes of the Executive meeting held at Woodsworth House, Edmonton, January 14, 1950; April 8, 1950; September 12, 1950. GAIA Alberta M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 118.

6. Lorne Ingle to William Irvine, August 29, 1950. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 44.

7. William Irvine to David Lewis, March 13, 1950. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 73, f. 4. This letter was in response to David Lewis to William Irvine, March 7, 1950. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 44.

8. William Irvine to David Lewis, March 13, 1950. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 73, f. 4.

9. William Irvine to Lorne Ingle, April 11, 1950. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 44.

10. Jack Griffin to William Irvine, February 15, 1950. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 148. The same problems were experienced by Harold E. Bronson. See Harold Bronson to Jack King, September 1949. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 166.

11. William Irvine to Jack Griffin, March 29 1950. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 148.

12. Jack Griffin to William Irvine, February 15, 1950. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 148.

13. William Irvine to David Lewis, March 13, 1950. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 73, f. 4.

14. Elmer Roper to David Lewis, October 13, 1949. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 155.

15. See table 6 in the appendix for a statistical review of the provincial general elections of 1952, 1955 and 1959.

16. Between 1944 and 1948 electoral support decreased 23.19%. Between 1948 and 1952 support decreased 26.6%, between 1952 and 1955, 41.1% and between 1955 and 1959, 47.5% It was a steadily increasing rate of decrease throughout the 1950s. See Table 7 in the appendix for a comparative analysis of the provincial elections between 1952 and 1959 in various sectors of the province.

17. In 1948 the CCF did not nominate candidates in ten ridings (out of sixteen) in southern Alberta. In 1952 the party did not run candidates in thirteen of sixteen ridings. In 1955 fourteen ridings out of sixteen did not have CCF candidates. In 1959 there was only one CCF candidate in southern Alberta - Acadia-Coronation.

18. Membership in the Alberta CCF:

1941	2,500 estimate	1951	1,826
1942	3,000 estimate	1952	1,772
1943	4,000 estimate	1953	1,452
1944	12,000 estimate	1954	1,671
1945	13,000 estimate	1955	1,889
1946	7,000 estimate	1956	1,392
1947	3,737	1957	1,029
1948	4,920	1958	1,009
1949	3,329	1959	1,110
1950	2,336		

Source: Membership files, GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers. Estimates are based upon the report of the Provincial Secretary in 1947. Other statistics were based upon membership reports and financial reports filed with the Provincial Secretary and Treasurer.

19. The membership statistics for Alberta appear to correlate with those of the national CCF. Between 1945 and 1950 the CCF lost almost 68,000 members (a 77% loss). Throughout the 1950s CCF membership fluctuated. There was an increase in membership between 1951 and 1953, and a further increase between 1955 and 1957. The final membership increase occurred in 1960 before the creation of

the NDP. 1950 was the lowest point in terms of CCF membership before the National Educational Programme took effect in 1951. Thereafter party membership hovered around 24,000. See Reports of the National Secretary to the National Convention, 1938 to 1960. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Volumes 12-21; Financial statements, NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 8.

20. Colin Cameron, "An Analysis of the Election Results", CCF News July 6, 1949, p. 3. Colin Cameron was provincial leader of the British Columbia CCF and prominent member of the "Socialist Fellowship" faction within the party. This article can be regarded as the opening salvo in the fight between the right and left within the CCF. The National Executive had Angus MacInnis respond immediately to Cameron's article - "The CCF and the Elections", CCF News July 20, 1949, p. 3. University of British Columbia Special Collections (UBCSC). Angus MacInnis Papers.

21. Ibid.

22. For information on "Socialist Fellowship" in British Columbia see the UBCSC Angus MacInnis Papers. See also Elaine Bernard, "The Rod Young Affair in the British Columbia Co-operative Commonwealth Federation" (M.A. thesis, University of British Columbia, 1979).

23. Motion reproduced in the minutes of the Provincial Board, March 12, 1949. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 118. A policy committee was appointed to oversee the implementation of the resolution.

24. 1948 resolution copied in Isabel MacMillan to Lorne Ingle, June 20, 1950. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76, f. 2.

25. For example, in April 1948, Jack King complained to David Lewis after noting an article in the Social Creditor describing an incident at Woodsworth House in Ottawa (Headquarters of the CCF) during which "The Red Flag" was sung. King urged more control over party activities and statements, whether official or not. Jack King to David Lewis, April 25, 1948. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76, f. 3.

26. For some of Walter Mentz's articles on "marxist" socialism, and the international situation, see his column in the People's Weekly, June 3, 1950; October 14, 1950; September 16, 1950; September 30, 1950; December 23, 1950; November 11, 1950; and October 28, 1950. Lorne Ingle was particularly incensed by Mentz's "tripe", acknowledging it as nothing more than "pure, unadulterated communist

propaganda." Lorne Ingle to Isabel MacMillan, June 9, 1950. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, vol. 76, f. 2. Lorne Ingle wrote an response to Mentz, to be published anonymously as a letter to the editor.

27. Isabel MacMillan to Lorne Ingle, June 20, 1950. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76, f. 2.

28. Resolution of the National Council, copied in Isabel MacMillan to Lorne Ingle, April 12, 1951. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76, f. 2.

29. Ibid.

30. Elmer Roper to Lorne Ingle, May 14, 1951. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76, f. 2. Conflicting evidence suggests that Elmer Roper attempted to sway Provincial Board members with the idea that the National Council had actually disapproved of restrictions on free discussion. In reality, the National Council went on record as not approving the publication of material opposed to CCF policies by regular contributors, and disapproved of "free discussion."

31. Lorne Ingle to Elmer Roper, May 17, 1951. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76, f. 2.

32. CCF Editorial Policy, attached to Ingle to Roper, May 17, 1951. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76, f. 2.

33. Lorne Ingle to Elmer Roper, May 17, 1951. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76, f. 2.

34. Appointed in November 1950 the committee consisted of Mary Crawford, Alex Calhoun, John Liebe, Les Harris, Harold Bronson and Norman P. Finnemore as chairman.

35. Report of the Alberta CCF Foreign Policy Committee, November 30, 1951. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 118. It called for the immediate Canadian and United Nations recognition of the People's Republic of China, agreement of the 38th Parallel as the border between North and South Korea, withdrawal of support from the government of South Korea, withdrawal of all United Nations troops from Korea, the return of Formosa to China, opposition to German rearmament, and support of NATO for economic and social reasons only.

36. Suggestions for the Reorientation of the CCF Program on International Affairs, submitted to the Alberta CCF Provincial Board by John P. Liebe, March 1951. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 16.

37. Ibid.

38. Norman Finnemore to Nellie Peterson, March 5, 1951; Alex Calhoun to Nellie Peterson, March 5, 1951. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 16.

39. William Irvine to John Liebe, February 28, 1951. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 16.

40. Minutes of the Alberta Provincial Executive, October 11, 1952. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 119.

41. Lorne Ingle to Isabel MacMillan, June 9, 1950. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76, f. 2.

42. Isabel MacMillan to Lorne Ingle, June 20, 1950. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76, f. 2.

43. Elmer Roper to Lorne Ingle, May 14, 1951. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76, f. 2.

44. Lorne Ingle to Isabel MacMillan, June 9, 1950. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76, f. 2.

45. Lorne Ingle to Elmer Roper, October 2, 1951. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 76, f. 2.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Elmer Roper to Lorne Ingle, October 17, 1951. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 103, 1951 file.

50. Harold E. Bronson to Chris Paterson, July 31, 1950. Bronson papers, Saskatoon.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. The basic introduction to the episode remains Anthony Mardiros, William Irvine: The Life of a Prairie Radical (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1979), pp. 234-239. Mardiros' source material was extremely limited and included the William Irvine papers at the Provincial Archives of Alberta and newspaper articles. The basic documentary sources can now be found in the (National) CCF Papers at the National Archives of Canada and the Alberta CCF Papers at the Glenbow Alberta Institute Archives in Calgary. The latter

includes a previously closed file on William Irvine. A more academic source is John Hart, "William Irvine and Radical Politics in Canada" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Guelph, 1972), pp. 281-284), Irvine's own observations in Live or Die with Russia (Edmonton: 1958) should not be overlooked for they provides an explanation of why the trip was undertaken and with what effect.

54. Interview with Harold E. Bronson, December 4, 1987. This assurance was not recorded in the party's documents, but was reported by Jack Leavens, secretary of the Edmonton C.C.F. to the Edmonton Journal. "Moscow Visit Causes Split", Edmonton Journal August 4, 1956, p. 21.

55. Edmonton Journal June 30, 1956, p. 2.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. For copies of the TASS news reports see NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, v. 77 William Irvine File.

59. "Remarkable Example of Democracy" [Statement by Leader of Social-Democrats on Visit to USSR and Supreme Soviet], Moscow Daily News No. 58 (1956), p. 1.; "Remarkable Example of Democracy in Action" [Leader of Group of Canadian Social Democrats in Kiev Gives His Impression of What He has Seen] Pravda July 20, 1956, p. 6. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 77, William Irvine File.

60. "CCF-er Praises Red Democracy", Edmonton Journal July 19, 1956, p. 6; "Executive of CCF Praises 'Democracy' in Red Parliament", Ottawa Journal July 19, 1956, p. 7.

61. "CCF Will Repudiate Irvine's Statement", Ottawa Journal July 20, 1956, p. 7; "To Query Irvine Pro-Red Quotes", Edmonton Journal July 20, 1956, p. 34.

62. "Soviet Communist Party Central Committee receives group of leaders of Alberta provincial organization of Canadian Social-Democratic Party", Pravda August 1, 1956, p. 1 and Ivestiia August 1, 1956, p. 2.; "Dinner at VOKS in honour of group of leaders of Alberta provincial organization of Canadian Social-Democratic Party", Ivestiia August 1, 1956, p. 4.; "We Arrived in the Soviet Union as Friends and We have Found Friendship Here", Moscow Daily News 62 (1956), p. 4; Pravda August 2, 1956, p. 4. The last item was transcribed, translated and provided to the members of the group. Bryon Tanner had a copy of it when he was interviewed by The Lethbridge Herald at the beginning of August, 1956. See "Local Man's Impressions of

Russia", The Lethbridge Herald August 11, 1956, pp. 9-10.

63. Lorne Ingle to Elmer Roper, August 9, 1956. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 77. William Irvine File.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Lorne Ingle to Elmer Roper, August 9, 1956. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 77. William Irvine File.

67. Jack Leavens to Lorne Ingle, August 22, 1956; Lorne Ingle to Elmer Roper, August 16, 1956. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 77, William Irvine File.

68. Jack Leavens to Lorne Ingle, August 22, 1956. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 77, William Irvine File. Interview with Harold E. Bronson, December 5, 1987.

69. Elmer Roper to Lorne Ingle, September 11, 1956. NAC MG 28.IV.1, CCF Papers, Vol. 77, William Irvine File.

70. Elmer Roper to Lorne Ingle, September 11, 1956; Lorne Ingle to Elmer Roper, September 14, 1956; Lorne Ingle to Elmer Roper, September 13, 1956; Roper to Lorne Ingle, September 18, 1956. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 77, William Irvine File.

71. Elmer Roper to William Irvine, September 19, 1956. NAC MG 28.IV.1, v. 77 William Irvine File. Elmer Roper to William Irvine, September 25, 1956. GAIA f. 285. NAC MG 28.IV.1 v. 6. Lorne Ingle to Elmer Roper, September 21, 1956. NAC MaG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 77, William Irvine File.

72. William Irvine to Norman Finnemore, October 24, 1956. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 285. Closed Irvine file.

73. Minutes of the Alberta CCF Provincial Board, November 10, 1956. GAIA M1722 Alberta CCF Papers, f. 285. Closed Irvine File.

74. Elmer Roper to Lorne Ingle, November 13, 1956. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 77, William Irvine file.

75. Ivor Dent to Lorne Ingle, November 11, 1956. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 77, William Irvine File.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid.

79. Lorne Ingle to Ivor G. Dent, November 12, 1956. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 77, William Irvine File.

80. John F. Milner to M.J. Coldwell, November 21, 1956. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 77, William Irvine file.

81. Ibid.

82. He cited the case of Alfred Froebel who replaced moderate John Liss on the Provincial Board for Jasper-Edson. Froebel had gained notoriety by suggesting that it was better for the CCF Executive to go to the Soviet Union than to attend the National Convention in Winnipeg.

83. Ibid.

84. Lorne Ingle to Elmer Roper, December 17, 1956. NAC MG 28.IV.1 CCF Papers, Vol. 77, William Irvine file.

85. Ibid.

REFERENCES

CHAPTER VI

1. Walter Young, *The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF 1932-51* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), and Leo Zakuta, *A Protest Movement Becalmed: A Study of Change in the CCF* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1964).

2. Dean E. McHenry, *The Third Force in Canada: The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, 1932-1948* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950).

3. Alan Whitehorn, "An Analysis of the Historiography of the CCF-NDP: The Protest Movement Becalmed Tradition" in Brennan, pp. 1-24.

4. Young, *Anatomy of a Party: the National CCF*, pp. 3-5.

5. David Laycock, *Populism and Democratic Thought in the Canadian Prairies*, pp. 140, 151-2, 207-208, 211-213.

6. Ibid, p. 152.

7. Ibid. Certainly the UFA and the CLP were political parties by 1932.

8. Ibid.

9. This conceptualization of what the author would call an "united front party" is supported theoretically and practically by Panebianco.

10. Ibid. Laycock's shift in terminology from "movement" to "party" throughout *Populism and Democratic Thought* is not conducive to his arguments that the CCF and Social Credit were populist movements.

11. This was the term given to Nellie Peterson, William Irvine and Harold Bronson by Grant Notley. See Larry Pratt, "Grant Notley: Politics as a Calling" in *Socialism and Democracy in Alberta: Essays in Honour of Grant Notley*, p. 9.

12. Ibid.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Primary Sources

A. Archival Collections

Glenbow Alberta Institute Archives (GAIA)

Alberta Co-operative Commonwealth Federation Papers
George C. Coote Papers (M 260)
Edward J. Garland (M 406)
Walter Norman Smith Papers (AS 663)
Henry E. Spencer Papers (AS 745)
United Farmers of Alberta Papers
E. Michaud (M 837)
Herbert E. Nichols (M 900)
Norman F. Priestley (M 1003)
Jack K. Sutherland Papers (M1199)
J. J. Bowlen Papers (M 118)
Calgary Trades and Labour Council Papers

Provincial Archives of Alberta (PAA)

Premiers Papers
Alf Farmilo Papers
William Irvine Papers
Grant Notley Papers
Alberta New Democratic Party Papers
Attorney General Department Records
Edmonton Trades and Labour Council Papers
Alberta Federation of Labour Papers
Alberta Provincial Police Records

National Archives of Canada (PAC)

CCF/NDP Archives (MG 28 IV 1)
J.S. Woodsworth Papers (MG 27 III C 7)
David Lewis Papers
M.J. Coldwell Papers (MG 27 III C 12)
Canadian Labour Party (MG 28 IV 9)
Co-operative Press Associates (MG 28 IV 176)
Norman F. Priestley Papers (MG 27 III D)
Henry E. Spencer Papers (MG 28 III C)
Communist Party of Canada Papers

University of Alberta Bruce Peel Special Collections
Co-operative Commonwealth Federation

Red Deer Regional Archives
Charles H. Snell Papers

B. Oral Interviews

Harold E. Bronson (December 13, 1987)

C. Taped Interviews

Glenbow Alberta Institute Archives

H. Spencer	Tape RCT-16 (1962)
J. A. Cameron	Tape RCT-17-1 (1961)
R. G. Reid	Tape RCT 17-1 (1961)
E. G. Garland	Tape RCT 19-1,2 (1961)
L. Proudfoot	Tape RCT 22-1,2 (1962)
J. R. Lore	Tape RCT 23 (1962)
R. Wood	Tape RCT 24 (1962)
G. Johnston	Tape RCT 37-1 (1962)
V. Kavaner	Tape RCT 63 (1969)
William Irvine	Tape RCT 68-1 (1961)
J. Brownlee	Tape RCT 14-1 (1961)

D. Newspapers

Alberta Labour News (Edmonton), 1919 - 1936.

Calgary Albertan, 1932 - 1962.

Calgary Herald, 1932 - 1962.

Commonwealth (Regina: CCF), 1953 - 1956.

Edmonton Journal, 1932 - 1962.

People's Weekly (Edmonton), 1936 - 1953.

Research Review. (Regina: CCF) June 1933 - March 1936.

The U.F.A. (Calgary) 1925 - 1935

Cotton Weekly (Toronto) 1907-1914

E. Published Sources

Alexander, W. H. *Taking the Fortress - And After. An Address on the CCF Delivered at the Annual Convention of the U.F.A.* (January 16, 1934) 8pp.

Bryden, Ken. *What is the CCF? A Brief Explanation in Question and Answer Form of the Origin, Nature and Aims of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation*. Ottawa: n.p., n.d. [c. 1939]

CCF Program in Saskatchewan. Regina: The Federation, 1943.

Coldwell, M. J.. For a Living Democracy. Ottawa: National Office of CCF, 1943.

Coldwell, M. J.. Left Turn, Canada. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1945.

Coldwell, M. J. Canadian Progressives on the March: the Story of the Rise of the CCF, League for Industrial Democracy. New York: League for Industrial Democracy, 1944.

Cooperative Commonwealth Federation. The CCF Can Do The Job! Toronto: CCF, 1949.

----------. CCF Handbook. Ottawa: CCF National Office, 1948.

----------. New Order Shall Arise: Statements on the Policy of the CCF in the Present Stuggle Against the Nazis and Fascists, Consisting of an Address by M. J. Coldwell. Ottawa: National Office, CCF, 1940.

-----------. Victory and Reconstruction: Study Outline. Vancouver: CCF BC Section, 1942.

Cooperative Coomonwealth Federation. National Convention. 12th (1952). Resolutions, CCF 12th National Convention, Toronto, Ont., August 6-8, 1952. Toronto: CCF, 1952.

Cooperative Commonwealth Federation. Ontario Section. The Farmer and the CCF. Toronto: CCF Ontario, 1946.

----------. Ontario Section. Planning for Freedom: 16 Lectures on the CCF, Its Policies and Program. Toronto: Ontario CCF, 1944.

----------. Ontario Section. 16th Convention, 1950. Program for Change. Toronto: CCF Ontario, 1950.

Cooperative Commonwealth Federation. Saskatchewan Section. CCF Program in Saskatchewan. Regina: The Federation, 1943.

The Decline and Fall of a Good Idea: CCF-NDP Manifestoes, 1932 to 1969. Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1974.

Douglas, T. C. The CCF and Total War. Ottawa: E. Cloutier, 1942.

For Victory and Reconstruction: CCF Policy Statement Adopted at the National Convention, July 29th, 1942. Ottawa: CCF National Office, 1942.

Irvine, William. The Brains We Trust. Toronto: Thomas Nelson,1935. [A Play]

----------. Can Capitalism Survive the War. Edmonton: Commercial Printers, 1943.

----------. Can Christians Vote for Capitalism? Ottawa: Labour Publishing, 1935.

----------. CCF Aims. Edmonton: Alberta CCF, 1944.

----------. The CCF Policy. Edmonton: CCF, 1944.

----------. CCF Provincial Policy: What the CCF Will Do for Alberta. Edmonton, CCF, 1944. 28pp.

----------. Cooperation or Catastrophe: An Interpretation of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation and its Policy. Ottawa, n.d.

----------. The Forces of Reconstruction: A Review of World Conditions Under Capitalism and the Forces Working Towards the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation. Ottawa: Labour Publications, 1934.

----------. Let Us Reason Together: An Appeal to Social Crediters and CCF. Edmonton: Commercial Printers, nd.

----------. Open Letters to Premier Aberhart. Edmonton: People's Weekly, 1936. [Reprinted from The People's Weekly, 25 January to 23 May 1936]

----------. Political Servants of Capitalism: Answering Lawson and Mackenzie King. Ottawa: Labour Publishers, 1933.

----------. Security or Abundance: The People Must Choose. Winnipeg: Contemporlary, 1944. 42pp.

----------. Is Socialism the Answer? The Intelligent Man's Guide to Basic Democracy. Winnipeg: Contemporary Publishers, 1945.

----------. The Strategy of Victory. Edmonton: People's Weekly, 1945.

----------. Take Profits Out of War: Suggestions as to How it May Be done in Canada. Edmonton: People's Weekly, 1936.

Kenny, Martin J. CCF shows its Hand. 3rd edition. Pickering, Ont.: Printers Guild, 1945.

Knowles, Stanley H. The New Party. Toronto: Mcclelland and Stewart, 1961.

League for Social Reconstruction. Social Planning for Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1935, 1975.

Lewis, David. Make This Your Canada: A Review of CCF History and Policy. Toronto: Central Canada Publishing Co., 1943.

II. Secondary Sources

A. Umpublished Theses

Anderson, Linda L. "Focus of Appeal in the Analysis of Political Parties and the Case of CCF/NDP." M.A. Thesis, University of Alberta, 1969.

Anderson, Owen. "The Alberta Social Credit Party: An Empirical Analysis of Membership, Characteristics, Participation and Opinion." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alberta, 1972.

Anton, Gordon A. "The Liberal Party in Alberta: An Organizational Case Study." M.A. Thesis, University of Calgary, 1972.

Armstrong, Myrtle M. "The Development of Trade Union Political Activity in the CCF." M.A. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1959.

Bernard, E. "The Rod Young Affair in the British Columbia CCF." M.A. dissertation, University of British Columbia, 1979.

Bernard, E. "The Development of the CCF/NDP into a Labour Party." Ph.D. dissertation, Simmon Fraser University, 1980.

Betke, Carl F. "The UFA, 1921-1935: The Relationship Between the Agricultural Organization and the Government of Alberta." M.A. Thesis, University of Alberta, 1971.

Bishop, B. "Impact of Regionalism on the New Democratic Party: A Case Study of the Confict between the Saskatchewan and Federal Parties, 1971 - 1982." Ph.D. dissertation, Queen's University, 1982.

Bronson, Harold E. "A Review of Legislation Pertaining to Petroleum Resources: Government of Alberta, 1935-1957." M.A. Thesis, Unviersity of Alberta, 1958.

Cameron, David M. "An Electoral Analysis of Democratic Socialism in Ontario: C.C.F.-N.D.P. Voting Patterns, 1934-1963." Phil.M. Thesis, University of Toronto, 1966.

Caplan, Gerald L. "The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Ontario, 1932-1945: A Study of Socialist and Anti-Socialist Politics." M.A. Thesis, University of Toronto, 1961.

Capling, M. A. "The Communist Party of Canada in Alberta 1922-1929." M.A. Thesis, University of Calgary, 1981.

Conway, J. F. "To Seek A Goodly Heritage: The Prairie Populist Response to the National Policy." Ph.D. dissertation, Simon Fraser University, 1978.

Crawford, Margaret Eleanor. "A Geographic Study of the Distribution of Population Change in Alberta. 1931-1961." M.A. Thesis, University of Alberta, 1962.

Davis, Bryn. "Ideology in the CCF-NDP." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Windsor, 1973.

Embree, David G. "Rise of the United Farmers of Alberta." M.A. Thesis, University of Alberta, 1956.

Engelmann, Frederick C. "The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation of Canada: A Study of Membership Participation in Party Policy Making." Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1954.

Falconer, Kenneth D. "Tommy Douglas, 1930-1944: A Case Study of Leadership and Social Structure." M.A. Thesis, University of Regina, 1978.

Fischer, Ray James. "Liberals in Alberta: Studying the Lessons of History." M.A. Thesis, University of Alberta, 1986.

Foster, F. L. "John Edward Brownlee: A Biography." Ph.D. dissertation, Queen's University, 1978.

Georgeson, Michael R. "A One-Party Dominant System: The Case of Alberta." M.A. Thesis, University of Calgary, 1974.

Goodfrey, William G. "The 1933 Regina Convention of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Waterloo, 1965.

Groome, Agnes Jean. "M. J. Coldwell and CCF Foreign Policy, 1932 - 1950." M.A. Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 1967.

Harper, Donald Calvin. "Secularization and Religion in Alberta." M.A. Thesis, University of Alberta, 1970.

Harrill, Ernest B. "The Structure of Organization and Power in Canadian Political Parties." Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1956.

Hart, John. "William Irvine and Radical Politics in Canada." Ph.D. Thesis, University of Guelph, 1972.

Hibel, Ronald S. "An Analytical Model of Political Ideology: the C.C.F. from Regina Manifesto to Winnipeg Declaration." Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1976.

Hill, Patrick George. "A Failure of Unity: Communist Party - CCF Relations in British Columbia, 1935 - 1939." M.A. Thesis, University of Victoria, 1977.

Hill, R. "Social Credit and the Press." M.A. Thesis, University of Alberta, 1977.

Hulmes, G. F. "The Senior Executive and the Fifteenth Alberta Legislature: A Study of the Social and Political Background of the Membership." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alberta, 1970.

Hutchinson, Roger. "The Fellowship for a Christian Social Order: A Social Ethical Analysis of a Christian Socialist Movement." Ph.D. dissertation, Victoria University, Toronto, 1975.

Jackson, A. "Populism, Class and Ideology: A Comparative Analysis of the CCF in Saskatchewan and Social Credit in Alberta." Ph.D. dissertation, University of British Columbia, 1978.

Jacques, John C. "Insurgency on the Canadian Prairies, 1918-1938." M.A. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1946.

Johnson, Myron. "The Failure of the CCF in Alberta: An Accident of History?" M. A. Thesis, University of Alberta, 1974.

Karas, K. P. "Labour and Coal in the Crowsnest Pass, 1925-1935." M.A. Thesis, University of Calgary, 1972.

Kawecki, T. "Canadian Socialism and the Origins of the CPC." M.A. Thesis, McMaster University, 1980.

King, Mona F. "Some Aspects of Post-War Migration to Edmonton, Alberta." M.A. Thesis, University of Alberta, 1971.

Kirkey, D. L. "The Student Christian Movement of Canada: Religion and Intellectuals Between the Two World Wars." Ph.D. dissertation, McMaster University, 1981.

Laycock, D. C. "Political Thought of William Irvine." M.A. Thesis, 1977.

LeDressay, D. "Changing Saskatchewan Political Economy and the Evolution of the NDP, 1944-1978." M.A. Thesis, University of Regina, 1980.

Levitt, Joseph. "The CCF and French Canadian 'Radical' Nationalism: A Comparison in Policy, 1933 - 1942." M.A. Thesis, University of Toronto, 1964.

Lopez, Duarte Muno. "The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Qubec: 1932-1950: A Study." M.A. Thesis, University of Toronto, 1983.

Lyons, William E. "The New Democratic Party in the Canadian Political System." Dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1966.

Malliah, Holavanahally Lingappa. "A Socio-Historical Study of the Legislators of Alberta, 1905-1967." Ph.D. Thesis, University of Alberta, 1970.

Manley, John. "Communism and the Canadian Working Class During the Great Depression: the Workers' Unity League, 1929-1936." Ph.D. dissertation, Dalhousie University, 1976.

Milnor, A. J. "Agrarian Protest in Saskatchewan, 1929 - 1948: Study in Ethnic Politics." Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke University, 1962.

Monkhouse, Bruce. "The Alberta New Democratic Party: Survival without Success." M.A. Thesis, University of Alberta, 1983.

Morley, John T. "The Politics of Socialist Secularization: A Biography of the Ontario CCF/NDP." Thesis, Queen's University, 1978.

Morrison, Lewis. "Trade Union Influence on the Ontario CCF-NDP Policy, 1957-1963." M.A. Thesis, Queen's University, 1975.

Ogmundson, Richard Lewis. "Social Class and Canadian Politics: A Reinterpretation." Ph.D. Thesis, University of Michigan, 1972.

Oliver, Thelma Isabel. "Aspects of Alienation in Alberta." Ph.D. Thesis, York University, 1974.

Phelan, William. "Radical Politics and Western Alienation: the Political Transformation of the Canadian Prairies." M.A. University of Calgary, 1977.

Reece, Bonnie Jean. "Leadership in the C.C.F. Party in Canada." M.A. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1955.

Roberts, Dorothy J. "Doctrine and Disunity in the B.C. Section of the CCF, 1932 - 1956." M.A. Thesis, University of Victoria, 1972.

Ross, David Philips. "The Causes of Labour Disputes in Alberta, 1955-1962." M.A. Thesis, University of Alberta, 1964.

Russell, B. "Western Alienation in Alberta in the 1930s." M.A. Thesis, University of Calgary, 1980.

Sanford, Thomas Michael. "The Politics of Protest: the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation and Social Credit League in British Columbia." Ph.D. dissertation, University of California Berkeley, 1961.

Sangster, Joan. "Canadian Women in Radical Politics and Labour, 1920-50." Ph.D. dissertation, McMaster University, 1984.

Schultz, Harold. "William Aberhart and the Social Credit Party: A Political Biography." Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1959.

Scratch, John Ronald. "Editorial Reaction of the Alberta Press to the Bennett Government, 1930-1935." M.A. Thesis, University of Alberta, 1968.

Serfaty, Meir. "Structure and Organization of Political Parties in Alberta, 1935-71." Ph.D. dissertation, Carleton University, 1977.

Shain, J. "Western Agrarian Revolt, The C.C.F. and the Social Gospel." M.A. Thesis, McMaster University, 1980.

Sievwright, Eric Colville. "The Effect of Petroleum Development on the Alberta Economy, 1947-1957." Ph.D. Thesis, McGill University, 1961.

Silverstein, Sanford. "The Rise, Ascendancy and Decline of the CCF of Saskatchewan." Ph.D. Dissertation, Washington University, 1968.

Sinclair, Peter. "Populism in Alberta and Saskatchewan: A Comparative Analysis of Social Credit and the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation." Ph.D. Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1972.

Skogstad, G. "The Political Ideologies and Behavior of Alberta Farmers." Ph.D. dissertation, University of British Columbia, 1976.

Smith, Mary Marcia. "The Ideological Relationship Between the United Farmers of Alberta and the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation." M.A. Thesis, McGill University, 1967.

Smith, Peter D. "UFA and the Ginger Group: Independent Political Action, 1919-1939." Ph.D. Thesis, University of Alberta, 1973.

Smith, S. G. D. "Politics and the Party System on the Three Prairie Provinces, 1917-1958." Thesis, Oxford University, 1950.

Stewart, I. "Labour Parties, Labour Unions and Labour Laws: A Comparative Analysis of B.C. and Manitoba." Dissertation, Queen's University, 1980.

Stolee, L. G. "Parliamentary Career of William Irvine, 1922-1935." M.A. University of Alberta, 1969.

Swan, J. B. "The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation." M.A. Thesis, Acadia University, 1950.

Taraska, Elizabeth Ann. "The Calgary Craft Union Movement." M.A. Thesis, University of Calgary, 1972.

Taylor, Georgina M. "Equal and Partner? An Examination of How Saskatchewan Women Reconciled their Activities for the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation and Traditional Roles for Women." M.A. Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 1983.

Warren, J. W. "From Pluralism to Pluralism: the Political Experience of Organized Labour in Saskatchewan from 1900 - 1938." M.A. Thesis, University of Regina, 1983.

Welch, T. D. "A Social Democratic Response to the Economic Crisis: The Federal New Democratic Party Reacts to the 1980s." M.A. Thesis, Carleton University, 1982.

Whalen, Hugh J. "Distinctive Legislation of the Government of Alberta, 1935-1950." M.A. Thesis, University of Alberta, 1951.

Wickerson, G. "Conflict in the B.C. CCF and the Connell Affair." M.A. Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1973.

Wilson, Bruce H. "The New Democratic Party of Canada: An Example of a Third Party Movement." Ph.D. dissertation, New School for Social Research, 1976.

Wiseman, Nelson. "A Political History of the Manitoba CCF-NDP." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1978

Young, Walter D. "The C.C.F. Party in Canada." Ph.D. Thesis, University of Toronto, 1964.

B. Articles

Andras, A. "The Government of a Central Labour Body." Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 13 (November 1947): 572-580.

Barnes, Samuel H. "Canadian Trade Unions, and the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation." Michigan Academy of Science, Arts and Letters 45 (1960): 251-264.

Betke, Carl F. "Farm Politics in an Urban Age: the Decline of the United Farmers of Alberta after 1921." Essays on Western History. Edited by Lewis H. Thomas. 1976.

----------. "The U.F.A.: Visions of a Cooperative Commonwealth." Alberta History 27 (Summer 1979):

Britnell, G. E. "Economics Effects of the War on the Prairie Economy." Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 9 (1945): 373-387.

----------. "The War and Canadian Wheat." Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 7 (1941): 397-413.

Bullen, John. "The Ontario Waffle and the Struggle for an Independent Socialist Canada: Conflict Within the NDP." Canadian Historical Review 74 (June 1983): 188-215.

Caplan, Gerald L. "The Failure of Canadian Socialism: the Ontario Experience, 1932-1945." Canadian Historical Review 44 (1963): 93-121.

"The CCF: It All Started Here." Alberta Democrat 9 (Summer 1982): 6.

Chi, N. H., and Perlin, G. C. "The New Democratic Party: A Party in Transition." In Party Politics in Canada. Edited by H. Thornburn. (1977). Pp. 177-187.

Conway, J. F. "The Saskatchewan CCF-NDP: Socialism By Steath." Briarpatch 12 (December 1983): 13-16.

Cross, Michael S. "Introduction." In The Decline and Fall of a Good Idea: CCF-NDP Manifestoes, 1932 to 1969. Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1974. Pp. 5-17.

Dobbin, Murray. "The Blurry Vision of the CCF-NDP." Brianpatch 12 (December 1983): 17-19.

Finkel, Alvin. "Obscure Origins: the Confused Early History of the Alberta CCF." In Building the Cooperative Commonwealth: Essays on the Democratic Socialist Tradition in Canada. Edited by J. Williams Brennan. Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1985. Pp. 99-122.

----------. "Populism and the Proletariat: Social Credit and the Alberta Working Class." Studies in Political Economy 13 (1984): 109-135.

----------. "The Rise and Fall of the Labour Party in Alberta, 1917-1942." Labour/Le Traval 16 (Fall 1985): 61-96.

----------. "Social Credit and the Unemployed." Alberta History 31 (1983): 24-32.

Forsey, E. A. "Remembering Regina: Memoir by Eugene Forsey." Saturday Night 98 (July 1983): 24-6.

Godfrey, W. G. "The C.C.F. in Ottawa, Ontario and the Maritimes." Acadiensis 3 (Spring 1974): 99-105.

Gordon, J. King. "A Christian Socialist in the 1930s." In The Social Gospel in Canada. Edited by Richard Allen. Ottawa: National Museums, 1975.

Hannant, Larry. "The Calgary Working Class and the Social Credit Movement in Alberta, 1932-35." Labour/Le Travail 16 (Fall 1985): 97-116.

Hart, Keith. "Military Aid to Edmonton." Alberta History 31 (Summer 1983): 35-8.

Heron, Craig. "The Ballot Box Blues: Canadian Labour and Politics." Canadian Dimension 17 (July 1983): 27-31.

Horn, Michael. "F. R. Scott, the Great Depression and the League for Social Reconstruction." In On F. R. Scott. Edited by Sandra Djwa and R. St. J. Macdonald. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1983. Pp. 71-7.

----------. "Frank Underhill's Early Drafts of the Regina Manifesto, 1933." Canadian Historical Review 54 (December 1973): 393-418.

----------. "The League for Social Reconstruction and the Development of a Canadian Socialism, 1932-1936." Journal of Canadian Studies 7 (November 1972): 3-17.

----------. "The LSR, the CCF and the Regina Manifesto." In Building the Cooperative Commonwealth: Essays on the Democratic Socialist Tradition in Canada. Edited by J. Williams Brennan. Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1985. 1985. Pp. 25-41.

Irving, John A. "Prairie Ideals and Loyalties: the Politics of Revolt." Queen's Quarterly 63 (1956): 88-200.

Johnson, Myron. "The Failure of the CCF in Alberta: An Accident of History." Society and Politics in Alberta: Research Papers. Toronto: Methuen, 1979.

Kirkconnell, W. "Canadian Communists and the Comintern." Royal Society of Canada Transactions 3rd Series, 42 (1948): 91-105.

Levine, Gilbert. "Patrick Lenihan and the Alberta Miners." Labour/Le Travail 16 (Fall 1985): 166-178.

Long, J. A., and Quo, F. Q. "Alberta: One Party Dominance." Canadian Provincial Politics (1972).

MacPherson, C. B. "Democracy in Alberta: A Reply." Canadian Forum 34 (January 1955): 223-225.

MacPherson, Ian. "The CCF and the Cooperative Movement in the Douglas Years: An Uneasy Alliance." In Building the Cooperative Commonwealth: Essays on the Democratic Socialist Tradition in Canada. Edited by J. Williams Brennan. Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1985. Pp. 181-203.

----------. "The 1945 Collapse of the C.C.F. in Windsor." Ontario History 61 (1969): 197-212.

Masson, Jack, and Blackie, Peter. "Labour Politics in Alberta." In Society and Politics in Alberta: Research Papers. Toronto: Methuen, 1979.

McNaught, Kenneth W. "CCF: Town and Country." Queen's Quarterly 61 (Summer 1954): 213-219.

McNaught, Kenneth W. "J.S. Woodsworth and a Political Party for Labour, 1896-1921." Canadian Historical Review 30 (1949/50): 123-143.

McNaughton, Kenneth W. "Socialism and the Canadian Political Tradition." In On F. R. Scott. Edited by Sandra Djwa and R. St. J. Macdonald. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1973. Pp. 89-100.

Monod, David. "The End of Agrarianism: The Fight for Farm Parity in Alberta and Saskatchewan, 1935-1948." Labour/Le Travail 16 (Fall 1985): 117-144.

Nichol, Christina J. "In Pursuit of the Voter: The British Columbia CCF, 1945-1950." In Building the Cooperative Commonwealth: Essays on the Democratic Socialist Tradition in Canada. Edited by J. Williams Brennan. Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1985. Pp. 123-139.

"1935: The First Electoral Challenge." Alberta Democrat 9 (Summer 1982): 11.

"1959: Moving to Form a New Party." Alberta Democrat 9 (Summer 1982): 20.

Pitsula, Jim. "The CCF Government in Saskatchewan and Socialist Aid, 1944-1964." In Building the Cooperative Commonwealth: Essays on the Democratic Socialist Tradition in Canada. Edited by J. Williams Brennan. Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1985. Pp. 205-225.

Pringle, Heather. "Alberta's Red Scare." Edmonton 4 (May 1983): 16-19, 21.

Redlin, Blair. "William Irvine: A Distinctive Western Canadian." Alberta Democrat 9 (Summer 1982): 12-15.

Rusch, R. A. "Political Thought of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation." Journal of Politics 12 (August 1950): 547-569.

Sangster, Joan "Women and the New Era: The Role of Women in the Early CCF, 1933-1940." In Building the Cooperative Commonwealth: Essays on the Democratic Socialist Tradition in Canada. Edited by J. Williams Brennan. Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1985. Pp. 69-97.

Schultz, Harold. "A Second Term, 1940." Alberta Historical Review 10 (Winter 1962): 17-26.

Seymour, Lipset Martin. "Democracy in Alberta: Review Article (Part 1)." Canadian Forum 34 (November 1954): 175-7.

----------. "Democracy in Alberta: Review Article (Part 2)." Canadian Forum 34 (December 1954): 196-8.

Sinclair, Peter "The Saskatchewan CCF and the Communist Party in the 1930s." Saskatchewan History 26 (Winter 1973): 1-10.

----------. "The Saskatchewan CCF: Ascent to Power and the Decline of Socialism." Canadian Historical Review 54 (December 1973).

Smart, John. "Populist and Socialist Movements in Canadian History." In Canada Ltd. (1973)

Socknat, Thomas P. "The Pacifist Background of the Early CCF." In Building the Cooperative Commonwealth: Essays on the Democratic Socialist Tradition in Canada. Edited by J. Williams Brennan. Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1985. Pp. 57-67.

Stolee, Paul T. "Towards an Understanding of Alberta Provincial Politics." Edmonton: University of Alberta, 1971. Manuscript. Provincial Library.

Swankey, Ben. "Reflections of a Communist, 1935 Election." Alberta History 28 (1980)

Taylor, Georgina M. "The Women ... Shall Help to Lead the Ways: Saskatchewan CCF-NDP Women Candidates in Provincial and Federal Elections, 1934-1965." In Building the Cooperative Commonwealth: Essays on the Democratic Socialist Tradition in Canada. Edited by J. Williams Brennan. Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1985. Pp. 141-160.

Thomas, L. H. "The CCF Victory in Saskatchewan, 1944." Saskatchewan History 33 (Winter 1981).

Thompson, L. "The Rise of Labor Unionism in Alberta." (Unpublished Paper for Eugene Forsey). Alberta Department of Labour Library, 1965.

Thompson, Laurie. "Bread box Unionism and Ballot Box Policies: Why the NDP cannot be made into a Labor Party." Brairpatch 12 (December 1983): 23-4.

Underhill, Frank H. "CCF, Nato and West Germany." Canadian Forum 34 (March 1955): 265, 274.

"Walter Stevens: We'd Like to See A System Based on Fair Play." Alberta Democrat 9 (Summer 1982): 18-19.

Waywitka, Anne B. "Recollections of a Union Man." Alberta History 23 (Autumn 1975): 6-20.

Whitehorn, Alan. "An Analysis of the Historiography of the CCF- NDP, the Protest Movement Becalmed Tradition." In Building the Cooperative Commonwealth: Essays on the Democratic Socialist Tradition in Canada. Edited by J. Williams Brennan. Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1985. Pp. 1-24.

Young, Walter D. "Ideology and Personality and the Origins of the CCF in British Columbia." BC Studies 32 (Winter 1976-77): 139-162.

C. Books

Abella, Irving. Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973.

Allen, Richard. The Social Passion. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1971.

Avakumovic, Ivan. Socialism in Canada. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978.

Barr, John J. The Dynasty: The Rise and Fall of Social Credit in Alberta. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974.

Bellamy, D.; Pammett, J; and Rowat, D. Provincial Party Systems. Toronto: Methuen, 1976.

Bradley, Michael. Crisis of Clarity: The New Democratic Party and the Quest for the Holy Grail. Toronto: Summerhill Press, 1985.

Brennan, J. Williams, ed. Building the Cooperative Commonwealth: Essays on the Democratic Socialist Tradition in Canada. Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1985.

Britnell, G. E., and Fowke, V. Canadian Agriculture in War and Peace. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962.

Caplan, Gerald L. The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism: The CCF in Ontario, 1932-1945. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975.

Caragata, Warren. Alberta Labor: A Heritage Untold. Toronto: 1979.

Cook, R. J. E. The UFA Experiment, 1920-1935: A Personal Recollection. Edmonton: Alberta Woodsworth House Association, 1985.

Christian, William, and Campbell, Colin. Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada: Liberals, Conservatives, Socialists, Nationalists. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1983.

Finkel, Alvin. The Social Credit Phenomenon in Alberta. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989.

Hooke, Alfred J. 30 + 5: I Know, I Was There. Edmonton: 1971.

Horowitz, Gad. Canadian Labour in Politics. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968.

Irving, John A. The Social Credit Movement in Alberta. Toronto: Univeristy of Toronto Press, 1959.

Knowles, Stanley H. The New Party. Toronto: Mcclelland and Stewart, 1961.

Laycock, David. Populism and Democratic Thought in the Canadian Prairies 1910 to 1945. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990.

Lazarus, Morden. The Long Winding Road: Canadian Labour in Politics. Vancouver: Boag Foundation, 1977.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. Agrarian Socialism: the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan: A Study of Political Sociology. Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1950.

----------. Agrarian Socialism: the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan; A Study of Political Sociology. Rev. ed. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1968.

s, David. The Good Fight: Political Memoirs, 1909-1958. Toronto: Macmillan, 1981.

MacInnis, Grace. J.S. Woodsworth: A Man to Remember. Toronto: Macmillan, 1953.

Mardiros, Anthony. William Irvine: the Life of a Prairie Radical. Toronto: James Lorimer, 1979, McHenry, Dean E. The Third Force in Canada: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation 1932 - 1948. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1950.

McNaught, Kenneth W. A Prophet in Politics: A Biography of J. S. Woodsworth. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959.

MacPherson, C. B. Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953.

Morley, John T. Secular Socialists: The CCF/NDP in Ontario: A Biography. Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1984.

Palmer, Howard and Tamara Palmer. Alberta: A New History. Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1990.

Penner, Norman. The Canadian Left: A Critical Analysis. Scarborough: 1977.

Pratt, Larry, Edited. Essays in Honour of Grant Notley: Socialism and Democracy in Alberta. Edmonton: NeWest Press, 1986.

Priestly, Norman F., and Swindlehurst, E. B. Furrows, Faith and Fellowship. Edmonton: Coop Press, 1967.

Richards, John, and Pratt, Larry. Prairie Capitalism: Power and Influence in the New West. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979.

Robin, M., ed. Canadian Political Politics. 2nd Edition. Toronto: Prentice Hall, 1978.

Rolph, W. K. Henry Wise Wood of Alberta. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950.

Thorburn, Hugh C. Party Politics in Canada. Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1972. 3rd Edition.

Watkins, Ernest. The Gold Province: A Political History of Alberta. Calgary, 1980.

Weinrich, Peter. Social Protest from the Left in Canada: 1870-1970: A Bibliography. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982.

Wiseman, Nelson. Social Democracy in Manitoba: A History of the CCF-NDP. Winnipeg: University of Toronto Press, 1983.

Young, Walter D. Democracy and Discontent: Progessivism, Socialism and Social Credit in the Canadian West. Toronto: McGraw-Hill/Ryerson, 1978.

Zakuta, Leo. A Protest Movement Becalmed: A Study of a Change in the C.C.F. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964.

D. Theoretical Literature

Anderson, Perry. "Communist Party History". In People's History and Socialist Theory. Edited by Raphael Samuel London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981.

Apter, David E. "A Comparative Method for the Study of Politics". American Journal of Sociology 64 (November 1958). Pp. 221-237.

Blau, Peter. The Dynamics of Bureaucracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955.

Blau, Peter and Richard Schoenherr. The Structure of Organizations. New York: Basic Books, 1971.

Brown, Michael E. "Issues in the Historiography of Communism: Part One". Socialism and Democracy 4 (Spring/Summer 1987). Pp. 7-38

----------. "Issues in the Historiography of Communism: Part Two: Some Principles of Critical Analysis". Socialism and Democracy 5 (Fall/Winter 1987). Pp. 1-34.

Cohen, Ira. Structuration Theory: Anthony Giddens and the Constitution of Social Life. New York: Macmillan, 1989.

Collins, Randall. Theoretical Sociology. Orlando: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988.

Crotty, William "A Perspective for the Comparative Analysis of Political Parties". Comparative Political Studies 3 (1970).

----------. "The Party Organization and Its Activities". In Approaches to the Study of Party Organization. Edited by William J. Crotty. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968. Pp. 247-306.

Downs, Anthony An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper, 1957.

Duverger, Maurice. Political Parties. New York: John Wiley, 1954.

Eldersveld, Samuel J. Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis Chicago: McNally, 1964.

Epstein, Leon D. Political Parties in Western Democracies. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.

Giddens, Anthony. Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis. London: Macmillan, 1979.

----------. Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987.

----------. New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretative Sociologies. London: Hutchinson, 1976.

----------. Sociology. London: Polity Press, 1989.

Giddens, Anthony and Turner, Jonathan, H., eds. Social Theory Today. Oxford: Polity Press, 1987.

Gross, Feliks. The Revolutionary Party: Essays in the Sociology of Politics. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1974.

Guttsman, W.L. The German Social Democratic Party, 1875-1933: From Ghetto to Government. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981.

Huntington, S. "Political Development and Political Decay". World Politics 17 (April 1965).

Janda, Kenneth. A Conceptual Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Political Parties. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1970.

Jenson, Jane. The View From Inside: A French Communist Cell in Crisis. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.

Lasswell, Harold D. and Abraham Kaplan. Power and Society: Framework for Political Enquiry. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.

Le Blanc, Paul. Lenin and the Revolutionary Party. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1990.

McKenzie,Robert T. British Political Parties: The Distribution of Power Within the Conservative and Labour Parties. London: Heinemann, 1963.

Michels, Robert. Political Parties: A Sociological Study of Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. New York: Dover Publications, 1959.

Michels, Robert. "Some Reflections on the Sociological Character of Political Parties". American Political Science Review 21 (1927). Pp. 753-71.

Mouzelis, Nicos P. Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialization in the Balkans and Latin America. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986.

Münch, Richard. "Parsonian Theory Today: In Search of a New Synthesis". In Social Theory Today. Edited by Anthony Giddens and Jonathan H. Turner. London: Polity Press, 1987.

Norton, Mary. Social Democracy and Society: Working Class Radicalism in Dusseldorf, 1890-1920. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Ostrogorski, M. Y. Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties. London: Macmillan, 1902.

Panebianco, Angelo. Political Parties Organization and Power. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Parsons, Talcott. The Structure of Social Action New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937.

Penner, Norman. Canadian Communism: The Stalin Years and Beyond. Toronto: Methuen, 1988.

----------. The Canadian Left, A Critical Analysis Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1977.

Perrow, Charles. Complex Organizations, A Critical Essay. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1986.

Pinard, Maurice. "The Rise of a Third Party: The Social Credit Party in Quebec in the 1962 Federal Elections", Ph.D. dissertation, John Hopkins University, 1967.

Pridham, Geoffrey. Political Parties and Coalitional Behaviour in Italy. London: Routledge, 1988.

Riggs, Fred Warren. Administrative Reform and Political Responsiveness: A Theory of Dynamic Balancing. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1970.

Robertson, David. A Theory of Party Competition, London: Wiley, 1976.

Rokkan, Stein. Citizens, Elections, Parties. Approaches to the Study of the Processes of Development. Oslo: Universitesforlaget, 1970.

Sartori, Giovanni. Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Volume 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Schlesinger, James. "The Primary Goals of Political Parties: A Clarification of Positive Theory". American Political Science Review 69 (1975). Pp. 840-849.

Schumpeter, Joseph A. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy New York: Harper, 1950

Shell, K.L. The Transformation of Austrian Socialism. New York: State University of New York, 1962.

Waisman, Carlos H. Modernization and the Working Class: The Politics of Legitimacy. Austin: University of Austin Press, 1982.

Ware, Alan. Political Parties: Electoral Change and Structural Response. London: Basil Blackwell, 1987.

Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York: Oxford University Press, 1922.922.

APPENDICES

Table 1

Alberta Provincial General Election of March 1940

	Votes	Percent	Seats
Social Credit	132 507	42.90%	36
CCF	34 316	11.11%	0
Independent	131 172	42.47%	19
Labour	3 258	1.05%	1
Liberal	2 755	.89%	1
Other	4 856	1.57%	0
Total	308 864	100%	57

Popular Support (Percent) in Regions

	North	Central	South
Social Credit	44.79%	46.62%	46.39%
CCF	17.15%	16.77%	3.14%
Independent	29.37%	32.14%	49.17%
Other	8.69%	4.47%	1.30%

	Urban	Rural
Social Credit	35.25%	46.39%
CCF	8.69%	12.21%
Independent	54.29%	36.14%
Other	1.77%	5.26%

	Calgary	Edmonton
Social Credit	37.14%	32.67%
CCF	9.03%	9.75%
Independent	53.29%	54.25%
Other	.55%	3.33%

Source: Alberta Chief Electoral Officer. A Report on Alberta Elections, 1905-1982 (Edmonton: Chief Electoral Officer, 1983). Statistical calculations are those of the author.

Table 2

Alberta Provincial General Election of August 1944

	Votes	Percent	Seats
Social Credit	146 367	51.88%	51
CCF	70 307	24.92%	2
Independents	47 239	16.75%	3
LPP	12 003	4.26%	0
Other	6 190	2.19%	1
Total	282 106	100%	57

Popular Support (Percent) in Regions

	North	Central	South
Social Credit	51.17%	57.57%	48.15%
CCF	26.31%	27.93%	21.63%
Independent	12.03%	9.68%	25.59%
LPP	6.32%	4.82%	2.28%
Other	4.17%	2.35%	

	Rural	Urban
Social Credit	55.92%	42.28%
CCF	26.04%	22.27%
Independent	12.26%	27.44%
LPP	4.45%	3.78%
Other	1.33%	4.23%

	Calgary	Edmonton
Social Credit	38.27%	49.88%
CCF	23.58%	20.75%
Independent	34.96%	18.24%
LPP	3.19%	4.44%
Other		9.34%

Source: Alberta Chief Electoral Officer. A Report on Alberta Elections, 1905-1982 (Edmonton: Chief Electoral Officer, 1983). Statistical calculations are those of the author.

Table 3

Federal General Election of 1945
Alberta Situation

	Votes	Percent	Seats
Conservative	58 077	18.69%	2
Liberal Party	67 662	21.77%	2
CCF	57 077	18.37%	0
LPP	14 137	4.55%	0
Social Credit	113 821	36.63%	13
Total	310 773	100% 17	

	North	Central	South
Conservative	8.69%	16.18%	18.86%
Liberal Party	27.31%	15.16%	19.51%
CCF	17.24%	20.77%	15.83%
LPP	8.26%	3.21%	4.11%
Social Credit	38.49%	44.82%	41.69%

	Urban	Rural
Conservative	27.25%	14.73%
Liberal Party	24.07%	20.71%
CCF	19.57%	17.81%
LPP	3.27%	4.18%
Social Credit	25.84%	41.62%

	Calgary	Edmonton
Conservative	34.86%	20.05%
Liberal Party	20.45%	27.49%
CCF	19.42%	19.71%
LPP	3.06%	3.46%
Social Credit	22.21%	29.29%

Source: Alberta Chief Electoral Officer. A Report on Alberta Elections, 1905-1982 (Edmonton: Chief Electoral Officer, 1983). Statistical calculations are those of the author.

Table 4

Alberta Provincial General Election of August 1948

	Votes	Percent	Seats
Social Credit	164 003	55.63%	51
CCF	56 387	19.14%	2
Independent	9 014	3.05%	1
LPP	1 372	.47%	0
Liberal	52 655	17.86%	2
Other	11,362	3.85%	1
TOTAL	294 793	100%	57

Popular Support (Percent) in Regions

	North	Central	South
Social Credit	53.01%	58.72%	53.74%
CCF	23.62%	24.73%	10.72%
Independent	.04%	------	4.03%
LPP	------	------	1.25%
Liberal	20.56%	14.25%	18.30%
Other	------	2.30%	11.96%

	Rural	Urban
Social Credit	57.37%	50.11%
CCF	20.69%	15.99%
Independent	1.71%	1.32%
LPP	.44%	.53%
Liberal	16.86%	19.87%
Other	2.93%	12.18%

	Calgary	Edmonton
Social Credit	46.10%	54.49%
CCF	11.87%	19.59%
Independent	15.90%	-----
LPP	1.45%	-----
Liberal	20.98%	20.02%
Other	3.66%	5.90%
TOTAL	35,532	46150

Source: Alberta Chief Electoral Officer. A Report on Alberta Elections, 1905-1982 (Edmonton: Chief Electoral Officer, 1983). Statistical calculations are those of the author.

Table 5

Differences between 1944 and 1948 Provincial General Elections

	1944 Prov. Elect.		1948 Prov. Elect.	
Social Credit	146 367	51.88%	164 003	55.63%
CCF	70 307	24.92%	56 387	19.14%
Independents	47 239	16.75%	9 014	3.05%
LPP	12 003	4.26%	1 372	.47%
Liberal	------	------	52 655	17.86%
Other	6 190	2.19%	11 362	3.85%
Total	282 106	100%	294 793	100%

	North		Central	
	1944	1948	1944	1948
Social Credit	51.17%	53.01%	57.57%	58.72%
CCF	26.31%	23.62%	27.93%	24.73%
Independent	12.03%	.04%	9.68%	------
LPP	6.32%	------	4.82%	------
Liberal	------	20.56%	------	14.25%
Other	4.17%	------	2.30%	------

	South	
	1944	1948
Social Credit	48.15%	53.74%
CCF	21.63%	10.72%
Independent	25.59%	4.03%
LPP	2.28%	1.25%
Liberal	------	18.30%
Other	2.35%	11.96%

	Rural		Urban	
	1944	1948	1944	1948
Social Credit	55.92%	57.37%	42.28%	50.11%
CCF	26.04%	20.69%	22.27%	15.99%
Independent	12.26%	1.32%	27.44%	1.32%
LPP	4.45%	.53%	3.78%	.53%
Liberal	------	16.86%	------	19.87%
Other	1.33%	2.93%	4.23%	12.18%

Source: Alberta Chief Electoral Officer. A Report on Alberta Elections, 1905-1982 (Edmonton: Chief Electoral Officer, 1983). Statistical calculations are those of the author.

Table 5 (Continued)

Differences between 1944 and 1948 Provincial General Elections

	Calgary		Edmonton	
	1944	1948	1944	1948
Social Credit	38.27%	46.10%	49.88%	54.49%
CCF	23.58%	11.87%	20.75%	19.59%
Independent	34.96%	15.90%	18.24%	------
LPP	3.19%	1.45%	4.44%	------
Liberal	------	20.98%	------	20.02%
Other	------	5.90%	9.34%	5.90%

Table 6

Provincial General Elections of 1952, 1955 and 1959

1952 Provincial General Election

	Votes	Percent	Candidates	Seats
Social Credit	167 789	56.24%	61	53
CCF	41 929	14.05%	41	2
Liberal	66 738	22.37%	55	3
Conservative	10 971	3.68%	12	2
Other	10 908	3.66%	14	1
TOTAL	298 335	100%		61

1955 Provincial General Election

	Votes	Percent	Candidates	Seats
Social Credit	175 553	46.42%	63	37
CCF	31 180	8.24%	38	2
Liberal	117 741	31.13%	53	15
Conservative	34 757	9.19%	26	3
Other	18 948	5.01%	23	4
TOTAL	378 179	100%		61

Source: Alberta Chief Electoral Officer. A Report on Alberta Elections 1905-1982 (Edmonton: Chief Electoral Officer, 1983). Statistical calculations are those of the author.

Table 6 (Continued)

1959 Provincial General Election

	Votes	Percent	Candidates	Seats
Social Credit	230 283	55.69%	64	61
CCF	17 899	4.33%	32	0
Liberal	57 408	13.88%	51	1
Conservative	98 730	23.88%	64	1
Other	9 196	2.22%	9	2
TOTAL	413 516	100%		65

Table 7

Comparative Analysis of CCF Electoral Support For 1952, 1955 and 1959 Provincial General Elections

Northern Alberta

	1952	1955	1959
Social Credit	48.75%	46.35%	54.61%
CCF	20.00%	9.24%	3.20%
Liberal	28.62%	39.56%	21.34%
Conservative	-----	.88%	20.56%
Other	2.63%	3.97%	.29%

Central Alberta

	1952	1955	1959
Social Credit	57.15%	47.22%	55.98%
CCF	18.91%	14.68%	6.38%
Liberal	18.70%	26.57%	11.30%
Conservative	------	9.53%	23.76%
Other	5.24%	2.00%	2.58%

Southern Alberta

	1952	1955	1959
Social Credit	71.75%	56.99%	66.28%
CCF	1.83%	2.08%	1.10%
Liberal	25.18%	28.73%	12.29%
Conservative	------	1.71%	17.61%
Other	1.24%	10.49%	2.72%

Table 7 (Continued)

Comparative Analysis of CCF Electoral Support For 1952, 1955 and 1959 Provincial General Elections

Urban Areas

	1952	1955	1959
Social Credit	52.94%	41.84%	52.89%
CCF	12.73%	6.89%	4.69%
Liberal	20.08%	32.53%	13.88%
Conservative	10.26%	17.46%	28.32%
Other	3.99%	1.28%	.22%

Rural Areas

	1952	1955	1959
Social Credit	58.14%	49.95%	58.20%
CCF	14.81%	9.29%	4.01%
Liberal	23.67%	31.92%	14.93%
Conservative	------	2.77%	19.91%
Other	3.38%	6.07%	2.95%

Calgary

	1952	1955	1959
Social Credit	54.88%	40.30%	54.61%
CCF	9.10%	4.21%	3.03%
Liberal	12.68%	27.76%	13.50%
Conservative	15.05%	26.06%	28.86%
Other	8.29%	1.67%	------

Edmonton

	1952	1955	1959
Social Credit	46.17%	39.13%	47.93%
CCF	18.86%	9.17%	7.01%
Liberal	24.35%	40.74%	16.48%
Conservative	9.03%	9.56%	28.08%
Other	1.59%	1.40%	.50%

Source: Alberta Chief Electoral Officer. A Report on Alberta Elections 1905-1982 (Edmonton: Chief Electoral Officer, 1983). Statistical calculations are those of the author.

Table 8

Comparative Table of CCF Support
1940 - 1959

	1940	1944	1948	1952	1955	1959
Province	11.11%	24.92%	19.14%	14.05%	8.24%	4.33%
North	17.15%	26.31%	23.62%	20.00%	9.24%	3.20%
Central	16.77%	27.93%	24.73%	18.91%	14.68%	6.38%
South	3.14%	21.63%	10.72%	1.83%	2.08%	1.10%
Urban	8.69%	23.27%	15.99%	12.73%	6.89%	4.69%
Rural	12.21%	26.01%	20.69%	14.81%	9.29%	4.01%
Calgary	9.03%	23.58%	11.87%	9.10%	4.21%	3.03%
Edmonton	9.75%	20.75%	19.59%	18.86%	9.17%	7.01%

Source: Alberta Chief Electoral Officer. *A Report on Alberta Elections 1905-1982* (Edmonton: Chief Electoral Officer, 1983). Statistical calculations are those of the author.